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Introduction
Sovereignty establishes boundaries. Virtually the entire planet is divided into states 
that claim sovereignty, separating humanity into British, Americans, Japanese and so 
on. When people try to understand the world, the study of domestic politics and 
society is separated from the study of international relations, with the concept of 
sovereignty lying between them. We live, both practically and intellectually, in the 
world created by this ‘inside/outside’.* Sovereignty has often been taken for granted 
as a natural feature of society. But now it seems to be in transition. It is widely 
argued that social changes are breaking down the barriers between sovereign states, 
and that the divisions that sovereignty enforced are illegitimate and undesirable. The 
claim that the study of politics and international relations must be divided into 
different academic specialities is no longer so persuasive. The idea that globalisation 
is undermining the ability of states to determine their own affairs is now 
commonplace. States that once aggressively defended their sovereignty now 
sunender it more or less willingly to international institutions like the European 
Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. In civil society, nationalism 
is not the force it once was in the Western world and there is now a plethora of voices 
calling for the subordination of sovereignty to cosmopolitan values and ethical norms.
Many recent approaches to International Relations from a wide variety of 
perspectives have tended to disparage the normative value of sovereignty, associating 
it with negative connotations such as irredentism, aggressive nationalism, 
particularism, autarchy and internal repression. Although such approaches cannot be 
assimilated into a common agenda, they shaie a broad outlook that disparages the 
virtues of traditional ways of approaching sovereignty. This thesis, by contrast will 
seek to uphold the idea of the self-determination of collective subjects -  which I shall 
understand as the purpose of sovereignty - as the best way under current 
circumstances for a progressivist, democratic politics to develop.
Of course, I should emphasise at the outset that I am not arguing that there are no 
changes taking place at all in the way sovereignty is understood and practised. The 
dispute is about what underlies them and what they mean. Among those who accept 
that these changes are taking place, two main sets of explanation can be discerned. 
Both are sometimes linked under the rubric of globalisation, but one emphasises 
teclinological and economic change, and the other sees changing ideas about the 
rightful sphere of politics and developing cosmopolitan ethics as the main driving 
force. The aim of this study is to dispute both of these explanations by providing an 
account both of shifting perceptions of sovereignty and a defence of the idea of 
sovereignty understood as a certain kind of right. To do this, I trace both the 
academic discussion and the political practice of sovereignty focusing on the place 
where these issues have most purchase, the field of International Relations. I start 
hom the thesis that two political processes must be understood in order to grasp these 
changes; the first is that third world liberation is no longer on the political agenda and 
the second is that nationalism has ceased to be an organising principle for Western 
states. Western liberals have lost sympathy for third world regimes, and since the 
achievement of formal independence no viable movements have emerged in the third 
world to counter western hegemony. As a result, intervention in the third world is 
now commonplace, and in some areas the state administration is simply not a viable 
administrative unit.2 Meanwhile, Western states are willing to pool their sovereignty 
in organisations like the European Union because the defence of their independence is 
no longer a pressing issue as nationalism has moved from a dominant ideology to a 
fringe issue. In the literature of International Relations the discussion of these issues 
is often confused because it is caught up in arcane theoretical disputes. A large part 
of this study is accordingly devoted to establishing and explaining the shortcomings 
of other approaches to sovereignty.
‘ The term is RBJ Walker’s. See his Inside/Outside: International Relations as po litica l theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Walker is especially interesting on sovereignty and I 
will return to his arguments in a later chapter
 ^Robert H. Jackson Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990)
Yet for all its centrality, there is little consensus about its meaning, history and, 
increasingly, its legitimacy. Scholars have constructed theories and histories around 
it, and political actors have argued and fought over its meaning and significance. For 
much of the early modem period, since its emergence in something like its modem 
form in the sixteenth and seventeenth century,^ it became central both to the claims of 
absolutist monarchy and its opponents. During the enlightenment, sovereignty 
became a radical claim against despotism."^ In the twentieth century sovereignty was 
slowly democratised, as the colonies that the great powers had acquired during the 
nineteenth century began to assert their own sovereignty against their colonial 
masters.^ As we enter the twenty-first century, however, sovereignty is under attack. 
The experiments in independence that decolonisation bred appear to have been a 
catastrophic failure, with despotic mle and economic underdevelopment the rule and 
successful independence very much the exception. Those very same radicals who 
joined in solidarity with anti-imperialists abroad have now repudiated sovereignty as 
part of a new stmggle for human rights, démocratisation and cosmopolitanism.^
In some ways, the study of sovereignty has suffered from an excess, rather than a 
dearth of scholarship, thus adding to the weight of scholarship on the topic requires 
some defence. In this thesis I hope to show that in order to understand what is at stake 
in contemporary discussions of sovereignty we need to stand back from the 
immediate conceptual issues and look at both the intellectual and the political 
interests that have shaped such discussions. This is especially tme in the discussion 
of sovereignty in intemational relations, the main focus of this thesis. Rather than 
simply being a convenient shorthand description of a state of affairs, sovereignty was 
a key term around which the discipline was constructed and whose meaning has been
 ^The classic account o f  the emergence o f  the notion, along with much else in the modern conceptions 
o f the state is Quentin Skimrer The Foundations o f  Modern Political Thought 2 vols (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978).
A  rich discussion can be found in vol 2 o f  Peter Gay The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New  
York: Wildwood House, 1970).
 ^Decolonisation lacks a standard history as such, though particular episodes are well treated, o f  course, 
for an idiosyncratic, but brilliant, reflection see Eric Hobsbawm, A ge o f  Extremes, (London: Abacus, 
1998)
 ^This move, witnessed in such as Martin Shaw and Mary Kaldor, are discussed in chapter 5-7.
centrally contested between different theoretical approaches/ A sign of the changing 
way in which sovereignty is treated today is that this relationship is inverted in a 
recent history of the discipline, which is organised around the concept of anarchy -  
the absence of a global sovereign -  rather than the positive concept of sovereignty/ 
As Jean Bethke Elshtain has remarked, “sovereignty generates a number of typical 
problems -  mediations of universalism and particularism; definitions of intemational 
relations in terms of presence and absence whereby present sovereign states are 
‘primary actors’ but the ‘system itself is defined by a lack, and absence of 
sovereignty.”^
Another version of this thesis has been argued by Justin Rosenberg, who argues that, 
“the disciplinary division of labour between the modem social sciences itself reflects 
uncritically and thereby naturalizes the distinctive social forms of modemity. States, 
markets, individuals -  precisely the things we need to explain -  are already assumed 
to be natural starting points.” ®^ He suggests that, “the rise of modem sovereignty 
involved not just the growth of a centralised political apparatus but also, more 
crucially, the abstraction of the political itself from its erstwhile role in constituting 
the ‘directly social’ relations of pre-capitalist societies”. I n  this thesis I will agree 
that the organisation and institutionalisation of the social sciences make it difficult to 
raise certain questions, although I perhaps hold recent critical approaches to account 
for this more than he does. But just as important as the disciplinary issues in terms of 
the debate over sovereignty have been the changing ways in which it has been 
possible to understand and debate state power.
’ For a brief discussion o f the evolution o f  the theory o f  international relations in much o f the twentieth 
century, see Hedley B ull’s ‘The theory o f  intemational politics 1919-1969’ in Brian Porter (ed) The 
Aberystwyth Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
® Brian C. Schmidt The Political Discourse o f  Anarchy: A Disciplinary History o f  International 
Relations (New York: SUNY 1998)
 ^Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty’ in Francis A. Beer and Robert Harriman (eds) Post- 
Realism: The rhetorical turn in international relations (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press 
1996) p. 175
Justin Rosenberg The Empire o f  Civil Society: A Critique o f  the Realist Theory o f  International 
Relations (London: Verso 1994) p. 4
" Justin Rosenberg The Follies o f  Globalisation Theory: Polem ical Essays (London: Verso 2000) p.
38
At the start of the twentieth century the European states were expanding and 
consolidating their empires, and the US was engaged in a debate between imperialists 
and isolationists. Although there were tensions between the great powers that 
surfaced later, with catastrophic results, there was also a remarkable degree of 
cooperation between them. Furthennore, they all employed the rhetoric of 
nationalism and relied on more or less explicit racial arguments to legitimise their 
empires.
This situation was undermined over time in several ways. Most obviously, there were 
tensions between the powers. An important consequence of this was that colonial 
subjects were trained and armed in World War I, encouraging their claims for 
freedom.. Colonial subjects began to hold western powers to account by their own 
standards of civilization, demanding the same freedoms for themselves, forming a 
second challenge to the imperial order. These calls for freedom received support 
from sections of the public in the imperialist states themselves, especially after they 
were given focus by Lenin’s study of the issue, and the success of the Russian 
Revolution.’^
The form of anti-imperialist rhetoric, especially as it was adopted in Europe and the 
US, is now often seen as misguided. The states that were created tlirough 
decolonisation often perpetuated the inequalities of colonial administration, which has 
sometimes been seen as an almost inevitable outcome of creating nation-states. This 
thesis will be critical of this line of argument because, and not withstanding all its 
faults, the sovereign state embodies a fonn of collective autonomy that is better than 
any alternative currently on offer.
My argument will be that claims to national self-determination at the present time are 
best understood as the assertion of collective autonomy. It is the assertion of a right -  
as we will see a particular kind of right -  that a group be allowed to make its own 
choices about how to organise its affairs. Its value is therefore instrumental rather
V. I Lenin Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f  Capitalism  (London: Pluto Press 1996)
than intrinsic in that it is valued for what it produces -  autonomy and empowerment -  
rather than in and of itself. One of the main tasks of this thesis will therefore be to 
offer some reasons for supposing that, in the contemporary context at least - and 
whatever might have been tme in the past or might be tme in the future -  the values 
of autonomy, independence, equality and self mle, those values we might in some 
general sense refer to as ‘democratic values’, are best secured through the political 
form of the sovereign state rather than the alternatives that are being widely 
discussed.
In order to make this case I need to be clear just how sovereignty has been understood 
both in general and in Intemational Relations. The term ‘sovereignty’ is notoriously 
hard to pin down, as it has been used in so many different contexts and as part of so 
many different theories. In 1905, the intemational lawyer F. H. M. Oppenheim wrote 
that, “There exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial 
than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the 
moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never 
had a meaning which was universally agreed upon.”’^  These difficulties persist 
today. One of the most influential contemporary intemational relations scholars, 
Kenneth Waltz, has described it as “a bothersome concept”,’'^  and more recently still, 
Steven Krasner has identified four ways in which the term has been used; 
intemational legal sovereignty; Westphalian sovereignty; domestic sovereignty; and 
interdependence sovereignty.’  ^ And for sheer obfuscation, the introduction to a 
recent edited volume discussing sovereignty can scarcely be bettered:
Our understanding of sovereignty links the social constmction of agency or 
identity (in this case, the state) to practice, and it highlights how sovereignty 
itself can be conceptualized as a set of practices. For example, while
F. L. M. O p p e n h e i m Law  (London: Longman 2 vols, 1905 & 1906), quoted in Hurst 
Viiimaxm Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation o f  Conflicting Rights 
(Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press 1990) p. 14 
Kenneth N. Waltz Theoiy o f  International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill 1979) p. 95, and 
widely quoted in the secondary literature
sovereignty is intimately bound up with the issues of recognition, recognition 
itself is embedded in an anay of different practices. While it is generally 
regarded as a positive, empowering term in discussion of state sovereignty and 
intemational law, recognition may be linked to specific cultural practices, 
resulting in the delegitimation of claims to authority made on behalf of 
territories and peoples with non-westem cultural traditions. Similarly, 
sovereign recognition is embedded in a network of intemational political 
economy practices that, in their liberal form, exclude ethical considerations 
such as a right to wealth, which may ultimately be necessary if sovereignty is 
ever to be fully realized by Third World states.’^
The first problem in thinking about sovereignty, then, is what it means and who can 
have it. The problem is not simply that there are different definitions of the term 
sovereignty. There are also different ideas about how terms like sovereignty should 
be defined in a way that is meaningful for social science. At the most basic level, 
there are commonplace meanings, used in everyday language and catalogued by 
lexicographers. Beyond that, however, specialists approach the question of definition 
differently. Some define terms according to the needs of theory building. This 
approach involves taking a particular meaning of a concept so that it can be used to 
explain, and perhaps predict, social phenomena. A typical example of this is 
provided by Kenneth Waltz, who writes that, “theoretical notions are defined by the 
theory in which they appear”.’  ^ He argues that wherever there are contradictory 
theories, the meanings of terms will be contested. It is possible to draw out a third 
approach to defining terms that will be very important for this study. Some critics 
may argue that a tenn has no meaning at all for social science, or that its meaning is 
so bound up with ideological interests that it obscures more than it explains. This 
may be called the critical approach. To clarify what these three different ways of
Stephen D. Krasner Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999) 
p. 3
Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber ‘The Social Constmction o f  State Sovereignty’ in 
Biersteker and Weber (eds) State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1996) p. 12 
Kenneth N. Waltz, op.cit. p. 11
thinking about concepts means, it might help to take a different example. The term 
‘race’ is used all the time often with little precision. However, social scientists have 
tried to develop more precise definitions of race, and of racial difference. Elaborate 
theories have been developed to explain social inequalities as the outcome of racial 
differences. Later critics argued that the term ‘race’ does not have the meaning that 
these theorists tried to give it. It was argued that racial difference was constructed, or 
invented, to explain or justify social inequalities that were the outcomes of different 
processes. Today, these critics have largely won this battle, at least in academia. 
This is analogous to some of the criticisms of sovereignty discussed in this thesis.
The difficulty for conceptual approaches to sovereignty is that they are tom between 
seeing sovereignty in terms of either power and capability, or legitimacy and 
authority. It is not possible to simply assert one or the other because neither extreme 
corresponds to ways in which sovereignty is exercised. To reduce it to either extreme 
is to render it redundant, because the terms power or legitimacy could suffice alone. 
Weber’s classic definition of the state as, “that human community which 
(successfully) lays claim to the monopoly o f legitimate physical violence within a 
certain territory”,’  ^ forms the basis of most attempts to mediate between the two. F. 
H. Hinsley lifted this definition for his analysis, which has become the locus classicus 
for discussions of sovereignty in Intemational Relations, calling it “the idea that there 
is a final and absolute political authority in the political community ... and no final 
and absolute authority exists elsewhere’'}^ In the inter-war period, pluralist 
approaches to sovereignty emphasised legitimacy and consent, as a critique of the 
glorification of the power of the state that was prevalent at the time. One of the most 
influential proponents of this approach was Harold Laski, who wrote that, "Where 
sovereignty prevails, where the State acts, it acts by the consent of men.” ’^’ More 
recently, neo-realists have concentrated on power and capability, although retaining 
an appreciation of the necessary component of consent. Waltz argues that, “To say
Max Weber ‘The Profession and vocation o f  politics’ in Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (ed) 
Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994) p. 310-311 
F. H. Hinsley Sovereignty (London: C. A. Watts and Company Ltd 1966) p. 27, emphasis in original 
Studies in the Problems o f  Sovereignty London: George Allen and Unwin 1968 [1917] p. 13
that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please, that they are free 
of others’ influence, that they are able to get what they want. ... To say that a state is 
sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and 
external problems.”^’
Although emphases may vary, conceptual approaches tend to use the term 
sovereignty to describe the attributes of independent territorial units within the 
intemational system. The theories that are built upon these definitions then try to 
account for the ways in which these sovereign entities interact. As a result, these 
divisions are treated as natural rather than conventional, and it is assumed that politics 
and international relations are different spheres of human experience that must be 
understood with different theories. The corollary of this is that the division of 
humanity into different states or nations is itself treated as natural, and beyond the 
scope of social scientific inquiry. Justin Rosenberg has developed this line of 
criticism furthest, arguing that sovereignty is treated as, “an absolute form of mle 
which never seems to be absolute in practice even though, for some reason, the 
formal constitution of the international system rests on the assumption that it is so.”^^  
In other words, because Intemational Relations is concemed with relations between 
states, it has to treat states as absolutely discrete entities. However, scholars 
recognise that in practice they are never quite absolute, and so they have to maintain a 
fiction where they study intemational relations as if states were absolutely 
autonomous even though they know that they are not, so that they can maintain 
artificial boundaries between academic disciplines.
Second, it is often argued - as we shall see - that sovereignty is an undesirable norm. 
The division of human society into fully autonomous states is seen as being an 
irrational, counterintutive and anyway deeply flawed way of organising human 
beings, pitting the people of each state against the people of every other state. 
Furthermore, the idea of sovereign autonomy is often invoked by political elites
Waltz op.cit. p. 96 
^  Justin Rosenberg o 
under question (unpublished PhD thesis, University o f  Sussex 1998)
p.cit p. 127; quoted in Norman Lewis A New Age o f  Inteiwention: Sovereignty
whenever they violate intemational norms such as human rights, providing a cover 
for dictatorial or oppressive regimes.
This leads on to the third point, which is the claim that ‘globalisation’ -  understood in 
a variety of ways -  is undermining the autonomy of the state. Although there is no 
consensus on the meaning or extent of globalisation, a useful working definition 
would describe it as the intensification of increasingly complex social processes 
across the globe. This neither limits us to economic changes, nor restricts us to the 
most recent period. Ideas about globalisation suggest that Intemational Relations 
should be concemed with the relations between many different kinds of processes and 
actors, including the state, but only alongside many others. The most extreme 
versions of the thesis, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 7, suggest that the 
concept of sovereignty is almost entirely redundant under these circumstances.
To explore these concems shapes my strategy in this thesis. Thus, the first part of this 
study is devoted to further exploring the debates in Intemational Relations germane to 
the discussion of sovereignty. Chapter 1 discusses those traditional approaches that 
essentially took sovereignty for granted as an ahistorical form of human society and 
which therefore predicated the ‘intemational system’ on a simple assumption of 
‘sovereign entities interacting’. Here I draw out the weaknesses of these approaches, 
hut also flag up the areas where critics have sometimes misinterpreted the tradition to 
provide a basis for their altematives. Chapters 2 and 3 then tums to some 
altematives, specifically those that have been grouped together as ‘post-positivist’, a 
label that I will argue is in many ways misapplied. These chapters argue that (so- 
called) post-positivist approaches have followed a common trajectory devaluing ideas 
of sovereignty based on self-determination. Taking as their starting point a 
scepticism towards the enlightenment model of society made up of knowing 
individuals with conscious desires, they have devalued the idea of sovereignty as a 
collective subjectivity, both in the version of the mainstream in Intemational 
Relations and in its radical re-appropriation by anti-colonialists and their 
sympathisers.
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Having examined how sovereignty is viewed within the discipline of intemational 
relations, chapter 4 then discusses manner in which is I suggest we understand 
sovereignty both historically and as a rights claim. In this chapter I elaborate on my 
claim that sovereignty should be understood as a right held by a collective subject and 
situate that discussion in terms of Hohfeld’s distinction between a power right and a 
claim right. Much -  perhaps most - contemporary ‘rights talk’ takes the fonn, I 
suggest of a Hohfeldian claim right. But sovereignty, understood as I shall try to 
understand it here, is a power right which should not, at least in the present context, 
be overridden by claim rights. If, to use Ronald Dworkin’s language ‘rights are 
tmmps’,^  ^ my argument in this chapter is essentially that sovereignty’s power right 
tmmps other claim rights, at least in the current context.
The third part tums to possible objections to this argument. Essentially, I shall argue 
that attempts to limit or undennine the status of sovereignty as a power right can take 
a number of forms. Chapter 5 looks at attempts to justify overcoming sovereignty for 
reasons that have to do with cultural (and often also therefore political) primacy. Two 
examples of this are offered: the changing face of imperialism, and the development 
of multiculturalism in modem westem societies.
Chapter 6 discusses the origin and nature of the new interventionism, and arguments 
associated with it, to the effect that some peoples claim rights (often human rights 
language is almost wholly couched in terms of claim rights) warrant to overtuming of 
the power right of sovereignty. I will, unsurprisingly, argue against this view. 
Chapter 7 then examines perhaps the most protean, but also amorphous, thesis that 
threatens sovereignty, to wit the claim, most obviously associated with various 
proponents of globalisation, that agency is effectively tmmped by stmcture and that 
sovereignty even if seen as I have seen it here is powerless to actually generate 
autonomy and equality, since the power of sovereign entities is heavily circumscribed 
in any case. Finally, in my concluding chapter, I offer a summary of the argument as
23 The classic presentation o f  his thesis is in his Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977)
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a whole and explore what I hope might be some more hopeful avenues for 
intemational relations scholarship in the light of it.
Some remarks on method
Before I can do any of this, however, I need to say something about the 
methodological assumptions that will guide the investigation.
The first claim of this thesis is that sovereignty is closely bound up with notions of 
agency, and debates about sovereignty have tended to follow discussions of agency, 
though not always very explicitly. I argue that traditional ideas about agency and 
sovereignty have faced a sustained assault in recent years, both in intellectual debate 
and in the political and social spheres. Accordingly, the first contribution of this 
thesis is to establish these links and demonstrate that while sovereignty is being 
attacked from several different directions, many of the directions emanate from a 
common source; the denial of the efficacy of agency -  either individual or collective - 
in intemational affairs. The second claim that I make is that many of the critics are 
attacking the wrong thing. If their aspiration is for a more progressive system of 
intemational relations -  and many state, obviously sincerely, that this is indeed, their 
aspiration - then they are focusing on the wrong target. I argue that a strong sense of 
human agency and of at least the possibility of sovereign (i.e. collective) agency is 
essential for a forward-looking approach to intemational relations.
However, and not withstanding the fact that this thesis will concentrate on 
Intemational Relations - both as a field and as a topic - it is obvious that an issue like 
sovereignty cannot be looked at through a single lens (only from the discipline of 
Intemational Relations, for example or only through a historical analysis). To 
understand what issues are contained within such a concept, to look at the interests 
that are at stake and the ideas that are contested, it is necessary to come at it from 
different angles, to combine readings that perhaps have different original disciplinary 
homes. To make these links it is thus necessary to engage with a wide variety of
12
different material, offering different kinds of evidence. The methodological 
assumptions that underpin the thesis will doubtless, then, look to some rather eclectic.
If the hallmark of eclecticism is taken to be a refusal to assume that there is only one 
royal road to epistemic truth it is one that I am happy to concede. However, that does 
not mean that there is no method in my madness, as it were. My thesis is 
fundamentally a thesis about how we might, could and should understand 
sovereignty; why existing theories of Intemational Relations do not understand it that 
way and why, indeed, many contemporary theories are so very critical of it and how, 
once we do understand it in that way, we can defend it against certain powerful 
objections. My ‘methods’ reflect my concems.
In section 1, for example, I discuss the treatment of sovereignty in Intemational 
Relations theory. This section therefore obviously relies heavily on textual exegesis 
from major contributions to both mainstream and critical theories of Intemational 
Relations. The material is divided up into a number of major problems that critical 
approaches set out to address, including agency, démocratisation and security as well 
as sovereignty. Although the discussion of sovereignty plays a large part in these 
discussions, it is not the sole focus for the simple reason that in trying to convey the 
character of the theory or theorist in general wider questions than simply the 
understanding of sovereignty are obviously necessary.
Using the terms ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical’ as I have just done, obviously begs a 
number of questions. Without entering into the theology of theoretical attribution here 
let me suggest that I shall understand ‘mainstream’ theory to be those theoretical 
interpretation which have largely set the intellectual scene in Intemational Relations. 
This therefore includes both ‘traditional’ realism^^ and its more ‘scientific’, stmctural
Nomenclature here is always a problem. ‘Traditional realism’ is taken to be the realism of, inter alia, 
Hans Morgenthau, Rlieinliold Niebuhr, George Kerman, Walter Lippman, Henry Kissinger and a host 
o f  lesser figures. O f course, tliere was hardly universal agreement between such individual thinkers but 
they spoke o f  themselves as, at least to some extent a ‘school’ and so may, by courtesy at least, be 
treated as one. For discussions see Joel Rosenthal, Righteous Realists: responsible pow er in the
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successor^^ as well as the so-called ‘English school’ of Martin Wight, Hedley Bull 
and others^’’ (now under a vigorous process of revivaf^).
The point to note about this is that - methodologically speaking -  this mainstream 
itself was remarkably eclectic: a clear positivist focus in the latter neo-realists an 
equally clear, and absolutely hostile, response to positivism from Morgenthau (whose 
Scientific Man versus Power Politics^^ remains one of the best attacks on positivism 
extant) and from the English school.
This has two particular benefits from my argument here. First, it substantiates the 
claims that I make about the changing treatment of sovereignty by showing how 
earlier approaches to intemational relations have treated the issue. Secondly, it 
allows me to develop a line of criticism against the ‘post-positivist’ theories by 
showing that traditional approaches are rich and varied in their discussion of 
sovereignty, and are quite different from the caricatures that are presented by post­
positivists. I would suggest that there is more in these theories than post-positivists 
allow, and although some of their claims about the conservative disposition of the 
writers that I discuss are merited, they are in danger of rejecting too much.
I use the chapter heading ‘traditional theories’ advisedly, because I want to avoid the 
fallacy that all traditional theories were ‘positivist’. I save the discussion of
nuclear age (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992) and Michael Joseph Smith, Realist 
Thought From Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press, 1986),
The most celebrated version o f  which has been Kenneth Waltz Theory o f  International Politics 
(Reading Ma: Addison Wesley, 1979).
For representative samples see Martin Wight, Systems o f  States (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1977), Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977), Hedley Bull and Adam  
Watson (ed) The Expansion o f  International Society (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1984). A now  
standard history o f  the school is Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History o f  the English 
School (London: Macmillan, 1997)
The revival is taking a number o f  forms. One might see a more ‘traditional’ revival ( if  that is not an 
oxymoron) in Robert Jakcson The Global Covenant: Human conduct in a world o f  states (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000) and a rather more radical revival in the work o f  Tim Dunne and Nick Wheeler. 
See, especially, Nicholas J Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian intervention and international 
society  (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 2000). There has also been an organised attempt to restart the school 
launched by Ban y Buzan and Richard Little following the publication o f  their massive International 
Systems in World Histoiy: Theoiy meets history (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).
 ^ See Hans J Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1947).
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positivism for the chapter on post-positivism. Here too, naming can be problematic. 
As I have already said, I think the tenn ‘post-positivism’ is in fact a bit of misnomer 
(I explain why in more detail in section one) but it has now become widely accepted^^ 
and so I follow the now customary usage. However, positivism itself is complex and 
hardly uncontroversial. Most discussions begin with the early nineteenth century 
French writer Auguste Comte, who tried to unify the natural and social sciences, 
developing a common method for both that allowed humanity to move beyond earlier 
theological and metaphysical conceptions of knowledge. It is ironic that while Comte 
was concerned to unify human knowledge, he is commonly credited as being among 
the first to establish sociology as a distinct discipline.^^ Later in the nineteenth 
century, and especially in the twentieth century, the natural sciences took great strides 
forward while the social and moral development of humanity seemed to take a back 
seat. Many social scientists were inspired by the natural sciences, and developed 
methods of enquiry that were explicitly ‘scientific’ and linked to what was often 
claimed to be a ‘positivistic’ conception of science, following C om te.H ow ever, a 
problem here in that throughout the nineteenth century the term ‘science’ was used 
much more loosely than today, implying knowledge or systematic study rather than 
enquiry into the laws of nature; a classicist, in this sense might be ‘scientific’^ .^ In 
the twentieth century, and especially after World War II, the division between arts, 
natural sciences and social sciences became far more entrenched, and the term 
positivism was narrowed down to suggest a mode of enquiry that employed inductive 
logic, made extensive use of statistics and tried to isolate specific variables that 
rational actors could respond to.^  ^ For the purposes of this study, then, I use the terms 
‘positivism’ and ‘post positivism’ in the sense that they have come to acquire in 
Intemational Relations theory. I make no comment on how accurate these claims are
It is increasingly seen as a central theme o f  the so-called ‘tliird debate’. See for example, Steve 
Smith ‘S elf images o f  a discipline’ in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds) International Relations Theory 
Today (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).
This is a point commonly made in intioductory texts, for example Mike Haralambos, Martin 
Holbom Sociology: Themes and Perspectives 5th Ed (Collins Educational 2000)
For a very recent argument which repeats some o f  these canards see Jolin Gray, A l Quaeda and what 
it is to be modern (London: Granta Books, 2003).
See the very interesting discussion in J.W. Burrow, The Crisis o f  Reason: European thought 1848- 
1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000)
This point is made by many o f  the post-positivists discussed in chapters 3 and 4 o f  this thesis.
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as an understanding of Comte or positivism generally. In Intemational Relations 
anyway, the term has itself come to stand for certain assumptions and it is the 
assumptions rather than the term that matter. Accordingly, although I defend a 
number of traditional writers against the charge that they are ‘positivists’ I am more 
concemed to rescue them from the calumny that they cmdely copied the methods of 
the natural sciences rather than to deny that they aspired to the rigour of ‘science’ in 
some much more general sense. The danger of overreacting to the abuse of the term 
positivism is to define it so narrowly that nobody is seen as being positivist at all.
In chapter four I look at historical debates about sovereignty and frame my own 
understanding of sovereignty as a ‘power right’, introducing this notion from the legal 
theorist Wesley Hohfeld. I take the opportunity to provide a fuller statement of what 
I think that sovereignty could be, drawing on earlier theorists who I discuss and 
evaluate. The methodology of this section is similar to that of part 1 except that it 
focuses both on debates about how one should understand the historical debates about 
sovereignty and on a particular argument about rights.
Part 3 then offers a reading of the current political controversies about sovereignty. 
Demonstrating that the changing views of sovereignty in contemporary Intemational 
Relations are reflected in foreign policy is essential to my argument. Accordingly, I 
concentrate on showing how certain aspects of the theories -  especially the so called 
post positivist theories - that I have discussed are reflected in political practice, with a 
view to undermining some of the evidence that is integral to the theories of 
sovereignty discussed in the first part of the thesis.
I should emphasise that in the overall stmcture of the thesis and in the relationship 
between the separate parts, I am not claiming that the debates that I am engaging with 
are causally linked to one another. I am not suggesting that the shifting grounds of 
Intemational Relations theory have inspired the changing political practices of 
sovereignty, nor that statesmen who are critical of sovereign statehood necessarily 
betray even an awareness of the existence of the academic debates that I cover in the
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thesis. Statesmen are acting in a changed world, and scholars are reflecting on it. 
This thesis tries to capture both sides of this.
However, in avoiding the claim that there is one particular movement of ideas or 
practices underlying changing views of sovereignty, I am not suggesting that it is 
simply a coincidence that so many writers from different areas of study (or indeed, 
practitioners) have converged around certain themes in discussing it. Rather I would 
argue that there is an underlying tendency in contemporaiy International Relations -  
both academic and practical -  towards devaluing human agency that, despite its 
often-radical claims, is in practice deeply conservative.^'’ This tendency has been 
shaped and developed in a number of intellectual contexts and is more familiar in 
some that in others. However in Intemational Relations, the underlying assumptions 
have not been questioned systematically. Bringing out some of these assumptions 
and questioning their consequences is a central aspiration of this thesis, and one of the 
ways that I do this is by showing how nonnative aspirations have shaped the 
presentation of certain situations. An example, in the third part of the thesis, is the 
discussion of the issues surrounding war crimes. If a particular contemporary writer 
has especially influenced the assumptions I make in this context and the methods I 
adopt in developing its key ideas it is probably Slavoj Zizek. He draws on a 
fonnidable and often abstract range of sources -  Kant, Hegel, Marx, Lacan -  but he is 
also consistent is relating these concems to much more ‘nuts and bolts issues, real 
political events or figures or aspects drawn from popular culture -  such as Alfred 
Hitchcock, David Cronenberg and Ridley Scott.^^ I am not trying to argue that all 
scholarship should do this but when engaging with current problems it is necessary to 
think about the context as well as about the method, a point made much of in other 
contexts by Quentin Skinner, for example.^’’ Method, after all, is surely something
Here in some respects at least, and without subscribing to the more specific aspects o f  his agenda, I 
am agreeing with and going further than Juigen Habermas in his influential The New Conservatism  
(Boston MIT Press, 1986).
The most comprehensive statement o f  Zizek’s approach to date is The Ticklish Subject: the absent 
centre o f  political ontology (London: Verso 1999).
^  See his reworked metliodological essays in vol 1 o f  Visions o f  Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2002).
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that follows on from the problems that are being tackled, not a rigid designator that 
determines what problems or issues can be tackled.
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1 International relations and sovereignty: Traditional Approaches
Sovereignty has been understood in various different ways in different disciplines and 
different spheres of society, but it is perhaps in International Relations that it has been 
subjected to the most intensive interrogation. Much of the theorising that has been 
deployed in international relations since the emergence of the discipline as such* has 
taken the notion of sovereignty as a fundamental given.^ Many critical thinkers on 
international relation over the last few years have therefore assumed that a simplistic 
approach to sovereignty, effectively locking International Relations into a 
conservative position viz a viz possible refonn of the states system, is a hallmark of 
‘traditional’ International Relations theorising.^
However, as some contemporary scholarship has begun to suggest, the picture is 
rather murkier than this. The very term ‘traditional approaches’ implies a coherence 
that does not necessarily exist, an impression that is reinforced by the now common 
(and increasing) tendency to refer to the various critical approaches that have sprung 
up in recent years as ‘post-positiv is tthus implying at least that the previous 
‘traditional’ International Relations theory was positivist. Again the position is rather 
more complex.
' Effectively after World War I. The first chair in the subject the Woodrow W ilson chair at the 
University o f Wales, Aberystwyth was founded in 1919, shortly followed by other chairs in both the us 
and the UK. For a brief discussion see Brian Porter’s intioduction to Brian Porter (ed) The 
Abeiystwyth Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972),
 ^Often cited examples, though one should add the qualifications that I w ill discuss later might be F.PI. 
Hinsley Sovereignty and Alan James Sovereign Statehood: The basis o f  international society  (London: 
Allen and Unwin 1986). One should also not forget the international lawyers, see especially J. L. 
Brierly The Law o f  Nations: An introduction to the international law o fpeace  (New York: Oxford 
University Press 6‘*‘ edition 1963).
 ^See for example, Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theoiy o f  International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1982. 2"^  edition 1990) and R.B.J.Walker, Inside/Outside: International 
Relations as Political Theoiy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). I shall return to both 
Linklater and Walker in the next two chapters.
 ^I f  not initiated by it, this notion was given increasing cmrency by the influential edited collection 
published in the early 1990’s. See Ken Booth and Steve smith (eds) International Relations Theory 
Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). See especially Steve Smith’s essay ‘S elf images o f  a 
discipline’.
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This chapter will seek to elucidate the position on sovereignty of three of the most 
influential so-called ‘traditional’ theories of International Relations, Hans 
Morgenthau’s realism, the international society approach most associated with Martin 
Wight and Hedley Bull and the structural or neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz. It will do 
this both to show how traditional International Relations theory was rather more 
ambiguous about the value of sovereignty than has often been thought but also to 
show how and why such theories did consider sovereignty to be a central value (as 
well as fact) in international relations. The purpose of this is in part to set up the 
discussion of ‘post-positivist’ and critical theories, which will be the concern of the 
next two chapters and which, I want to suggest, have been the chief carriers of the 
devaluing of sovereignty in International Relations theory over the last three decades. 
If their understanding of traditional theorising is mistaken, it might be the reasons 
they have for rejecting sovereignty might be problematic as well. However, there is 
an additional reason, in that some aspects of the traditional account of sovereignty 
will be, in fact, reasonably hospitable to the account of sovereignty I shall give in 
chapter four. How it might be possible to link ‘traditional accounts’ and the more 
progressive account I shall offer there is something I shall take up again in both 
chapter four and the conclusion.
The strategy the chapter will follow will be dictated by these aims. I will first look at 
perhaps the two most generally influential accounts of sovereignty in international 
relations, that offered by Morgenthau and that offered by the English school. I shall 
then take up the theme of positivism and say something in general about it before 
moving on to its impact of (especially) US International Relations theory and finally 
discuss the position adopted by Kenneth Waltz. I will then round of the chapter with 
some concluding remarks that will set up the discussion of ‘post-positivist theories’ I 
shall undertake in the next two chapters.
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Hans Morgenthau: Sovereignty and the national interest
In much of the critical literature, Morgenthau is widely condemned for his uncritical 
acceptance of sovereignty as the founding principle of international relations, and of 
his pessimistic, cynical view of human nature and the ‘realism that emerges from it. 
His critics have often have seen his methodology as unreflectively positivist, 
dedicated to uncovering scientific ‘truths’ about international politics, have 
compounded these criticisms.^ All of these assessments are very wide of the mark. 
In the third edition of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau himself wrote,
I am still being told that I believe in the prominence of the international 
system based upon the nation state, although the obsolescence of the nation 
state and the need to merge it into supranational organizations of a functional 
nature was already one of the main points of the first edition of 1948. I am 
still being told that I am making success the standard of political action. Even 
so, as far back as 1955 I refuted that conception of politics with the very same 
arguments which are being used against me. And, of course, I am still being 
accused of indifference to the moral problem in spite of abundant evidence, in 
this book and elsewhere, to the contrary.^
Added to these misperceptions, today his more theoretically oriented critics have 
focused on his alleged positivism, that is his alleged adoption of natural scientific 
methods to investigate society. This is particularly ironic, as he was one of the most 
ardent and effective critics of positivism at a time when its influence was giowing 
across the American social sciences. Even J. Ann Tickner, one of his more subtle 
critics cannot resist this line of attack,
 ^This is especially true in general textbook accounts o f  international relations or o f  realism. See, for 
example, the accounts given in J Docherty and R Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories o f  International 
Relations : A comprehensive sw~vey 5^ *’ edition (London: Longman, 2000)
^Hans J. Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace edition (New  
York: Alfred A. Knopf 1962), Preface to the Third Edition (unnumbered page)
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Using a vocabulary that contains many of the words associated with 
masculinity, as I have defined it, Morgenthau asserts that it is possible to 
develop a rational (and unemotional) theory of international politics based on 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature. Since Morgenthau wrote 
the first edition of Politics Among Nations in 1948, this search for an 
objective science of international politics, based on the model of the natural 
sciences, has been an important part of the realist and neo-realist agenda.^
The significant phrase here is at the end of the quotation, where she links 
Morgenthau’s work with that of some of his later followers, although Morgenthau 
was at pains to distance himself from much of their work. And his view of 
sovereignty was neither as ahistorical nor as central to his approach as critics have 
suggested. Often, scholars seem to have formed their whole view of Morgenthau 
fi'om his ‘Six Principles of Political Realism’, a brief synopsis of his approach 
prepared for the second and subsequent editions of his textbook, Politics Among 
Nations,  ^ but not present in the first. To gain any appreciation of Morgenthau’s 
views on sovereignty and international relations it is necessary to look at the full 
range of his writings, many of which were addressed to an audience beyond academic 
specialists, and engaged with immediate social and political questions he was, as 
Mitchell Rologas has called him, an ‘intellectual in the political sphere’.^  This 
discussion will start with his critique of positivism, which immediately set him 
against the mainstream in post-war American social science. The next issue is 
Morgenthau’s view of politics, which was derived from the European conservative 
tradition and clarifies a great deal about his approach to the management of 
international relations. Finally, I turn to his specific approach to sovereignty, which 
can only be demystified in the light of his methodological and political positions.
’ J. Ann Tickner, ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Principles o f Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation 
Millennium 17 (3) 1988 pp 429-440 p. 431-432
®Hans J. Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace  edition (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf 1962) pp 4 -  16; compare T‘ edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1948)
 ^See Mitchell Rologas, Hans Morgenthau: Intellectual in the political sphere (PhD thesis, St Andrews 
University 2001).
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Morgenthau on Method: criticising positivism
Scott Burchill has expressed the view that Morgenthau was a positivist with unusual 
vigour: “Morgenthau took up Carr’s challenge to create a ‘science of international 
politics’ by applying the positivist methodology of the ‘hard’ or natural sciences to 
the study of international relations.”**^ The problem with this sort of claim is that it is 
simply false.
In an attack on positivist approaches that would not be out of place in contemporary 
critical compilations, Morgenthau claimed that.
The new attitude toward foreign policy stems from an intellectual disposition 
which is deeply imbedded in the American folklore of social action. That 
disposition shuns elaborate philosophies and consistent theories. It bows to 
the facts which are supposed to ‘tell their own story’ and ‘not to lie’. It 
accepts only one test of the tmth of a proposition: that it works. It expects the 
problems of the social world to yield to a series of piecemeal empirical 
attacks, unencumbered by preconceived notions and comprehensive plamiing. 
If a social problem proves obstinate, it must be made to yield to a new 
empirical attack, armed with more facts more thoroughly understood.”**
Morgenthau’s chief attack on positivism, published just after his appointment to the 
Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago in 1943, was Scientific 
Man Versus Power Politics. The book was seen at the time (and has remained) a 
major critique of the attempt to turn the study of social affairs, politics especially into 
a science, praised as such by no less a critic than Michael Oakeshott.*^ It is an 
unambiguous, articulate and passionate indictment of the positivist methodologies
Scott Burchill ‘Realism and Neo-Realism ’ in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds) Theories o f  
International Relations (London: Macmillan 1996)
Hans J. Morgenthau ‘The Perils o f  Empiricism’ in The Restoration o f  American Politics, Volume 3 
o f  Politics in the Twentieth Century, 3 volumes (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press 1962) p. 110 
See Oakeshott’s review o f  the book, reprinted in Religion, Politics and the M oral Life (ed Tim Fuller 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
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that were dominant in that department and growing in dominance across us social 
science. An anonymous reviewer for the University of Chicago Press, which 
ultimately published the book, wrote that “I have little doubt that the book will find a 
publisher. But I should be sorry to see it published by the Chicago University Press. 
There is no reason why books attacking the attempt to be rational and scientific in 
politics should not be published, but a university (or its press) does not seem to me an 
appropriate sponsor for such a book.” *^
Unlike more recent postmodern writers, Morgenthau does not attack rationalism as 
such. He tries to contextualise it against influences on human behaviour: “The 
philosophy of rationalism has misunderstood the nature of man, the nature of the 
social world, and the nature of reason itself. It does not see that man’s nature has 
three dimensions: biological, rational, and spiritual. By neglecting the biological 
impulses and spiritual aspirations of man, it misconstrues the function reason fulfils 
within the whole of human existence; it distorts the problem of ethics, especially in 
the political field; and it perverts the natural sciences into an instrument of social 
salvation for which neither their own nature nor the nature of the social world fits 
them.”*'*
Morgenthau’s starting point is the Aristotelian insight that we are political animals, 
and it is from here that he constructs a more ‘truly rational’ account of human 
activity:
To be successful and truly ‘rational’ in social action, knowledge of a different 
order is needed. This is not the knowledge of single tangible facts but of the 
eternal laws by which man moves in the social world. There are, aside from 
the laws of mathematics, no other eternal laws beside these. The Aristotelian 
truth that man is a political animal is true forever; the truths of the natural
University o f  Chicago Press -  Manuscript Report Feb 5 1945 Hans J. Morgenthau papers, Library o f  
Congress Box 145
Hans J. Morgenthau Scientific Man versus Pow er Politics (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press 
1965) p. 5
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sciences are only true until other truths have supplanted them. The key to 
these laws of man is not in the facts from whose uniformity the sciences 
derive their laws. It is in the insight and wisdom by which more-than- 
scientific man elevates his experiences into the universal laws of human 
nature. It is he who, by doing so, establishes himself as the representative of 
true reason, while nothing-but-scientific man appears as the true dogmatist 
who universalizes cognitive principles of limited validity and applies them to 
realms not accessible to them. It is also the former who proves himself to be 
the true realist; for it is he who does justice to the true nature of things.*^
At times, Morgenthau appears as a traditional German idealist, arguing that, “Facts 
have no social meaning in themselves. It is the significance we attribute to certain 
facts of our sensual experience, in terms of our hopes and fears, our memories, 
intentions, and expectations, that create them as social facts. The social world itself, 
then, is but an artefact of man’s mind as the reflection of his thoughts and the creation 
of his actions.”**" This claim goes further than many of his constructivist critics today. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile this claim with the arguments about immutable 
human nature and the eternal struggle for power in Politics Among Nations. No final 
answer is possible; as many contemporary Morgenthau scholars have pointed out,*  ^
Morgenthau himself was not always very consistent about how he understood what he 
was for, methodologically, though he was always fairly clear about what he was 
against. It is possible that he adopted the rhetoric of ‘human nature’ in order to define 
the social world in a way that forced the conclusions that he wanted to draw, forcing 
rival, idealist conceptions out of discussions of international relations. Scientific Man 
versus Power Politics expressed the difficulty that he had in squaring his political 
beliefs with his philosophical beliefs. Much of his later writings took the form of
'U b id .p .2 1 9 -2 2 0
Hans J. Morgenthau ‘The Perils o f  Empiricism’ in The Restoration o f  American Politics (Volume 3 
o f Politics in the Twentieth Century) p. 110 
See, for example, Rologas, Hans Morgenthau, Michael Jospeh Smith, Realist Thought from  Weber 
to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louiseana State University Press, 1986) and Alistair Murray, 
Reconsidering Realism  (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997).
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essays, the best of which meditate on the tragic nature of the choices that confront the 
statesman and which also reflect aspects of the same ambiguity.*^
Under normal circumstances, methodological eclecticism would not trouble a thinker 
as powerful and influential as Morgenthau. But at a time when an approach that was 
repugnant to him was winning over American scholars, he felt compelled to clarify 
his approach. After Scientific Man Versus Power Politics he leaves us with only 
tantalising hints, but no fully formed theory to resolve the difficulties that his early 
book implied.
Politics
Clarifying Morgenthau’s general political sensibilities is a much easier task. He has a 
conservative’s natural suspicion of utopian claims, and an emphasis on the eternal 
challenge of exercising prudential judgement. The influence of Weber comes through 
very strongly in his commentaries on the nature of politics.*^ His admiration for 
heroic statesmen seems at times almost Nietzschean,^^ and he has a keen sense of the 
tension between thought and action in a complex modem society: “in th[e] 
inescapable tension between reason and experience, between theoretical and practical 
knowledge, between the light of political philosophy and the twilight of political 
action, is indeed the ultimate dilemma of politics.” *^
His study of history has not led him to an unthinkingly reactionary stance, however. 
Morgenthau not only sees the possibility of change in the international system, he 
sees its necessity. He argues that, “the territorial frontier has lost its significance for 
the expansion of equality in freedom, and we have also seen that the moral, political 
and technological conditions of the age require a principle of political organization
See, for example Truth and Power: Essays o f  a D ecade (New York; Knopf, 1970)
This legacy is emphasised in Michael Joseph Smith Realist Thought from  Weber to Kissinger 
Nietzsche unquestionably was enormously influential on the young Morgenthau. This has now been 
established beyond question by Christoph Frei’s Hans Morgenathau: An intellectual life (Baton
Rouge: Louiseana State University Press, 2000).
26
transcending the nation state”.^  ^ Many people have made these claims in the past, 
and some continue to do so today. What marks Morgenthau’s approach as distinctive 
is its refusal to imagine that a utopian scheme for world order could be imposed by 
dictât. Instead, an understanding of the constitution of the current international order 
is required, from which incremental steps can be promoted.
Morgenthau conveys a sense of righteous anger at the utopian critics who represent 
the realist position as immoral:
The contest between utopianism and realism is not tantamount to a contest 
between principle and expediency, morality and immorality, although some 
spokesmen for the former would like to have it that way. The contest is rather 
between one type of political morality and another type of political morality, 
one taking as its standard universal moral principles abstractly formulated, the 
other weighing those principles against the moral requirements of concrete 
political action, their relative merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of 
the political consequences to which they are likely to lead.^^
Indeed, for Morgenthau, “power politics, rooted in the lust for power which is 
common to all men is ... inseparable from social life itself.” "^* However, 
Morgenthau’s approach is clearly distinct from that of most international ethicists, as 
can be seen in his ‘Six Principles of Political Realism’ in later editions of Politics 
Among Nations.
The first of Morgenthau’s ‘Six Principles of Political Realism’ is that, “Political 
realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws
Hans J. Morgenthau ‘The Retrieval o f  Objective Standards: Walter Lippmann’ in The Restoration o f  
American Politics (Volume 3 o f  Politics in the Twentieth Century) p. 67 
^  Hans J. Morgenthau The Purpose o f  American Politics (New York: Vintage 1960) p. 308 
Hans J. Morgenthau ‘The Problem o f the National Interest’ in The Decline o f  Democratic Politics 
(Volume 1 o f  Politics in the Twentieth Century) Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press 1962 p. I l l  
Hans J. Morgenthau Scientific Man vs Power Politics (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press 1965) 
p. 9
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that have their roots in human nature.”^^  Principles three, four and five claim that the 
power and interest have historically relative meanings, that realism is aware of the 
moral significance of political action, and that the moral aspirations of a particular 
nation caimot be universalised. The sixth principle asserts the novelty of the political 
realist approach, and its autonomy from other spheres of intellectual endeavour. The 
political realist, “thinks of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms 
of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; 
the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles.”^^
Morgenthau’s ideas about the nature of power and interest are central to his ideas 
about sovereignty, and his ideas about politics and power are derived from his view 
of human nature . Human nature will frustrate utopian schemes, and our yearning for 
security will lead us to try to maximise our power. In advanced, complex societies 
this individual drive is subordinated to the collective will of the nation. Whatever the 
aspirations of the nation, it will always seek to maximise its power in order to achieve 
those aspirations.
One can imagine Morgenthau endorsing Churchill’s famous claim that, “democracy 
is the worst possible form of government, except for all those other forms that have 
been tried from time to time”^^  in the sense in which it was intended. Democracies 
can degenerate into mobs, and great statesmen who are aware of the tragic nature of 
the choices that they make are needed to lead them, but they do act as a check upon 
unrestrained power. Moreover, Morgenthau’s later writings are imbued with an 
American patriotism that never seems forced or false; his belief in American 
institutions seems real. Indeed, his separation of international relations from 
domestic politics could perhaps be seen as a normative claim about the separation of 
powers, rather than the more obvious claim that international relations is conceptually 
distinct. If only lawyers, economists, politicians and statesmen respected the division 
of authority between them, then none would become too powerful. Although this is
Hans J. Morgenthau Politics Among Nations. 4 
ibid. p. 11
Hansard 11 N ov 1947 col. 206
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not the most obvious textual inteipretation, it does seem most in keeping with 
Morgenthau’s own perspective and experience. This leads us to his approach to 
sovereignty, which can be understood only in the context of these wider 
methodological and political concerns.
A Realistic Approach to Sovereignty: The National Interest
Morgenthau had remarkably little to say directly about sovereignty, and what he did 
say was remarkably conventional. However, if we look beyond his direct discussion 
of the topic, it is possible to identify many of the concerns that are bound up with the 
contemporary discussion of sovereignty expressed by Morgenthau in the concept of 
the national interest.
In Part VI of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau approaches the concept of 
sovereignty directly. It was, he claims, established in the latter part of the sixteenth 
century as “supreme power over a certain territory.”^^  He goes on to discuss the 
freedoms that are widely, though eiToneously thought to be attached to sovereignty, 
cataloguing freedom from legal restraint, freedom from regulation by international 
law, equality of rights and obligations, and actual political, military, economic, or 
technological independence.^^ In discussing the indivisibility of sovereignty and 
criticising approaches to sovereignty that were popular at the time, he implies that he 
is saying something new and distinctive. However, there is nothing in this section 
that has not been said before, and it is derived from a Weberian tradition that was 
familiar in America in 1948, when he first published Politics Among Nations.
However, this does not mean that Morgenthau had nothing of interest to say about 
sovereignty. Rather, it must be teased out of his writings on other questions. He 
second ‘Principle of Political Realism’ is that “The main signpost that helps political 
realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of
^  Hans J. Morgenthau Politics Among Nations p. 312 
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interest defined in terms of power.” *^* In international politics, the power and interest 
is national. The often contradictory and confusing ways in which he develops these 
ideas tliroughout his writings provide the key to his approach to sovereignty.
The concept of the national interest allows Morgenthau to develop an approach to 
history that is far more sophisticated than his critics allege. Although many writers 
have implied that state sovereignty is a permanent form of rule that never changes in 
its most essential elements, Morgenthau uses the concept of the national interest 
rather than the nation-state. The argument here is that humans are social creatures, 
and they will make collective arrangements for rule and administration. However, 
since human nature does not change across history, these collectivities, or nations, 
will always have an interest in maximising their power over other nations. This 
approach allows for considerable variation in the concrete forms that these nations 
take across history, but asserts that they will always be subject to the unchanging 
character of human nature. This seems to be his most basic argument, and stated in 
this form seems to be strongest. His case is undermined when he goes beyond this 
minimalist claim to attribute greater uniformity to society and politics across history.
One the one hand Morgenthau presents the national interest in a historicist form, 
claiming that, “The relative permanency of what one might call the hard core of the 
national interest stems from three factors: the nature of the interests to be protected, 
the political enviromnent within which the interests operate, and the rational 
necessities which limits the policy.” *^ Since so much of his argument hinges on the 
eternal necessity to defend the national interest, it is surprising that he refers here only 
to relative peimanency. Even more damning is the loose definition of the core. It 
tells us precisely nothing unless we know about the contingent factors that make up 
the national interest.
ibid. p. 5
Hans J. Morgenthau ‘The Problem o f the National Interest’ in The Decline o f  Democratic Politics 
(Volume 1 o f  Politics in the Twentieth Century) Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press 1962 p. 91
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On the other hand, having established the permanency of the national interest, he goes 
further in claiming that the tools that can be used to achieve these interests are the 
same across history. “Faced with the necessity to protect the hard core of the national 
interest, that is, to preserve the identity of the nation, all governments have resorted 
throughout history to certain basic policies, such as competitive armaments, the 
balance of power, alliances, and subversion, intended to make of the abstract concept 
of the national interest a viable political r e a l i t y . B y  this stage he has gone well 
beyond a minimal argument about the primacy of survival for social organisations, 
and his point loses some of its strength when he extrapolates too far from it.
However, at other times he is remarkably sensitive to historical specificity. For 
example in 1957 he claimed that, “Nationalism has had its day. It was the political 
principle appropriate to the post-feudal and pre-atomic age. For the technology of the 
steam engine, it was indeed in good measure a force for progress. In the atomic age, 
it must make way for a political principle of larger dimensions, in tune with the 
world-wide configurations of interest and power of the age.”^^
Although he was a keen advocate of new international arrangements for the atomic 
age, Morgenthau was sceptical of the claims put forward about the new international 
institutions that were developing. He claimed that “The United Nations has become 
an instrument for the pursuit of national interests which a nation has in common with 
many others.” '^* This does not suggest hostility towards international institutions per 
se. Rather than claiming that they are at best useless, he proposes that there are some 
things that all states have an interest in that can be fruitfully pursued collectively. 
This may even be seen as an anticipation of regime theory.
ibid. p. 91
Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Nationalism’ in The Decline o f  Democratic Politics (Volume 1 o f  Politics in 
the Twentieth Century) Chicago: University o f Chicago Press 1962 p. 195 
Hans J. Morgenthau ‘The Yardstick o f  the National Interest’ in The Impasse o f  American Foreign 
Policy (Volume 2 o f  Politics in the Twentieth Centmy) Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press 1962 p. 
125
See Stephen D. Ki'asner (ed) International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983)
31
A final observation to be made about Morgenthau’s concept of the national interest is 
that it is not amoral, as is sometimes alleged. He argues that, “The choice is not 
between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but 
between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality, and another set of 
moral principles derived from political reality.” Morgenthau is at his most biting 
when he polemicises against his moralising critics, suggesting that “The moralistic 
detractors of the national interest are guilty of both intellectual error and moral 
p e r v e r s i o n . T h e  defence of the nation is an honourable thing, and in a brutal world 
it is the best hope for human advancement.
Indeed, there is a whole other side to Morgenthau’s thinking on sovereignty. While 
the writings most frequently cited by international relations specialists concentrate on 
the national interest, he also addresses the concerns of those still struggling for the 
recognition of their nationality. One of his most provocative essays, ‘Nationalism’, 
makes the claim that “The idea of nationalism, both in its historic origins and in the 
political functions it has performed, is intimately connected with the idea of freedom 
and shares the latter’s ambiguity. Nationalism as a political phenomenon must be 
understood as the aspiration for two freedoms, on collective, the other individual: the 
freedom of a nation from domination by another nation and the freedom of the 
individual to join the nation of his choice.”^^  He explains that, “The political and 
legal principles originally formulated to support and guarantee the freedom of the 
individual, were applied to the nation. The nation came to be regarded as a kind of 
collective personality with peculiar characteristics and inalienable rights of its own; 
and the typically liberal antithesis between individual freedom and feudalistic 
oppression was transferred to the nation where it was duplicated in the hostility 
between the national aspirations and the feudal state. The nation should be free from 
oppression both from within and from without.”^^  Morgenthau concludes from this 
that, “the principle of national self-determination fulfils the postulates of both
Hans J. Morgenthau American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination (London: Methuen 1952) p. 
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democracy and nationalism.”^^  His counter to this is that these aspirations did not 
reflect political reality. For Morgenthau, World War I and its aftermath revealed “the 
insufficient, self-contradictory, and self-defeating nature of nationalism as the 
exclusive principle of international order and justice and its inevitable subordination 
in fact, and requisite subordination in theory, to an oveniding political system.”'*** He 
saw that atomic war removed the protective function of state. Furtheimore, 
nationalism has been transformed into a universalist and expansionist ideology. “Not 
only do the interests of the state now take precedence over the will of the people, but 
the people themselves -  their life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness -  count for 
nothing if they appear to stand in the way of the interests of the state. No longer are 
national minorities to be protected against the state; it is now the state which must be 
protected against the minorities.”'**
The main point to be made is that Morgenthau is not as committed to a conventional 
legal idea of state sovereignty as his critics sometimes imply. He is concerned above 
all with the national interest, which he considers to be both the organising principle of 
international relations in fact, and the best guarantee against arbitrary rule. In other 
words his commitment to sovereignty is instrumental rather than, as was the case in 
much nineteenth and twentieth century international law, for instance, juristic.'*^ 
Within this context he is ready to see some scope for ethical criticism and future 
aspirations, but they must be understood and promoted within the context of 
competing national interests.
The English School: sovereignty and order international society
In Britain, perhaps the most original account of international relations that emerged in 
the immediate post war period was that known (now) as the ‘English School’ on
ibid. p. 182 
ibid. p. 181-182 
ibid. p. 184 
ibid. p. 193
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international relations. There is considerable debate about its exact provenance, who 
was ‘in’ and who ‘out’ and what its exact scope was,'*  ^but there is general agreement 
that the two most influential scholars in the school, at least to begin with were Martin 
Wight and Hedley Bull. The school especially emphasised the notion of ‘international 
society’ and has remained influential. A number of critical scholars take a good deal 
fl'om it,'*'* some younger scholars seek to radicalise aspects of its agenda,'*  ^ and 
perhaps most recently of all, the more formal aspects of its history have been 
deliberately revived by Barry Buzan and Richard Little.'*^
Sovereignty has been a more important concept for defining the English School’s 
approach to international relations than for classical realists such as Morgenthau. For 
example, Alan James has seen sovereignty as qualification for membership of 
international society. Whilst acknowledging that there is some force to the argument 
that other actors have gained influence in international relations he notes that there is 
never any doubt where one stands -  all the world is controlled by sovereign states. 
He writes that “If political communities are to have regular and orderly dealing with 
each other it is necessary that the extent of their competence is clear and accepted by 
all concerned.”'*^
The difference between classical realism and the English School is emphasised in a 
recent treatment of sovereignty in the classical vein, by Stephen Krasner. He writes 
that, “The starting point for this study, the ontological givens, are rulers, specific 
policy makers, usually but not always the executive head of state. Rulers, not states -
For a brilliant discussion o f  Morgenthau’s relationship to the nineteenth and twentieth century 
international lawyers see Marti Koskiniemmi, The Gentle Civilizer o f  Nations: The rise and fa ll o f  
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and not the international system -  make choices about polices, mles and 
institutions.”'*^ Krasner describes four uses of the term sovereignty -  domestic 
sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty and 
Westphalian sovereignty. These principals have been enduring, but in the absence of 
an overarching authority to enforce them, they have been violated systematically. He 
therefore describes sovereignty as ‘Organized Hypocrisy’.
The main claim associated with the English School is that there is an international 
society that exists to maintain global order despite the absence of rigid, hierarchical 
institutions associated with internal order. International society is defined by Hedley 
Bull and Adam Watson as “a group of states (or, more generally, a group of 
independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that 
the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of others, but also have 
established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of 
their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these 
arrangements.”'*^  Bull further defines international order as “a pattern of human 
activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or 
international society.” *^*
Bull adopts a conventional distinction between internal and external sovereignty, “On 
the one hand, states assert, in relations to ... tenitory and population, what may be 
called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within 
that territory and population. On the other hand, they assert what may be called 
external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy but independence of outside 
authority.” *^ He goes on to explain that these two senses of sovereignty exist both
Alan James Sovereign Statehood: The basis o f  international society (London: Allen and Unwin 
1986) p. 267
Stephen D. Kiasner Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999) 
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nonnatively and factually. They both assert and exercise supremacy and 
independence to varying degrees.
In explaining the existence of international order Bull has to go beyond conventional 
laws, which only exist in a tenuous sense in international relations; “Order, it is 
contended here, does depend for its maintenance upon rules, and in the modem 
international system (by contrast with some other international systems) a major role 
in the maintenance of order has been played by those mles which have the status of 
international law. But to account for the existence of international order we have to 
acknowledge the place of mles that do not have the status of law.”^^  More recent 
constructivists, who will be discussed in chapter 2, have developed this insight 
further. Bull’s claim that, “agents and spectators are not distinct classes. All agents 
are partly spectators (of the other agents) and all policy presupposes some theory. 
And all spectators (above all in politically free societies) are frustrated agents” comes 
further still towards a constmctivist approach.^^ The earlier scholars associated with 
the English School used this claim to establish that there is a kind of international 
club where the recognition of tacit mles and conventions is essential to the orderly 
conduct of business. Thus, “A society of states (or international society) exists when 
a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a 
society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of 
rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common 
institutions.” '^* Bull identifies the common goals of the contemporary international 
system as the preservation of the system itself, the maintenance of the independence 
of the individual states themselves, upholding peace, limitation of violence and 
preseiwation of property.
The English School, or international society approach, has become associated with 
radical, or at least critical scholarship in International Relations. However, the group
Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society p. xiii-xiv
Martin Wight, ‘The Balance o f Power’ in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds) Diplomatic 
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of scholars associated with the original English School were rather more conservative 
than their latter-day allies assume. Their constant preoccupation was with order, 
which has always been held up against demands for change. The background to this 
concern is perhaps the potential upheaval caused by the transformation of the society 
of states from a small and select club to a much larger association including states 
which were achieving independence from European colonial empires. Hedley Bull 
rather disingenuously writes that The Anarchical Society does not assume that order 
is a desirable or ovemding goal, as if his selection of subject matter was quite 
independent of his political ideals.^^ He does claim that order is not necessarily 
ovemding, but his example is of “the preoccupation of the poor and non-industrial 
states with historical change”.^ *" It is surely significant that he adds the rider just to 
the demand for change, implying that just means must be used to achieve change. 
And how are we to understand just means? Surely, by their being compatible with 
order.
The latent conservatism of the English School is sometimes made explicit; “Demands 
for world justice are ... demands for the transfoimation of the system and society of 
states, and are inherently revolutionary. World justice may ultimately be reconcilable 
with world order, in the sense that we may have a vision of a world or cosmopolitan 
society that provides for both. But to pursue the idea of world justice in the context 
of the system and society of states is to enter into conflict with the devices thiough 
which order is at present m a i n t a i n e d . And, further, “international order is 
preserved by means which systematically affront the most basic and widely agreed 
principles of international justice... the institutions and mechanisms which sustain 
international order, even when they are working properly, indeed especially when 
they are working properly, or fulfilling their functions ... necessarily violate ordinary 
notions of justice.” ®^
Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society p. 13 
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Another quotation serves to demonstrate the difficulty that Bull finds himself in when 
trying to reconcile justice and order in international society,
International order, or order within the society of states, is the condition of 
justice or equality among states or nations; except in a context of international 
order there can be no such thing as the equal rights of states to independence 
or of nations to govern themselves. World order, or order in the great society 
of all mankind, is similarly the condition of realisation of goals of human or of 
cosmopolitan justice; if there is not a certain minimum of security against 
violence, respect for undertakings and stability of rules of property, goals of 
political, social and economic justice for individual men or of a just 
distribution of burdens and regards in relation to the world common good can 
have no meaning.^**
Again, with the English School, as with Morgenthau, sovereignty is central, but 
largely instrumental. It is just that international society requires sovereignty, and 
international society is the grounding of international order.
Positivism and American social science: a ‘heretical hegemony'^**?
Both Morgenthau and the English school were, quite clearly, critical of ‘positivism’ 
but up to now we have said little directly about this much abused term. Thus, before 
we move on to more recently dominant forms of International Relations theory and 
see how they have treated sovereignty, we need to say something about that which 
critical approaches are supposed to be ‘post-’.
Perhaps the best place to start to unravel the meaning of positivist international 
relations is Robert Keohane’s presidential address to the American International
ibid. p. 91
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Studies Association in 1988, which did a great deal to define the parameters of the 
cunent debate, at least in the US.^* In his address, Keohane contrasts the dominant 
rationalist approach that characterises realist and neo-realist theory with newer, 
critical approaches that he terms reflectivist. Although Keohane’s sympathies are 
perhaps with realism and rationalism, his address is concerned to emphasise the 
achievements of reflectivism. Partly because of their dominance in the field, 
rationalists have developed a clear research agenda, carried out good empirical and 
historical studies and their approach has the virtue of simplicity. However, he 
concludes that, “rationalistic theories seem only to deal with one dimension of 
multidimensional reality: they are incomplete, since they ignore changes taking place 
in consciousness. They do not enable us to understand how interests change as a 
result of changes in belief systems. They obscure rather than illuminate the sources 
of states’ policy preferences”.*"^ Counterposed to this tradition is the reflectivist 
approach. Reflectivists seek to understand the historical, cultural and institutional 
contexts in which supposedly rational choices are made. This approach ‘stresses the 
role of impersonal social forces as well as the impact of cultural practices, norms and 
values that are not derived from calculations of interests’. K e o h a n e  suggests that 
this is a more sophisticated approach which can potentially account for the lacunae in 
rationalist theoiy -  its failure to adequately explain the circumstances under which 
international institutions will develop, how successful they will be, and why they 
sometimes demise, hi his conclusion, Keohane argues for the importance of 
synthesising the sophisticated theoretical approach of the reflectivists .with the 
concrete empirical research programme of the rationalists.
Keohane’s address is important for a number of reasons. First and foremost it is 
significant that such a prestigious address should discuss the reflectivist agenda, 
forcing rationalist scholars to take it seriously. Second, Keohane expresses some 
sympathy towards the reflectivists, who he welcomes for introducing new and
Tnternational Institutions: Two Approaches’ in James Dei Derian (ed.) International Theory: 
Critical Investigations (New York: N ew  York University Press 1995)
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ibid, p. 282 - 283
39
exciting ideas, but he wants to adopt these ideas to revitalise the rationalist approach 
rather than point the whole discipline in a new direction. The challenge that he sets 
the reflectivists is to establish an empirical, testable research agenda in exactly the 
way that the rationalists have. There are two points to be drawn out of this. First, this 
approach is symptomatic of the bias that still exists towards narrowly defined ‘useful’ 
theory -  implicitly, theory that deals with the concerns of statesmen. Secondly, and 
more interestingly for our purposes, Keohane’s address suggests a grudging 
realisation of the limits of the rationalist agenda, which has become moribund in the 
face of its more exciting rivals. Keohane finds that the rationalist agenda imposes 
unacceptable restraints on our ability to know the world, while the reflectivists 
impose unacceptable restraints on our ability to test our knowledge of the world. He 
therefore occupies an uncomfortable middle ground trying to carry out research with 
an ultimately untenable compromise between two contradictory positions. So what is 
the rationalist agenda? Many have taken it to be positivism, and although I have tried 
to show that there is more to traditional approaches than positivism, this is a good 
starting point.
The methodological basis for the new positivism in International Relations was 
provided by the rump of the Vienna Circle in the 1950s, in particular by Carnap, 
Hempel and Popper. They moved away from the narrowness of earlier positivist 
philosophy, and saw their role as providing a methodology for misguided social 
scientists rather than deconstructing philosophy as Wittgenstein had tried to do. 
Steve Smith suggests that the most influential variant was Hempel’s deductive- 
nomological approach, which argues that events are explained by general laws which 
are deduced by firstly postulating a general lay, then specifying its precondition, and 
then deducing the explanation of the observed event on the basis of the general law 
and its antecedent conditions. However, Smith argues that its features “have become 
somewhat detached from their philosophical roots as they have taken hold in 
international relations.” '^* A useful summary is given by Mark Neufeld, who has
Steve Smith Positivism and Beyond in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond  ed. Steve Smith, 
Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996) p. 15
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identified three key methodological characteristics of positivism: “(i) truth as 
correspondence; (ii) the methodological unity of science; and (iii) the value-free 
nature of social science. These three tenets rest, in turn, upon three basic 
assumptions: (i) the separation of subject and object; (ii) naturalism; and (iii) the 
separation of fact and v a l u e . T h e  strong version of positivism has not been highly 
influential in mainstream International Relations, but my argument is that even the 
weaker versions of positivism have been rejected by some of the most important 
traditional theorists, as we saw above. Kemieth Waltz, of course has ususally been 
seen as a central figure in positivist International Relations -  although it only fair to 
say that he has rejected the label. So before we turn to Waltz let me just briefly 
examine an unambiguously positivist International Relations theory, in the sense of 
being self-affirmed (although with an admixture of other traditions). This is the 
theory developed by Morton Kaplan.
In System and Process in International Politics, he makes a powerful and nuanced 
case for a game theory approach to international relations. Kaplan introduces the 
1964 edition of his book by distancing himself from positivism:
The proponents of scientific positivism saw me as an important cohort. Their 
antagonists saw me as the enemy incarnate. Few paid attention to what I 
actually said, to the fact that my philosophy was grounded in American 
pragmatism rather than in European positivism, that my approach to theory 
was comparative and empirical rather than general and abstract (for most of 
those who called themselves comparative theorists also thought of themselves 
as general theorists) or paid much attention to Part III of System and Process 
and the Appendices, where, in the pragmatist tradition, I outlined a scientific 
approach to values.
65 Mark Neufeld The Restructuring o f  International Relations Theoiy (Cambridge; Cambridge 
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We need to take Kaplan’s self-description seriously, as from the discussion of 
positivism above it is clear that the European positivist tradition covers a range of 
possible positions, but at least in its early stages it avoided the kind of analysis that 
Kaplan wants to engage in. Although his work can be located in the post-war 
positivist tradition in the social sciences more easily than in the American pragmatism 
of James, Dewey and Peirce,*"  ^ both traditions are present in his work. There is a 
tendency in post-positivism to characterise anything that they dislike as positivist, 
without considering the other traditions that they encompass. That Kaplan is self­
consciously locating himself within the pragmatist tradition is testament to the 
sophistication with which he argues for a behaviouralist approach.
Kaplan is well aware that there is a rich historical context to International Relations, 
but he argues that we must necessarily restrict our analysis to generalisations about a 
small number of variables, and that “we require models to test the generalizations we 
must employ at the level of international systems. There is no alternative -  no other 
method to state or to analyze these generalizations.”^^  This is at once a modest and 
an ambitious project. On the one hand, Kaplan restricts the ambition of the theorist to 
identifying and understanding a small range of actions in the international system. 
On the other hand, however, he believes that we can create sophisticated models on 
the basis of these generalisations that can provide us with a scientific understanding 
of the operation of the international system.
This claim is the basis of the behaviouralist approach that came to dominate 
American research on International Relations in the 1950s and maintains a powerful 
hold today. This form of positivist analysis created a greater division within the 
discipline than had been apparent before, and was the basis for the contemporary 
approaches that are explicitly anti-positivist. In the 1960s the classical theorists in 
international relations, most especially certain members of the English School,
For a very good discussion o f  pragmatism see James T Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: European 
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engaged directly with the behavioiiralists, and in doing so were forced to consider the 
basis of their own positions. The attack from the English School is the most 
interesting, as they were furthest from the positivist tradition, emphasising instead a 
more nuanced giasp of the contributions made by other disciplines to our 
understanding of international affairs.
The opening salvo in this attack on behaviourism was made in Hedley Bull’s 
influential article in World Politics in 1966, ‘International Theory: The Case for a 
Classical A p p r o a c h . I n  this essay Bull advocates
the approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law, and 
that is characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of 
judgement and by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict 
standards of verification and proof there is very little of significance that can 
be said about international relations, that general propositions about this 
subject must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process of 
perception and intuition, and that these general propositions cannot be 
accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate 
to their doubtful origin.^ **
As if this was not sufficiently direct, Bull goes on to savage the behavioiiralists’ work 
as “in some cases distorted and impoverished by a fetish for measurement” *^ which 
Bull believes is an absurd and impossible way to approach the complexities of human 
society. Kaplan’s response to Bull is equally withering, and written from the 
perspective of one who is winning the war. He argues that the traditionalists ‘ “view 
philosophy as elegant but undisciplined speculation -  speculation devoid of serious 
substantive or methodological concerns. Thus traditionalists repeat the same refrain
^  Morton A. Kaplan ‘Problems o f  Theory Building and Theoiy Confirmation in International Politics’ 
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like a gramophone endlessly playing a single record; that refrain is beautifully 
orchestrated, wittily produced, and sensitive only to the wear of the needle in the 
groove"/^ This rhetorical reposte was perhaps unnecessary, as the positivist 
approach was securely established in America and the methodological eclecticism of 
the English School won few converts across the Atlantic^^.
Positivism was secure for a generation. The English School declined to the point at 
which the case was made for closure, '^  ^ and it was only with the thawing of the Cold 
War that post-positivists identified themselves as a coherent, if eclectic, group in 
conscious opposition to positivist methodologies.
Kenneth Waltz and the logic of anarchy: sovereignty ignored
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics has had an immense impact on 
International Relations since its publication in 1979. Waltz’s realism is consistent 
with the move to more scientific and objective methods that had become dominant in 
American social science at that time, even though his version of it is very different 
(and explicitly critical of) those like Kaplan’s. The book quickly became established 
as a reference point for these debates and inspired a generation of scholars to adopt 
Waltz’s research programme. Like Morgenthau, Waltz has little to say directly about 
sovereignty. His focus is on the way that the international system is constituted by 
the balance between the great powers. Other sovereign states position themselves in 
relation to the great powers, choosing to balance by joining the lesser power, or 
bandwaggoning with the hegemon, or joining the revolutionary power. However, 
unlike Morgenthau, because of the emphasis on the structure of the system and the 
downgrading, as a result, of nations of agency, sovereignty simply becomes a given 
of the system, and not a value either instrumentally or intrinsically important. Again,
" ibid, p. 33
Morton A. Kaplan The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations in 
Knorr and Rosenau (eds) The International System p. 61 
Though there are signs that this is now no longer true. 2003 saw the establishment o f an ‘English 
School’ section in the US International Studies Association.
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this section will begin with a consideration of Waltz’s methodology, before 
considering his approach to sovereignty.
Waltz’s 'Positivism ’
From the publication of his first book, Man, the State and Waf^  in 1959, Waltz 
sought to distinguish his approach from the classical realism associated most with 
Morgenthau. He wrote that “The attempt to derive a philosophy of politics fiom an 
assumed nature of man leads one to a concern with the role of ethics in statecraft 
without providing criteria for distinguishing ethical fiom unethical behavior.”^^  
Already, we see his concern for theoretical rigour.
One of Waltz’s major concerns was to establish International Relations as a credible 
and independent academic discipline, separate from Political Science. This, he 
argues, is necessary for the construction of international theory; “first, one must 
conceive of international politics as a bounded realm or domain; second, one must 
discover some law-like regularities within it; and third, one must develop a way of 
explaining the obseiwed regularities.”^^
Waltz sharply divides national and international politics, “National politics is the 
realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of 
power, of struggle, and of accommodation.”^^  Indeed, it seems that he cannot 
conceive of international theory except as an absolutely distinct realm: “To be a 
success, such a theory has to show how international politics can be conceived of as a 
domain distinct from the economic, social, and other international domains that one 
may conceive of.”^^  He then continues by framing the problem around his own
Roy E. Jones, The English school o f international relations; a case for closure Review o f  
International Studies (Vol 7 N o 1 pp 1 -  13 1981)
Kenneth N. Waltz Man, the State and War: A theoretical analysis (New York: Columbia University 
Press 1959) 
ibid. p. 37
Kenneth N. Waltz Theory o f  International Politics (New  York: McGraw Hill 1979) p. 116 
ibid. p. 113 
ibid. p. 79
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solution: “To mark international-political systems off from other international 
systems, and to distinguish systems-level from unit-level forces, requires showing 
how political structures are generated and how they affect, and are affected by, the 
units of the system.” ®^
Waltz is trying to construct an explanatory theory of international politics. It aims, 
“to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to say why 
patterns of behavior recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that 
none or few of the actors may like. The structure of a system acts as a constraining 
and disposing force, and because it does so systems theories explain and predict 
continuity within a system. A systems theory shows why changes at the unit level 
produce less change of outcomes than one would expect in the absence of systemic 
constraints. A theory of international politics can tell us some things about expected 
international-political outcomes, about the resilience systems may show in response 
to the unpredictable acts of a varied set of state, and about the expected effects of 
systems on states.”^’
Sovereignty
Waltz’s approach to sovereignty is determined by the demands of his structural 
account of international politics, which requires that sovereign states be seen as like 
units performing the same functions, competing for power in an anarchical world. 
The impoverishment of realist theory from Morgenthau to Waltz is apparent. Waltz 
shows little interest in the formation of states, the nature of political community, or 
the significance of the nation. Instead, states are assumed as actors, and the 
international system is characterised by their interaction -  in particular, the actions of 
major states. While Morgenthau gives his readers a sense of the dilemmas that he 
faces himself, the difficulties that he encounters, and the wealth of sources that he
ibid. p. 79 
ibid. p. 69
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tries to assimilate, Waltz conveys a certainty that he has discovered the laws of 
motion that govern the international system.
For Waltz, therefore, sovereignty is dealt with very briefly, in an almost dismissive 
manner. As noted in the introduction. Waltz claims that “To say that states are 
sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please, that they are free of others’ 
influence, that they are able to get what they want. ... To say that a state is sovereign 
means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external 
problems.”^^  But where Morgenthau sees a range of factors explaining the 
organisation of international politics around the concept of the national interest. Waltz 
reduces it to the international system. If only the system is understood, then we will 
understand international relations. He writes that “National politics consists of 
differentiated units performing specified functions, hitemational politics consists of 
like units duplicating one another’s activities.”^^  But only some of these units are 
important for understanding international relations. Once we understand the actions 
of the great powers, then the little powers only have the choice between 
bandwaggoning and balancing; they can either join one of the great powers or with 
the great powers’ enemies.
Waltz leads realism away from its classical roots by introducing the toolkit of modem 
social science. Such an approach could only triumph to the extent that it has in the 
context of a depoliticised atmosphere where most theorists and practitioners shared 
exactly the same prejudices about the larger context of international affairs. And it is 
for this reason that the critical approaches that have largely shaped contemporary 
debates about sovereignty in International Relations emerged largely as an explicit 
reaction to Waltzian neo-realism. And this, of course, in part accounts (as we shall 
see) for the tendency to read all Traditional’ approaches tluough the lens of that 
encounter.
ibid. p. 96 
ibid. p. 97
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Conclusion
Three points arise out of this chapter. The first is the sheer diversity of traditional 
approaches. Whereas Waltz develops a social-scientific approach specific to 
international relations -  and in this is followed at least in part by Krasner - 
Morgenthau drew on a wide range of material to produce a more nuanced theory that 
was not positivist. The second point is that traditional approaches are not universally 
guilty of the charge of ‘amorality’ that their critics level at them. Morgenthau, in 
particular, was keenly concerned with ethical questions. The third point is that 
although the idea of sovereignty is of great interest to critical writers today, it was not 
as central to traditional theorists as they imply. Morgenthau discusses the national 
interest, while Waltz is interested in the balance between great powers. Sovereignty 
is not the main analytical category for either writer. As the next chapter will go on to 
show, many critics today lack this sensitivity. This is important, as it suggests that 
the claim that the critique of sovereignty is a reaction to the direction of previous 
work in International Relations is not the whole story.
The approaches discussed in this chapter, together with the work of many other 
scholars, has been widely criticised by critical scholars for employing a positivist 
methodology that seeks to apply the methods of the natural sciences onto human 
society. The focus of this chapter has been to explain rather than criticise, but two 
general criticisms that have been made of positivist approaches should be mentioned. 
The first is that the data for human society is inadequate. Since society is dynamic, it 
cannot stop for measurements to be taken. Furthermore, the measurements that do 
exist are often unreliable, or hard to compare. A classic example of this problem is 
the scientific study of the causes of war. There exist widely different definitions of 
what should count as war, and huge discrepancies in the historical data over issues 
such as casualty r a t e s . A  second, and more fundamental, criticism, is that human 
society must necessary fioistrate attempts to study it scientifically because it has a
^  See Bryan C. Schmidt The Political Discourse ofAnarchy: A Disciplinary History o f  International 
Relations (New York: SUNY Press 1998)
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fundamentally different logic from the natural world. There are many different 
varieties of this argument, but an influential variation claims that humans consciously 
act upon the data that are produced about their behaviour.
These inform many of the approaches discussed in the next two chapters, which take 
the story of sovereignty forward to the contemporary critics of traditional approaches, 
focusing on critical theorists, poststmcturalists, feminists and constmctivists.
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2 New Approaches: Constructivism, Poststructuralism and the 
Challenge to Positivism
The traditional theories of International Relations discussed in Chapter 1 focus on 
statesmen and their desire for order. They were aimed at describing and often, not 
always explicitly, limiting the formulation and execution of foreign policy to a small 
élite entrusted with identifying and pursuing the national interest. The contrast 
between these approaches and their modem critics shows a great divergence between 
high and low politics, and between the rhetoric of elites and peoples. Against the 
national interest, critics flag up universal human interests. Against the anti­
democratic elitism of the realists, they call for popular participation in global politics 
and for the development of a more cosmopolitan sensibility. However, the next two 
chapters suggest that the kind of participation that is advocated and the changes that 
are called for, are an impoverishment of the democratic content of the right to 
national self-determination that was identified in the introduction. The reason that is 
identified for this is that the ‘self that is described by the social theories that the 
critics draw upon is a much reduced version of the active, subjective force that is 
called for by earlier approaches.
Compared to the empirical bias of traditional theories, the modem critics are 
conspicuously speculative. In place of the emphasis on power politics, nation-states 
and empirical research, there has been a proliferation of critical methodologies from 
postmodemism to constmctivism and an expansion of the disciplinary imagination to 
encompass political economy, the study of non-governmental organisations, the 
promotion of human rights, the development of ethics, and feminist concems about 
inter-personal relations and role of children. While they differ about a good deal, 
these approaches have been termed ‘post-positivisf theories, emphasising a common 
hositlity to ‘scientific’ or ’rationalist’ temper of much contemporary political science 
and Intemational Relations. There are different brands of post-positivism that will be 
discussed in the next two chapters, but they share a number of common features. 
They reject the idea that scholais can step outside of the societies that they are
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studying and leave behind their prejudices and preferences to engage in objective 
research. As a corollary to this, post-positivist scholars tend to have an explicit 
normative agenda, constructing their research around an investigation into the 
possibilities for new kinds of intemational politics to emerge. However, in an 
important contrast with earlier critical approaches to politics post-positive theorists 
eschew the idea of basing their thought on an active and self-conscious human 
subject.
The debate between positivism and post-positivism has been posed as a vital contest 
over politics as well as method. It is claimed that it goes to the very heart of 
contemporary Intemational Relations, raising fundamental theoretical and 
methodological issues, as well as forcing the discipline to confront its own history 
and question its purpose. It has been described as the third of the ‘great debates’ 
which have forged Intemational Relations as a distinct area of academic study, 
following on from the debates between the realists and idealists, and between the 
classical theorists and the behavioralists.^ For a ‘great debate’, however, there is 
remarkably little engagement between the two approaches, which continue to engage 
in parallel research programmes without getting involved in the meta-theoretical 
disputes that we are told are so important. It is notable that the writers who are 
opposed to positivism choose to describe themselves as ‘post-’ rather than ‘anti-’ 
positivist, implying that they are building on the mins of an approach that is already 
discredited. In spite of this confidence, they work in a discipline where scholars 
pursuing a positivist agenda still represent a significant, if  not dominant, force.
However, if the claims made for post-positivism really were wholly vacuous, there 
would be no need to engage with it (the course adopted by many of its intellectual 
opponents). In order to establish the importance of this debate, we need to look 
beyond the issues that the protagonists have identified as important to show the 
direction that the debate points towards.
’ See Y osef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects o f  Intemational Theory in a Post-Positivist 
Era’ International Studies Quarterly (Vol 33 No 3 1989 pp 235 -  254)
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The term ‘post-positivist’ is an almost accidental epithet, which unites a range of 
conflicting perspectives against a putative ‘positivist’ enemy. As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, the term ‘positivist’ has always been problematic, and in 
International Relations its meaning stretches from a naiTOw description of American 
behaviouralism to a definition which encompasses all rationalist theories.^ The 
former meaning is used by more conservative post-positivists who reject the extremes 
of number-crunching positivism, but are not prepared to concede too much ground to 
the anti-foundationalism of the postmodems. It is also adopted by some positivists 
who argue that there has been a long-standing prejudice against positivism, at least in 
Britain.^ The latter meaning is used by writers who want to challenge what they see 
as the enlightenment project more broadly. The danger here is that they use this as a 
rhetorical point by associating sophisticated rationalist theory with mindlessly 
instrumental behaviouralism. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, for example, quote 
Condorcet, the most extreme Panglossian of the enlightenment writers, and note that 
“writing in the spirit of the enlightemnent [he] proposes to apply the methods and 
assumptions of the natural sciences to the study of human beings”."* This is a 
remarkable claim to make about a man writing in a period before the natural and 
social sciences had clearly been distinguished from each other at all. It would be 
more accurate to say that he was contributing to the flowering of human knowledge in 
all areas which was taking place in that period, rather than try to discredit his 
enterprise by associating it with ‘modem’ positivism.
 ^The former sense is the more usual; a good example o f  the latter is to be found in Steve Smith 
‘Positivism and Beyond’ in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds) International Theory: 
Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996) and ‘The Self-Images o f a 
Discipline: A  Genealogy o f  International Relations Theory’ in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds) 
International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity 1995).
 ^In ‘The Enigma o f  Martin Wight’ Review o f  Intel-national Studies 1981 (Vol 7 N o .l pp. 15 -  22), 
Michael Nicholson writes that, ‘Too many English writers disdainfully produce a list o f  terms such as 
“systems analysis”, “simulation”, “games theory” as i f  they were a list o f diseases which it would be 
undesirable for a healthy student to catch’ (p. 22)
Martin Hollis and Steve Smitli Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon 1991) p. 49
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This chapter introduces some of the main themes in constructivism and 
poststructuralism. My aim is not to give an exhaustive account of the many strands of 
these approaches, but to isolate some of the more important themes and describe 
some of the debates that were decisive in their development and elaboration. In the 
first section I look at constructivism, which has proved to be one of the most 
influential critical approaches. One reason for this success is its ability to adapt itself 
to mainstream research agendas, and to take up ideas from other approaches. One of 
my main aims in this section, therefore, is to define the distinctive contribution that 
has been made by constructivism. In the next section I turn to one of the most 
controversial approaches within post-positivism, that of poststructuralism. I treat this 
more briefly, as it has never established as much of a hold over Intemational 
Relations as in other disciplines. Tracing all of the components of poststmctural 
approaches would require a weighty thesis in itself, so I limit this study to identifying 
the most important elements that are pertinent in Intemational Relations. The next 
chapter continues this analysis by discussing the other two main post-positivist 
approaches, feminism and critical theory. This part of the thesis concludes by 
discussing how these four approaches treat the question of human agency, which is 
important for my overall argument because I claim that a more credible radical 
approach to sovereignty requires a stronger sense of active agency that can 
consciously shape socety.
Constructivism
The belated incorporation of constmctivist approaches into Intemational Relations 
represents the first serious challenge to the neorealist/neoliberal debate that divided 
the discipline in the 1980s, and provides a non-positivist altemative that had already 
been employed in a number of historical and sociological studies of the world polity. 
Although constmctivism was not necessarily the first post-positivist approach 
chronologically, it is the logical starting point as in the weak sense that they do not 
believe that the character of the intemational system is natural or given, but rather 
that it is shaped by actors and discourses, all of the post-positivist theorists are
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constmctivists. There is, however, a group of writers including John Gerard Ruggie, 
Alexander Wendt and Friedrich Kratochwil who rmderstand their own work as 
constmctivist in a narrower sense than this, although it is not always obvious what 
makes them distinct. Many mainstream theorists are baffled by the interest in 
constmctivism because they take the minimal claims that it makes at face value rather 
than examine the hidden sources and assumptions that it makes. Lea Brilmayr speaks 
for many when she writes that “Liberals are impatient with long-winded critical 
expositions of what liberals see as obvious: that social enviromnent influences 
personal identity,”  ^ This chapter, however, will argue that they do represent a new, 
distinct and important theoretical approach which has been misrepresented by those 
who are unwilling to look at their sources in social theory.*^
The idea that society is determined by the interplay of social forces rather than given 
by nature has a long pedigree. Recently however, sociologists have developed 
constmctivism into an independent theoretical approach, which has been applied to a 
range of issues.^ These theories offer a radical challenge to the status quo in the 
sphere of politics as well as social theory, and many of the constmctivists seem quite 
close to postmodern accounts. In discussing their own intellectual roots, however, 
constmctivists are more likely to refer to a distinctive Anglo-American philosophical 
tradition including, for example, Wittgenstein and his English interpreter, Peter 
Winch and the linguistic tradition that has been carried on by analytic philosophers 
like John Searle, rather than Foucault. This is partly for tactical reasons, as 
continental philosophers get short shrift in American political science departments, 
but also reflects real differences between these approaches. Discussing continental
 ^Lea Brilmayr American Hegemony: Political M orality in a One-Superpower World (New Haven: 
Yale University Press 1994) p. 210
 ^Whilst I recognise that constructivism exists outside social theory -  in philosophy, for example -  this 
thesis focuses on its incorporation into social theory and particularly International Relations.
 ^The sociology o f  race and sex are the best examples o f  this, and it is a mark o f  the success o f the 
constructivist project that we now use the terms ethnicity and gender to refer to the socially determined 
nature o f these phenomena. Many other areas have been discussed as socially constmcted, however, 
including what would appear to be the most natural things in the world, nature and the body. For the 
former, see Klaus Eder The Social Construction o f  Nature: The Sociology o f  Ecological Enlightenment 
(London: Sage 1996) and the latter, Bryan S. Turner The Body and Society: Explorations in Social 
Theory 2"** edition (London: Sage 1996) and Chris Shilling The Body and Social Theory (London: Sage 
1994).
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writers therefore does not expose the unacknowledged sources of constructivism as 
much as clarify some of the unstated assumptions that they make which are more 
explicit in writers like Husserl and Mannheim. In Intemational Relations, this 
conseiwatism is even more pronounced, and although some writers make 
unconvincing attempts to read post-stmcturalism as a subset of their own school, the 
writers that they are most likely to cite are Wittgenstein, Winch, Searle, Giddens and 
the critical realist Roy Bhaskar.^ However, it is possible to trace the roots of the 
constmctivist approach in continental philosophy and inter-war sociology. Although 
these sources are rarely cited, at least in Intemational Relations, a discussion of some 
of these writers clarifies what is distinctive about the constmctivist challenge to 
positivism.
Origins o f Constructivism
The starting point for constmctivism could be pushed back as far as the renaissance 
and enlightenment, when Vico established human society as a distinct area of inquiry 
from natural science.^ The nineteenth century hermeneuts undoubtedly also play a 
part in the prehistory of constmctivism. However, is with Edmund Husserl and Karl 
Mannheim that we find a recognisably constmctivist approach emerging. Husserl 
established the idea of the intersubjective creation of meaning, and Mannheim linked 
our knowledge of the world to the social circumstances in which knowledge is 
created. Husserl was a phenomenologist who is perhaps best known in the social 
sciences for arguing that certain large philosophical questions can be bracketed out 
and not dealt with, in favour of smaller problems, many of which are of interest to 
social scientists. It is not necessary, for example, to have an answer to the question of 
whether or not there is an extemal world in order to study the war in Bosnia. For
® Key sources include Ludwig WiiXgenstcm Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell 1973), 
Peter Winch The Idea o f  a Social Science and its Relations to Philosophy (London: Routledge 1988), 
Jolin Searle The Consti'uction o f  Social Reality (London: Penguin 1996), Anthony Giddens The 
Constitution o f  Society (Cambridge: Polity 1986) and Roy Bhaskar The Possibility o f  Naturalism 
(London: Routledge 1998).
 ^Giambattista Vico The New Science (London: Penguin 1999)
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constmctivism, however, his key contribution is the idea that the world is created 
intersubj ectively :
. . . [W]e speak of the “intersubjective constitution” of the world, meaning by 
this the total system of manners of givenness, however hidden, and also of 
modes of validity for egos; through this constitution, if we systematically 
uncover it, the world as it is for us becomes understandable as a stmcture of 
meaning formed out of elementary intentionalities. The being of these 
intentionalities themselves is nothing but one meaning-formation operating 
together with another, “constituting” new meaning through synthesis. And 
meaning is never anything but meaning in modes of validity, that is, as related 
to intending ego-subjects which effect validity.**^
His prose is tortuous, but Husserl’s point is remarkably incipient. He anticipates not 
only the development of constmctivism, but goes a long way towards the 
Habermasian turn in critical theory, which will be discussed in the next chapter. He 
argues that as we individually make sense of the world we interact with other people 
who are also trying to understand the circumstances that they find themselves in. 
This process creates meaning that did exist prior to the actions of these ‘egos’. These 
structures of meaning constitute the social world, hence;
Only by starting from the ego and the system of its transcendental functions 
and accomplishments can we methodically exhibit transcendental 
intersubjectivity and its transcendental communalization, through which, in 
the functioning system of ego-poles, the “world for all”, and for each subject 
as world for all is constituted.**
Here Husserl explains intersubjectivity as making sense only from the point of the 
individual ego. From this we can extrapolate the ‘world for all’. It is notable in both
Edmund Husserl The Crisis o f  the Ew opean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An 
Intr'oduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1970) p. 168
" ibid, p. 185-186
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of these quotations that he uses the term intersubjectivity where society would 
suffice. This is not just an incidental feature of his prose or an arbitrary choice of the 
translator. He is making the point that there are no essential determinates that cohere 
‘society’ other than the search for meaning and understanding by individual egos. 
What we term society is, for Husserl, the networks of meaning between these egos. 
This is one of Husserl’s outstanding contributions to twentieth century social theory, 
and one, which has infused many other intellectual movements. The idea of 
intersubjectivity has become so well established that contemporary theorists think it 
scarcely worth noting, which is why Husserl remains worth reading as he makes 
explicit the ideas that form the background assumptions of more recent writers. In 
considering the constmctivists' account of agency this will be important, as the idea 
of intersubjectivity degrades the scope for conscious human action whilst avoiding 
the extremes of iirationalism that form a separate tradition.*^
Mamiheim is important in the development of constmctivist approaches because of 
his linking of the development of knowledge to social forces. Against the 
conventional positivist accounts of the time, Mannheim wanted to analyse the 
relationship between knowledge and existence.*^ He claims that:
the principal propositions of the social sciences are neither mechanistically 
extemal nor formal, nor do they represent purely quantitative correlations but 
rather situational diagnoses in which we use, by and large, the same concrete 
concepts and thought models which were created for activistic purposes in 
real life. It is clear, furthermore, that every social science diagnosis is closely 
connected with the evaluations and unconscious orientations of the observer 
and that the critical self-clarification of the social sciences is intimately bound 
up with the critical self-clarification of our orientation in the real world.*"*
In Husserl’s time this included his student, Martin Heidegger and the fascist social theorists. In our 
own it is best represented by the post-structuralist project which will be discussed below.
Karl Mannlieim Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology o f  Knowledge (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co 1936)
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This is a decisive refutation of the positivist aspiration to a neutral social science. 
Mannheim goes on to discuss ideology in the broad sense not of the system of ideas 
of an opponent, but of an age or a concrete social group. Once knowledge has been 
linked to group interests in this way it is a small step to claim that, “A modern theory 
of knowledge which takes account of the relational as distinct from the merely 
relative character of all historical knowledge must start with the assumption that there 
are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute tmth 
independently of the values and position of the subject and unrelated to the social 
context”.*^  Thus Mannheim claims that knowledge is, to employ a slightly 
anachronistic term, socially constructed. He reflects on his argument by noting that:
We see then that we have employed metaphysical-ontological value 
judgements of which we have not been aware. But only those will be alarmed 
by this recognition who are prey to the positivistic prejudices of a past 
generation, and who still believe in the possibility of being completely 
emancipated in their thinking from ontological, metaphysical, and ethical 
presuppositions.*^
In other words, knowledge is intrinsically and inevitably bound up with historically 
specific circumstances and social groups. The only escape from this is in the utopian 
thinking which is by definition incongruous with social reality, but which is needed to 
maintain our sense of the possibility of transcendence. It is a short step fiom 
Mannheim’s argument about the socially constructed nature of knowledge to 
contemporary claims that society is constructed from the knowledge which we 
believe that we have of it.
One final comment that can be made about the relationship between contemporary 
constructivism and Mannheim is his self-congratulatory identification of the
ibid, p. 41 
ibid, p. 51 
ibid, p. 7 0 - 7 1  
ibid, p. 79
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intellectual as the vanguard of the new society, a point that became more pronounced 
as he became more conservative.*^ Intellectuals, he argues, are ‘de-classed’ by their 
education, and therefore have to choose between voluntary class alignment and 
“scrutiny of their own social moorings and the quest for the fulfilment of their 
mission as the predestined advocate of the intellectual interests of the whole”. This 
self-serving argument prefigures a strong tendency in contemporary constructivism 
towards emphasising the role of the intellectual in framing the perimeters of 
discourses towards the construction of desirable identities. This is an important part 
of the uptake of constructivism in Intemational Relations, which I now turn to.
Constructivism in International Relations
Constructivism in Intemational Relations has avoided the extremes of sociology 
where even the human body is seen as a human invention. Alexander Wendt has 
defined constmctivism in Intemational Relations as “a stmctural theory of 
intemational politics that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal 
actors in the system; (2) the key stmctures in the states system are intersubjective 
rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in large part constmcted 
by those stmctures, rather than being determined endogenously to the system by 
human nature or domestic politics.”*^  The aim of this approach is to “analyze how 
processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social stmctures -  cooperative or 
conflictual -  that shape actors’ identities and interests and the significance of their 
material context s .Cons tmct iv i sm,  as defined by Wendt, is explicitly statist, 
contrary to many of the other post-positivist approaches. His argument is with 
realism and rationalism, which he argues cannot account for historical change in the 
intemational system. The constmctivist altemative that he outlines emphasises the 
way that apparently etemal aspects of world politics like power politics and anarchy
See, for example. Diagnosis o f  Our Time: Wartime Essays o f  a Sociologist (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner and Co. 1943), which was also perhaps the first use o f  the term ‘third w ay’.
Alexander Wendt Identity and Structural Change in International Politics in Y osef Lapid and 
Friedrich Kratochwil (eds) The Return o f  Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
1996) p. 48
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are shaped by the interrelationship between agency and stmcture, which he boiTOws 
from Giddens’ stmcturation theory. Here he takes a middle ground between the 
realists and rationalists on one side, who emphasise stmcture, and the post­
stmcturalists on the other who see these phenomena as entirely constituted by 
discourse. The continuum between these approaches has been a source of much 
disagreement among constructivists, who have defined themselves against one 
another and adopted different strategies for pursuing their various agendas from 
stmcturation theory, scientific realism and speech act theory. These are shades of 
opinion rather than splits, and it is a source of strength that constructivism can 
accommodate these differences. However, there is a problem with defining a cut-off 
point, for if constmctivism is to incorporate all post-positivist methodologies then it 
becomes meaningless to discuss it as a separate approach.
Ruggie has recently classified stmcturalist approaches in Intemational Relations as 
consisting of neo-classical, postmodem and hybrid approaches.^* This is perhaps the 
widest definition of constmctivism. The neo-classical constmctivists, of whom 
Ruggie is a representative, are committed to the ideal of social science and aim to 
make sense of intersubjective meanings using a variety of approaches. John Searle’s 
speech act theory is cited as an influence on this school. The postmodem 
constmctivists are influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault and Denida and include writers 
like Richard Ashley, James Der Derian and R. B. J. Walker in Intemational Relations. 
These writers stress the linguistic constmction of subjects and, Ruggie claims, are 
pessimistic about the possibility of a legitimate social science. I treat this approach 
separately below as poststmcturalist. Finally, Ruggie identifies a constmctivist 
approach which lies somewhere between the first two, with intellectual roots in the 
scientific realism of Roy Bhaskar. Alexander Wendt and David Dessler are cited as 
Intemational Relations scholars working with this approach. These writers are not 
concemed with the distinction between insider and outsider approaches described by
Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’ International Security (Vol 20 N o 1 pp 71 -  
81) 1995 p. 81
John Gerard Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constmctivist Challenge’ International Organization (Vol 52 No 4 pp. 855 -  885) 1998
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Hollis and Smith, but see scientific investigation of the natural and social vyorld as 
concerned with nonobsevables. They believe that since subjects are not conscious of 
the intersubjective understandings that constitute social life the distinction between 
insider and outsider is just as invalid as in the study of quarks. We could perhaps add 
a fourth dimension to Ruggie’s taxonomy with intemational society theorists like 
Nick Wheeler and Tim Dunne who have tried to fuse constmctivism with the English 
School, which was discussed in chapter one.^^ The problem with this sort of 
classification, however, is that it risks losing sight of what is specific about 
constmctivism. Simply to assert that post-stmcturalism is a variety of constmctivism 
is to lose sight of what is distinctive in the theory, and to treat it as virtually 
synonymous with post-positivism in its broadest sense. In what follows, I 
accordingly restrict my comments to the narrower sense of constmctivism in 
discussing it application to the central problems of Intemational Relations and 
especially to sovereignty.
Security
Ruggie has significantly modified Sir Arthur Salter’s famous description of the idea 
of collective security arrangements as a permanent potential alliance against the 
unknown enemy to that of a permanent potential alliance on behalf of the unknown 
victim.^^ The idea of defending victims is a significant departure from the conception 
of international politics that Sir Arthur Salter’s generation would have understood. 
However, at this level of analysis in global politics a concem with the unknown 
victim is perhaps an unsuiprising feature of any theory of intemational relations in an 
age when great military stmggles are fought in defence of the victims of Hussain’s 
Iraq, Milosovic’s Serbia and the ragbag armies of warlords in Africa. The 
intemational arena is, and perhaps always has been, a fearful sphere. The fact that 
Ruggie, a consultant to United States government agencies and the United Nations,
Timothy Dunne, ‘The Social Construction o f  Intemational Society’ European Journal o f  
International Relations 1 (3) 1998 pp. 367-389 is typical o f  this approach.
John Gerard Ruggie Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1996) p. 21
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should be concemed with victims abroad points to the critical project that the 
constructivists are engaged in. The challenge that we face is to identify ourselves 
with the victims, and if  we take the constmctivist claim that how we think about 
society determines its nature then this means accounting for the fomiation of identity 
in world politics.
For Wendt, “Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and 
foremost with preservation or ‘security’ of the self. Concepts of security therefore 
differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively 
with the other”.^ "* In other words, identity is formed around the idea of self- 
preservation fi'om an ‘other’ that is constituted as an enemy. This approach has been 
used extensively in social theory to explain the marginalisation of certain individuals 
and groups.^^ hi this case, the ‘self is the state, and Wendt applies this framework to 
state security, identifying the state as an actor that constmcts an identity against other 
states, and derives its interests from its identity. This makes an assumption that the 
behaviour of a corporate body like a nation can be understood in the same way as an 
individual ego. Although Hegel used the idea of the master-slave dialectic to explain 
society through the idea of selves and others, it is not quite clear how Wendt can 
adapt this to deal with the collective self of the state, which he does not open up for 
analysis. Instead the idea of self and other is used as an analogy for other processes 
which he describes.
Law
In Intemational Relations the constructivists have made perhaps the most significant 
contribution to our understanding of law. Whereas in legal theory an array of 
approaches have coalesced around similar themes to create a school of critical legal 
theory, and in social theory feminism, postmodemism and critical theory have all had 
a major impact upon thinking about the relationship between law and society, in
Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make o f it: the social consti'uctions o f  power politics’ 
International Organization 1992 (Vol 46 N o 2 pp 391 -  425) p. 399
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International Relations the constructivists have mounted the most sustained and 
theoretically rigorous challenge to legal positivism. In opposition to the dichotomy 
between a communitarian insistence on the importance of attitudes and values and an 
individualist advocacy of rights and rules, Kratochwil sets the basis for a 
constmctivist approach to law which emphasises the inter-determination of the two.^  ^
Law is both a determinate of society (at the global as well as the national level) and 
detemiined by social practices. In this section I discuss how this mediated 
relationship is described by constmctivists.
The main aspect of constmctivist thinking about law is the expansion of the term to 
include not only written mles but also tacit understandings and certain modes of 
reasoning. Kratochwil defines law as the application of existing norms to a 
controversy by a third party.^^ This, clearly, is very different from the lay 
understanding of law as a body of mles that are enforced by an extemal agency. It is, 
in Kratochwil’s reading, “better understood as a particular style of reasoning with 
rules”.^  ^ This opens the floodgates to consider a whole host of relationships at the 
global level as forms of law. Rather than being a body of enforceable mles, law 
encompasses understandings, regimes and agreements. Once this definition is 
accepted, law can be seen as constitutive of intemational society and identified as the 
arena in which norms should be contested. Sovereignty is constituted through law, 
tlirough the recognition of intemal legitimacy by other intemational actors, and it is 
tlirough the legitimation of sovereignty that intemal hierarchy is justified.^^ The 
positive and negative aspects of this reading of intemational law become apparent 
fiom Kratochwil’s conclusion, where he aigues that,
Edward Said Orientalism: Western Conceptions o f  the Orient (London: Penguin 1995) is the classic 
statement o f  this approach, but it is an important element in critical theory and poststructuralism.
Friedrich V. Kratochwil Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the conditions o f  practical and legal 
reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1989) Chapter Two. 
ibid p. 210 
ibid, p. 211 
ibid.
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It would be a legalism of the worst kind to reduce the problem of compliance 
to the technical problem of ensuring noi*m-conformity at the least cost through 
the elaboration of repressive techniques, while leaving the issue of justifying 
actions in terms of broader principles, demands for justice, and pleas for 
peaceful change to history and philosophy.
These are noble sentiments, but they only make sense in relation to the expanded 
notion of law that Kratochwil endorses. His argument is almost tautological in the 
context of his earlier remarks. A naiTow understanding of law could quite 
legitimately indulge in the kind of Tegalism’ that he castigates, adopting a purely 
instrumental approach to enforcing decisions that have been made in another sphere. 
This is defensible if we allow that ‘broader principles, demands for justice and pleas 
for peaceful change’ can all be made at a level of decision making that is apart from 
the legal process itself. However, once all agreements are held to be law, and once 
law becomes a fonn of reasoning rather than a body of enforceable rules, then these 
principles must play a role in the legal process.
For an account of how norms emerge we must turn to the work of Nicholas Onuf, 
who was one of the first intemational relations scholars to explicitly identify himself 
as a constmctivist in his influential book. World o f Our Making?^ Onuf gives a wide- 
ranging account of the diverse elements that constitute the constmctivist approach in 
social theory before applying it to Intemational Relations. Anthony Giddens’ 
stmcturation theory is a particular influence on Onuf s approach, but he has also 
applied the speech act theory developed by John Searle in dealing with particular 
issues in intemational relations, including an important section on law and language. 
Against the legal positivists who argue for the primacy and legitimacy of statute law, 
and the natural law theorists who believe that there are imperatives which exist 
outside specific social and historical settings, Onuf argues that mles emerge and are 
justified through social convention. He is aware of the problems that this poses for
ibid, p. 256
Nicolas Greenwood Onuf World o f  Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and Intem ational 
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64
conventional accounts of law as well as for intemational relations: “The possibility 
that legality is not what it seems to be poses a far greater challenge to legal theory. It 
calls into question the ontological presumption that mles at least in the hard core of 
law are positivities of a kind and thus the paradigmatic claim that law is a distinct 
phenomenon -  an operative paradigm -  worthy of its own discipline.”^^  The 
important element of this claim for our purposes is not that it undermines the basis of 
law as a distinct academic discipline, but that it tears law away from the lavyyers and 
plants it firmly in the discipline of Intemational Relations as a central constitutive 
element of the intemational order.
Onuf explains this in terms of the constitutive role that law plays in society, and 
particularly in intemational society, by setting the background against which choices 
are made: “rules do not ‘govem’ all that is social. People always have a choice, 
which is to follow mles or not. Instead mles govem the constmction of the situation 
within which choices are made intelligible”.^  ^ This is an interesting parallel with 
Mai*x’s famous point that men make history, but not in circumstances of their own 
choosing.^"* Whereas Marx believed that human subjects had the potential to change 
their circumstances, the intersubjective constitution of society that Onuf and Wendt 
describe limits the scope of human action to compliance or non-compliance with the 
discourse ethics which are imposed by his understanding of the nature and scope of 
legal reasoning. Their expanded notion of law, therefore, serves not to democratise 
the legal process but rather to legalise the political process. Action is limited to 
attempts to influence the direction of the discourse, but this is constrained by the 
insistence on compliance with legal reasoning. David Dessler, for example, argues 
that in the context of the scientific realist model of constmctivism that he espouses, 
“«// social action depends on the preexistence of mles, implying that even under 
anarchy, mles are an essential prerequisite for action.”^^  This approach, he claims.
ibid, p. 71 
ibid, p. 261
34 Karl Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire o f  Louis Bonaparte’ in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
Selected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1991) p. 93 
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“provides the conceptual basis not only for explaining current practices but also for 
situating possibilities of action that might lead to freedom from unwanted sources of 
structural determination.” *^’ There is a tension between the legalism of Kratochwil 
and the claims made by Dessler about agency that needs further probing. In the next 
chapter I will return to the constructivist account of agency and argue that the 
possibility for human action is limited by this theory.
Sovereignty
The normative critique of sovereignty is central to the constructivist challenge in 
International Relations, and one which they have enthusiastically pursued in arguing 
that it is a norm which is potentially detrimental to the global polity if it is not 
restrained by extra-territorial norms and institutions, and that it is possible to make 
these changes because it is a socially constructed norm that requires the tacit consent 
of those bound by it if it is to continue to exist. The form that the argument takes, 
however, is as an argument about anarchy rather than sovereignty. This is a result of 
the influence of neo-realism in North America, where many of the constructivists are 
writing, which gives particular emphasis to the anarchical nature of the intemational 
system rather than to the sovereign units which it comprises. Nevertheless, it will be 
argued here that the critique of sovereignty is the more important aspect of the 
constmctivist critique, and it is their questioning of the nature of sovereignty which 
has ramifications beyond academic disputes with neo-realism. It is at the level of 
sovereignty that the intemational system is being remade.
The first stage of the constmctivist account is to explain the historical nature of the 
state system. This is a familiar point in history and sociology, and these discussions 
have been freely borrowed by the constmctivists.^^ Although this idea is almost
ibid, p. 473
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received wisdom in other disciplines, it does run contrary to the realist prejudice 
about the etemal nature of the state, and prepares the ground for the more substantial 
claims that the constmctivists make about the constitution of the intemational system 
and the possibilities for its reconstitution.
Although there is much borrowing from historical work on the constmction of 
sovereignty, the theoretical basis of constmctivist theory in philosophy and sociology 
does lead to some quirky idiosyncrasies in constmctivist writings. Ruggie writes that 
“The concept of sovereignty . . . was merely the doctrinal counterpart of the 
application of single-point perspectival forms to the spatial organization of politics.”^^  
This is an astonishing claim. He links the political development of sovereignty to the 
artistic development of single-point perspective by Brunelleschi, and gives priority to 
the work of Bmnelleschi. Inverting materialist explanations, Ruggie believes that the 
development of political organisation can only proceed within the confines of how we 
conceptualise the world that we live in. This makes his point about Brunelleschi 
seem rhetorical rather than absurd, but although it sounds like an exaggeration the 
logic of his position demands that we accept it as literal tmth. If we accept that 
Bmnelleschi was an important part of the self-understanding of Florentine society 
(and he undoubtedly was), then his work on perspective really is the precondition for 
the actions of state-building princes. However, Ruggie is no post-stmcturalist. There 
is still room to develop an account of agency from this history, as we will see in the 
next chapter. For a start, people like Bmnelleschi were more or less conscious of 
what they were doing, as were the intellectual systematisers of these ideas like 
Machiavelli, Above all, these developments empower certain social actors who are 
faced with real choices about what to do. Ruggie believes that “central mlers became 
more powerful because of their state-building missions,”^^  that they acquired political 
power through their ability to translate the artistic development of single-point 
perspective into political and social transformations. As a result, “this process of
1991) offers an incisive critique o f  this approach, without losing sight o f  the historical nature o f the 
state.
ibid, p. 159
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social empowerment was part of the means by which the new units of political 
discourse were inscribed in social life to produce new units of political order.”"***
Of course, as with all historical typologies of this sort Ruggie is not trying to improve 
our understanding of the past so much as to clarify the situation that we find ourselves 
in today. Marx’s universal history was based on the conflict of classes that he 
recognised in his own society and Hegel’s account of the philosophical Zeitgeist 
reflected the philosophical idealism that emerged in a nation with the greatest 
universities in the world but which was being left behind by the huge social, political 
and economic developments in Britain and France. Ruggie’s account of history is 
based on his understanding of the importance of how we think about the world for the 
way it is today. Two points can be culled fi'om the preceding discussion. First, his 
account of the historical development of the nation-state culminates in his analysis of 
the contemporary development of multilateralism which points beyond the absolute 
sovereignty of the nation-state. Secondly, his claim about empowerment forms the 
historical justification for the identification of progr essive groups who can be charged 
with the task of implementing the ideas of the academics, just as the renaissance 
princes were responsible for implementing the programme of Brunelleschi. To 
develop the analysis of their understanding of the contemporary nature of 
sovereignty, we must now turn to Alexander Wendt’s discussion of anarchy.
Wendt’s article, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ "** is the most famous statement of 
the constructivists’ approach to sovereignty. He argues that sovereignty is a social 
practice rather than an etemal fact; “Sovereignty is an institution, and so it exists only 
in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no 
sovereignty without an other. These understandings and expectations not only 
constitute a particular kind of state -  the ‘sovereign’ state -  but also constitute a 
particular form of community, since identity is relational.”"*^ The state, therefore, is 
“an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that
40 ;
41
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somehow exist apart from practice.”'*^ The normative case that he is making is that 
by bridging liberal concerns with the transformative potential of international 
institutions with constructivist insights into the intersubjective creation of identities 
he can make a more convincing case for a form of liberal internationalism than the 
liberals have been able to because of their privileging of structure over process.
This approach is contrasted with mainstream theoretical assumptions about 
sovereignty. His primary target is the one-sided emphasis on structure in neo-realism, 
and its claim that this necessarily gives rise to power politics, but he argues that 
neoliberals fail to offer a convincing challenge to this approach because they 
‘privilege realist insights about structure while advancing their own insights about 
process’. T h e  neoliberals assume the institutionalised form that International 
Relations has taken rather than accounting for its creation and above all its 
maintenance tlirough intersubjective understandings. Wendt believes that 
constmctivism offers a more distinctive and convincing alternative to neoliberalism 
by challenging the fundamental basis of neorealism. He claims that, “self-help and 
power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and . . .  if today 
we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to structure, not process. There is 
no ‘logic’ of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure 
of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal 
powers apart from process”.'^  ^ Wendt ties structure and process together, as 
i/i/e/'detemiinate, against the idea that one could change one but not the other. The 
same rhetorical strategy is employed when he puts power and institutions together, 
arguing that ‘anarchy and the distribution of power only have meaning for state action 
in virtue of the understandings and expectations that constitute institutional identities 
and i n t e r e s t s I n d e e d ,  after his iconoclastic tour of contemporary International 
Relations theory, the only constitutive features of the international system that remain
ibid, p. 413 
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are agency and a desire to survive, by which he means merely to preserve their 
agency/^
Wendt’s famous article on sovereignty established him as one of the main thinkers 
within the constmctivist school of International Relations. He has since tried to 
cement his reputation with a hugely ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to 
create a giand theory in Social Theory o f International Politics.^^ This is less 
important for the purposes of this thesis than his earlier articles, which focus more 
directly on sovereignty. The book incoiporates a wide range of theories, but is on 
occasion guilty of making theory out of the obvious. Here we learn, for example, that 
“autonomy is always a matter of degree and can be traded away when the benefits of 
dependence outweigh the costs.”^^
Wendt’s discussion is an effective coiTective to the structural prejudice of much 
research in International Relations, but two criticisms can be raised. The first is that 
his emphasis is still too one-sided, albeit in a different direction from the conventional 
accounts that he criticises. Although he claims that agency and stmcture are inter­
determined, he does not make it entirely clear the processes by which this takes place; 
rather, he emphasises the importance of ideas as a corrective to the structuralist bent 
of mainstream theory. This indicates the exploratory character of constructivism in 
International Relations, where it is still trying to develop its critique rather than 
develop a fully-fledged theory of its own as Waltz did in Theory o f International 
Politics. The second criticism, which we will discuss below, is that his constitutive 
account of agency is inadequate. The constitutive basis of international relations in 
agency may or may not be accurate, but it does undermine the statue of International 
Relations as a distinct discipline. The only difference between International Relations 
and sociology or politics is in the body of literature that one positions oneself against 
and the department that one works in. All social relationships begin with units
ibid, p. 402
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concerned with their self-preservation, and so the only question that can be put prior 
to this idea of pre-existing agency is essentially a biological one about the conditions 
for the development of human consciousness. Wendt therefore still evades the 
question of how the units of international relations evolved, which is to the detriment 
of his theory of sovereignty. Ruggie’s historical account, as discussed above, 
suggests how states emerged as the units of international relations, but Wendt seems 
content to restrict his analysis to methodological problems. He ends with the 
observation that constructivists can offer “a systematic communitarian ontology in 
which intersubjective knowledge constitutes identities and interests” but cautions that 
they “have often devoted too much effort to questions of ontology and constitution 
and not enough effort to the causal and empirical questions of how identities and 
interests are produced by practice in anarchic conditions. As a result, they have not 
taken on board neoliberal insights into learning and social cognition. This suggests 
that he doesn’t actually want to say a great deal about sovereignty because there are 
other questions that are more important for the constructivist agenda. It is, in a sense, 
a ground-clearing operation which opens up more interesting lines of enquiry. 
Against the neo-realists, he wants to say that anarchy and sovereignty are not the 
most important issues in international relations, but he realises that he must give an 
account of why this is the case before developing alternative lines of enquiry.
The relationship between structure and agency that the constructivists have 
established through their discussion of sovereignty points to a new focus in 
international relations to account for the processes by which international relations 
are maintained. One way in which this has been done is through the discussion of 
law, which acquires a new importance for constructivists as a channel through which 
society is constituted at the national and international level through ongoing 
discursive practices which range from the statute law that legal positivists recognise 
to shared norms which they argue are an equally important element of law. My 
criticism of this -  which will be developed in the next chapter when I turn to the issue
50 Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make o f  It’
71
of agency -  is that scope for people to consciously shape the political landscape of 
international relations is, in practice, circumscribed by constructivist accounts.
Poststructuralism
In International Relations there is a deep-seated hostility to poststructural approaches, 
not least because of the self-marginalisation of the poststructuralists. In opposition to 
mainstream approaches, they castigate the very subject matter of security studies as 
contributing to a culture of militarism and are scathing about dominant approaches 
like neo-realism. Nevertheless, poststructural writing has become part of the canon of 
International Relations through the thoughtful contributions of writers like R. B. J. 
Walker, James Der Derian, Richard Ashely and David Campbell. A collection of 
essays edited by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, International/Intertextual 
R e la tio n s ,and special issues of International Studies Quarterly and Millennium 
have contributed to the notoriety of poststructural approaches.^^ This chapter will 
situate these writings in the context of a much larger canon of dissent writers who 
have developed a poststructural approach to social theory. However, partly because 
these writers have attracted so much critical attention I will have less to say about 
them. In a sense, the role of poststructuralism in International Relations is that of the 
‘other’. Critical theorists are able to define themselves as part of the reasonable 
mainstream by emphasising their difference from the poststructuralists and traditional 
theorists can ridicule the poststructuralists and convince themselves that they are 
dispatching all other critical approaches with them. In this sense, it is analogous to 
the role of Marxism in an earlier era.
(Lexington: Lexington Books 1989)
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Debates about modernity have been taking place since before the development of 
poststructural thought. The nineteenth century French novelist Baudellaire is 
generally credited with coining the term ‘modernity’, and the prolific writer on 
international relations Arnold J. Toynbee is credited with being the first to use the 
word ‘postmodern’. Even earlier than this, Marx noted that in capitalist society “All 
that is solid melts into air”.^  ^ However, the terms modernity and postmodemity are 
notoriously difficult to pin down, and can be used as descriptive as well as analytical 
concepts.^"  ^ The foremost theorist of ‘postmodemity’ is perhaps Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, whose definition of postmodernism as “an incredulity towards 
metanarratives”^^  is repeated with tiresome regularity by those who want to discredit 
poststructuralism as well as academics who want to attach their research to an 
approach which seemed like the wave of the future in the 1980s. This section will 
concentrate on poststmcturalism, which is a narrower and more intellectually rigorous 
strand of thought developed by French thinkers like Jacques Derrida, Giles Deleuze, 
Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault. However, it should be noted that 
poststmcturalism is also a problematic term and writers such as Foucault repudiated 
its label while others who would claim it for themselves are no more than relativists 
in search of a respectable title.
A major theme of poststmcturalism is its return to thinkers and strands of thought 
which have been marginalised in contemporary debate. In discussing the history of 
ideas there is always a tendency towards what Butterfield called the Whig 
interpretation of history,^^ where contemporary ideas are seen as an inevitable
perspectives and are not exclusively poststructuralist. It still had the effect o f  raising the profile o f  
poststmcturalism in the discipline.
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progression from earlier thought. This marginalises other voices which were 
important in historical debates. Poststructuralists have a slightly different agenda 
from the Cambridge School’s historical reconstructions. On the one hand, they are 
searching for intellectual inspiration and self-clarification thi'ough a re-reading of 
classic texts. On the other, they are engaging in what Foucault termed a ‘history of 
the present’,^  ^ which rejects conventional teleologies in favour of a genealogical 
approach. Writers like Spinoza have been important elements in this enterprise, but 
the most important thinker in the poststructural canon is Friedrich Nietzsche. This 
section will concentrate on the poststmctural reading of Nietzsche not because this is 
the essence of poststmcturalism, but because it gives us a way into a complicated 
range of approaches. It also allows us to concentrate on the social and political 
aspects of poststmctural thought rather than going into the literary side of the theory 
for which it is perhaps best known to a popular audience.^^
Giles Deleuze is one of the most important poststructuralists who has developed an 
independent approach to political thought derived from his engagement with Bergson, 
Nietzsche and Spinoza, hi collaboration with Felix Guattari he has been responsible 
for an influential account of human action which has inspired an ‘agonistic’ approach 
to democracy which emphasises the perfoimative.^^ However, the decisive point in 
the development of Deleuze’s thought came through his book on Nietzsche, Nietzsche 
and Philosophy!’'^  Although it is at best controversial as a guide to Nietzsche it tells 
us a great deal about Deleuze’s own concerns. In common with much poststructural
see, for example, Michel Foucault H istory o f  Sexuality Volume I: The Care o f  the (London:
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introduction, and o f course Derrida’s substantial coipus o f  early work is central to this approach.
Deleuze and Guattari collaborated on a number o f volumes, but the peculiar pair Anti-Oedipus 
(London: Athlone Press 1983) and/I Thousand Plateaus (London: Athlone Press 1988) contain their 
most important reflections on agonistic democracy.
^  London: Athlone Press 1983
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thought, his emphasis is on embracing nothingness, the rejection of ideologies 
without trying to replicate their errors with new utopias:
Active destruction means: the point, the moment of transmutation in the will 
to nothingness. Destruction becomes active at the moment when, with the 
alliance between reactive forces and the will to nothingness broken, the will to 
nothingness is converted and crosses to the side of affirmation, it is related to 
a power o f affirming which destroys the reactive forces themselves.^ ^
In this quotation Deleuze sides with Nietzsche in claiming that we can derive a 
certain paradoxical power from positively embracing nothingness, that is an existence 
without foundational myths, be they religious beliefs or political utopias.
Foucault is a difficult case within poststmcturalism as he self-consciously rejected 
labels. Nevertheless, he has many affinities with poststmctural thought and his 
account of genealogy relies heavily on Nietzsche, as he explains in Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, Histoiy!^ He uses Nietzsche to show that, “if the genealogist refuses to 
extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is 
‘something altogether different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but 
the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a 
piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”^^  History is not made by people; “no one is 
responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the 
intersice.” "^^ This leads to a rather pessimistic assessment of human progress: 
“Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at 
universal reciprocity, where the mle of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs 
each of its violences in a system of mles and thus proceeds from domination to 
domination.”^^  Foucault explains his approach through Nietzsche’s contrast between
ibid p. 174, emphasis in original
in Language, Counter-Memoiy, Practice: Selected essays and interviews ed. Donald F. Bouchard 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1977) 
ibid, p. 142 
ibid, p. 150 
ibid, p. 151
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traditional and effective history. Traditional history, “is given to a contemplation of 
distances and heights: the noblest periods, the highest forms, the most abstract ideas, 
the purest individualities”, whereas effective history, “shortens its vision to those 
things nearest to it -  the body, the nervous system, nutrition, digestion, and energies; 
it unearths the periods of decadence and if it chances upon lofty epochs, it is with the 
suspicion -  not vindictive but joyous -  of finding a barbarous and shameful 
confusion.”^^  This echoes Deleuze’s embrace of the negation, a celebration of our 
hopeless situation which derives its strength from standing up to the inevitable 
paradoxes of our existence. But Foucault approaches the problem slightly differently 
from Deleuze. Deleuze is telling us how we can live; Foucault is telling us how we 
can study. His essay on Nietzsche contains a programme for research that starts from 
the point that there are no subjects, but only power. This is an important element that 
has been assumed, though not always digested, as these ideas have been carried over 
into disciplines like International Relations.
Approaching poststructuralist thought through its reading of Nietzsche has allowed us 
to concentrate on the social and political elements of the theory which are most 
relevant to International Relations. It is more commonly approached through its 
approach to textual analysis, most closely associated with Jacques Derrida and 
literary criticism. However, it is not necessary to discuss this literature in depth to 
appreciate the incorporation of poststmctural approaches into International Relations. 
The starting point for these approaches is the analysis of the independent power of 
discourse. A good example of this is in David Campbell’s analysis of U.S. foreign 
policy which links the politics of security and the sociology of risk:
To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and 
threats which abound in it is ... not to offer a simple ethnographic description 
of our condition; it is to invoke a discussion of danger through which the 
incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the 
insistences of identity. Danger (death, in its ultimate form) might therefore be
66 ibid, p. 155
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thought of as the new god for the modem world of states, not because it is 
peculiar to our time, but because it replicates the logic of Christendom’s 
evangelism of fear.*"^
Here he is arguing that when the spectre of danger is invoked in discussions of 
security, it is not a simple reflection of real dangers, but an imaginary creation of 
dangers harnessed to a particular agenda. Turning to poststmcturalist accounts of 
sovereignty we can this further developed.
Sovereignty
The basis for a poststructural account of sovereignty can be found in the foundational 
myths of the state. Jim George explains how the fusion of sovereign man and that 
sovereign state, “prefigures the modem logic of power politics and the state-centric 
view of an anarchical world of Othemess. It gives identity to the sovereign state, as 
the site of modem reason, in opposition to a world of anarchy ‘out there’, always 
threatening to undermine rationality and tmth, with its false beliefs and 
counterpractices.”^^
Post-structural re-readings of intemational relations challenge the assumption that 
world politics is best understood in terms of relations between nations, a claim which 
they regard as merely a discursive strategy which is itself partly responsible for 
shaping global politics. R. B. J. Walker expresses this idea well: “I offer a reading of 
modem theories of intemational relations as a discourse that systematically reifies an 
historically specific spatial ontology, a sharp delineation of here and there, a 
discourse that both expresses and constantly affirms the presence and absence of 
political life inside and outside the modem state as the only ground on which
David Campbell Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the politics o f  identity 
(Manchester; Manchester University Press 1992) p. 55 
Jim George Discourses o f  Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations 
(Boulder; Lynne Rienner 1994) p. 202
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structural necessities can be understood and new realms of freedom and history can 
be revealed.”^^
An important element of Walker’s argument is its profound ethical dimension. 
Tlirough a reading of classic texts as much as poststmctural ones he develops an 
approach to world politics which refuses to recognise the territorial state as the limit 
of our community. This, he notes, is a limit on many emancipatory movements: 
“Whatever avenues are now being opened up in the exploration of contemporary 
political identities, whether in the name of nations, humanities, classes, races, 
cultures, genders or movements, they remain largely constrained by ontological and 
discursive options expressed most elegantly, and to the modem imagination most 
pursuasively, by claims about the formal sovereignty of territorial states.”^^
Another aspect of Walker’s approach is its theoretical eclecticism. He claims that, “it 
is often just as helpful to engage with, say, Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau, Hume, Kant, 
Hegel and Marx in order to appreciate the problematic character of modemity as to 
those who have absorbed the lessons of Nietzsche, Foucault and Deirida.”^^  
Although this makes it problematic to characterise him as a poststmcturalist, it 
demonstrates a willingness to engage with a wider canon of writing than most are 
prepared to consider, and it is very much to his credit that he tries to apply these 
thinkers to particular problems rather than attempting to create his own theory out of 
them.
Many writers conclude that sovereignty is an artificial construct, and leave their 
analysis at that point. An honourable exception to this is found in James Der Derian, 
who has developed an original historical analysis of a central institution of the state 
system, diplomacy, and shown how it cannot be simply equated with the emergence 
of states. He sums up his analysis thus:
R. B. J. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theoiy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1995) 
ibid, p. 162 
ibid, p. 20
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the unifonnity attributed to the origins of diplomacy is partially explained by 
the modem political theories (that is, liberal and Marxist) which accord the 
state a near-monopoly of power. In contrast, my argument was that the 
origins of diplomacy and of diplomatic culture, and their discontinuous 
history outside the domain of state sovereignty, could not be fully understood 
unless one investigated the multiple strategies and sites of power which 
produce and are sustained by the diplomatic discourse.^^
Der Derian traces the genealogy of diplomacy from the earliest biblical myths, 
through medieval proto-diplomacy to the diplomacy associated with a system of 
states and on to its potential undoing through anti-diplomacy, a theme developed in a 
subsequent book.^^ Diplomacy, he argues, emerged from the contradictory forces of 
a new solidarity emerging between political units estranged from an earlier suzerain 
states system and a new tension arising from the pursuit of particular interests by 
individual states.^ "^  He claims that, “state power and diplomatic culture emerge 
interdependently when mutually estranged and formally equal states constitute a 
system, in which the universalization, secularization and normalization of culture, and 
the alienation, organization, and regulation of power, support one another reciprocally 
and act mutually as particular means to a systemic end.”^^
This quotation shows the strengths and the weaknesses of his work. Through his 
historical investigation of the origins of diplomacy he makes a powerful case for a 
poststmctural approach. He also goes beyond familiar platitudes about the 
importance of discourse and actually analyses a concrete case, setting an example 
which will have to be followed by others if poststmcturalism is to continue to 
contribute to research in Intemational Relations. However, it becomes problematic 
when it goes beyond the historical and attempts to explain his intellectual debts and
James Der Derian On Diplomacy: A Genealogy o f  Western Estrangement (Oxford; Basil Blackwell 
1987) p. 200
James Der D tn m  Antidiplomacy (Oxford: Blackwell 1992)
Der Derian On Diplomacy, chapter six
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draw out theoretical lessons. When he discusses ‘mutual estrangement’ and ‘formal 
equality’, Der Derian is drawing on a range of literature in political theory which is 
not always clearly explained or drawn together. The point he is making is a valid 
one, but it can be made without reference to Sartre, Nietzsche and Marx on alienation 
and estrangement in the way that Der Derian does in his introductory chapters. As a 
result it hovers between intellectual history, political theory and history.
Conclusion
Poststmcturalism has its strengths. The theorists discussed in the introduction have 
re-read many important classical theorists, and their approach has been adopted by 
critics like Lupton to subvert dominant ideological trends of our time. In 
Intemational Relations, writers like Der Derian have reconceptualised some of the 
central themes of the discipline, such as diplomacy. The question that must be asked, 
however, is whether we need a post-stmctural framework to provide these insights. 
One can pose the polemical question: Do we need Foucault to tell us that prisons are 
unpleasant places? We can further suggest that, in the light of our discussion of the 
(non-) account of agency provided by poststmcturalists, the theory could be a barrier 
to a more thorough critique, and their might in fact be more substance to the claim 
that poststmcturalists fail to provide an altemative than was allowed in the 
introduction.
This claim can be substantiated with reference to James Der Derian. In the subtitle of 
On Diplomacy he claims to be offering '’A genealogy o f western estrangemenV but 
he also offers a genealogy of his own theoretical approach. The development of the 
theory adds little to his historical analysis, which could be equally plausibly explained 
through another framework, such as a variation of constructivist thought. 
Furthermore, his discussion of poststmcturalism is used to justify a cavalier approach
ibid. p. 127
Ferdinand de Saussure Course in General Linguistics (London: Duckworth 1990)
For example, Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar Reading Capital (London: N ew  Left Books 1970) 
Der Derian On Diplomacy
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to reading other political theorists. When he turns to Marx, for example, he is simply 
wrong: '"qua commodity, the object has only an exchange-value, or a power of 
exchanging against different quantities of commodities. Consequently, says Marx, it 
does not ‘contain an atom of use-value.’ In the context of a modem society, the result 
is ‘a definite social relation between men, that assumes in their eyes, the fantastic 
form of a relation between things. Compare this with what Marx wrote: “As use- 
values, commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as exchange-values they 
are merely different quantities, and consequently do not contain an atom of use- 
value.” He continues, “If then we leave out of consideration the use-values of 
commodities they have only one common property left, that of being products of 
labour.”^^  Marx is clearly saying the opposite of what Der Derian’s ‘Marx’ is saying. 
For Mai-x the commodity is defined by its possession of both use-value and exchange 
value. Having trivialised the categories which Marx proceeds from he then engages 
in bizarre speculation about commodities: “nuclear weaponry is the ultimate 
commodity of and impetus behind techno-diplomacy. Nuclear production is 
fetischized and alien, in effect, identical with destmction; it does not ‘contain an atom 
of use value.’ And in the context of the Cold War, it has deformed human relations 
into ‘the fantastic form of a relation between t h i n g s . T h i s  is an appalling misuse 
of political theory which adds nothing to his analysis, misreads his source and 
confuses his audience. The terrible irony is that On Diplomacy contains a wonderful 
account of the emergence of diplomacy. It is unfortunate that a good historian feels 
the need to justify himself with references to undigested texts that are fashionable in 
certain radical circles.
This critique of Der Derian is central to the case against poststmctural analysis. The 
best applications of poststmcturalism in social science would be strengthened if the 
theory was removed. This is partly because of its wilful obscurantism, a common 
criticism, but one which fails to engage with the substance of the theory. However it 
can be a devastating critique when applied to the close study of a particular text as
ibid, p. 206. Footnotes omitted.
Karl Marx Capital Volume 1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1983) p. 45
81 Der Derian On Diplomacy p. 206
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this section has attempted to do with Der Derian. There is, however, rather more at 
stake than this. The reason for the obscurantism can be found in the poststmctural 
assault on the subject, which will be discussed further in the next chapter. The 
problem which is addressed by poststmctural social science is how to carry out 
critical research in the absence of the subject.
The strength of poststmctural approaches in International Relations rests on the 
strength of poststmcturalists like James Der Derian and R. B. J. Walker, but they are 
at there best when not being poststmctural. They unwittingly (at least in Der Derian’s 
case) make a strong case for a more flexible approach to hitemational Relations 
which flows from its subject matter rather than from a pre-determined theoretical 
framework. Poststmcturalism developed as a critique of subjectivity and an account 
of a post-humanist age. In the hands of great thinkers engaged in these intellectual 
stmggles it scored many success, but is perhaps being sidelined by other approaches 
which are less absolutist and more amenable to application in the social sciences. 
However, the heterodox methodology of many writers associated with 
postmcturalism is comparable to my own methodological eclecticism as outlined in 
the introduction.
This chapter has examined two influential strands of post-positivism, both of which 
emphasise the way that the sphere of intemational relations is constmcted by forces 
that we do not have as much conscious control over as we might like to imagine. 
Ideas from both of these approaches have their place as correctives to the ahistorical 
absolutism of some traditional approaches. However, precisely because they 
emphasise our lack of control, they are of limited value in developing a progiessive 
critique of Intemational Relations because they must undermine any idea of a 
conscious agency for positive change, relying instead on more uncertain forces. I will 
build upon this claim in the conclusion to the next chapter, where I extend this 
discussion by looking at two other post-positivist approaches, those of feminism and
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critical theory. In particular, the next chapter ends with a fuller discussion of agency, 
which will return to the theories discussed here and explain in some detail why their 
account of progiess is hampered by their lack of an adequately strong notion of 
agency.
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3 New Approaches: Feminism and Critical Theory
In this chapter I turn to two other broad churches within post-positivism. First I look 
in some detail at feminist approaches. In this section I develop a discussion of certain 
strands of feminist thinking about Intemational Relations. This necessarily simplifies 
to a certain degree, as feminism can attach itself to any of the other approaches to the 
discipline, and is not necessarily free-standing. However, a distinction can be drawn 
between approaches that aspire to be specifically feminist, with a distinct 
methodology or political approach, and those which try to incorporate arguments for 
women’s rights, or the perspective of women, into a broader theory. Neither of these 
strategies can be rejected a priori; both need to be assessed on their specific merits. 
In this section, however, my focus is on the possibility of a specifically feminist 
approach to Intemational Relations. In the next section I look more briefly at the 
impact of Frankfurt School critical theory, which is perhaps less controversial. This 
section concentrates on Andrew Linklater, who has been most closely associated with 
the incoiporation of the Frankfurt School into Intemational Relations theory.
My survey of the main critical challenges to the discipline then concludes with a 
discussion of how the four challenges -  constmctivism, poststmcturalism, feminism 
and critical theory -  deal with agency. This allows me to develop a critique of the 
major critical approaches in Intemational Relations, clearing a space for my own 
approach which makes sovereignty and agency central.
Feminism
Feminist theory draws a certain moral authority from its marginal status and from the 
links that it creates with the political struggles of the oppressed. However, far from 
being a marginalised ideology, which could be derided or ignored by mainstream 
thinkers, feminism has moved to the centre of nonnative social theory over the last 
few decades. It is also taken seriously by policy-makers at the national and 
intemational level. Intemational Relations, however, has been slow to incorporate
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these ideas, in spite of important contributions by writers like Jean Bethke Elshtain 
and Cynthia Enloe. Many mainstream (or ‘malestream’ as some prefer^) writers in 
Intemational Relations have been able to get away with dismissing feminist writing 
because they ignore this sophisticated basis for feminist thought, concentrating 
instead on their conclusions, which appear ridiculous when measured against their 
own beliefs. Some of these scholars explain their neglect of feminism as a result of 
its tendency to address other feminists in a jargon inaccessible to outsiders, or the 
banality of feminist research. The fomier explanation certainly points to a real issue, 
although all sub-disciplines and theories have their own jargon. The latter 
explanation smacks of prejudice, but should not be dismissed too hastily as it is a 
commonly held prejudice among writers who have made serious contributions to their 
own areas. Bad writing and sloppy scholarship is common to many areas of research, 
however, and is especially tme of areas perceived as fashionable, particularly 
globalisation, post-stmcturalism, and of course the ‘third debate’ in Intemational 
Relations. But there is still a particular hostility to feminism, perhaps because it is 
seen as representing a sectional political interest group, or because of defensiveness 
towards certain feminist claims about masculinity.
However, the case for the marginalisation of feminism can be overdone, and hostility 
co-exists with an exaggerated sympathy from the politically correct (and from those 
afraid of the effect of political correctness).^ Although feminism has tended to be 
marginal to the conventional concems of Intemational Relations, it has been 
influential in a number of sub-disciplines. In development studies, there has been a 
long-standing interest in women in development (WID),^ which has been reflected in
' For example, Marianne Hester, Liz Kelly and Jill Radford (eds) Women, Violence and M ale Power: 
Feminist Activism, Research and Practice (Buckingham: Open University Press 1996)
 ^It would be unfair to level specific accusations here. However, three male scholars in Intemational 
Relations who have taken feminist claims seriously are Terrell Carver, ‘A  political theory o f gender: 
Perspectives on the “universal subject”’ in Vicky Randall and Georgia Wagler (eds) Gender, politics 
and the state (London: Routledge 1998), Fred Halliday Rethinking International Relations (London: 
Macmillan 1994 ) and ‘Gender and IR: Progress, Bacldash and Prospect’ Millennium (Vol 27 No 4 
1998 pp 833-846) Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Relations Theory: Contributions o f  a Feminist 
Standpoint’ Millennium (Vol 18 No 2 1989 pp 245-253)
 ^It is symptomatic o f the development o f  feminist thought in Intemational Relations that the term now  
used is Gender and Development (GAD), implying a socially constmcted idea o f  femininity rather than 
an essential ‘woman’.
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the policies of international institutions. In particular, Esther Boserup’s Women’s 
Role in Economic Development  ^ set out an agenda that has influenced the discipline 
since its first publication in 1970. In the field of environmentalism, the writings of 
Vandana Shiva and others have established an ecofeminist approach that has been 
important in environmental thought as well as Intemational Relations. And, perhaps 
most visibly, feminists have been important and vocal contributors to peace studies, 
which developed explicitly in opposition to conventional ‘high politics’ approaches to 
Intemational Relations. More recently, these concems have migrated from the 
margins to challenge the traditional interests of Intemational Relations scholars, and 
feminist theorists have tried to view issues like security and sovereignty through 
‘feminist lenses’.^  Although some important studies of these themes have been 
produced, much of the writing in this area bears the hallmarks of its recent birth and it 
sometimes lacks the theoretical depth and rigour of feminist contributions in other 
disciplines. To get a better understanding of feminist work, it is important to 
understand something of how feminist thought has developed.
Feminist Epistemology
Feminist theory began with the stmggle for formal political equality for women. This 
can be traced back at least to Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication o f the Rights o f 
Woman in 1792,^ and was continued in the political sphere by groups like the 
suffragettes well into the twentieth century. However, this tradition was not a 
significant challenge to mainstream political theory. It merely extended the claims of 
citizenship to women, which may have challenged certain prejudices about biology 
but which did not seek to recast social thought. This tradition continues today in 
liberal strands of feminist thinking, which have been contemptuously referred to as 
‘add-women-and-stir’ approaches.^ More recently, feminist thinkers have claimed
London: Earthscan 1989
 ^Jill Steans Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity 1998) reviews 
the literature which tries to do this.
® Mary Wollstonecraft Vindication o f  the Rights o f  Woman (Mineola: Dover 1996)
 ^A thoughtful (though perhaps a little ahistorical) critique o f  these aspects o f  Wollstonecraft is found 
in Moira Gattens, ‘ “The Oppressed State o f M y Sex”: Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and
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that there can be a distinctly feminine approach to social issues, privileging the 
insights that women have by virtue of their subordinate position in society. This body 
of work fundamentally challenges positivist methodologies, and offers a quite 
distinctive approach to studying society. The starting point for these feminist 
epistemologies is a critique of masculine values like competitiveness and control, 
which are linked to a particular way of thinking which has dominated western thought 
for the last three hundred years. This recasts the conventional division of feminist 
thought into liberal, radical and socialist by putting epistemology rather than politics 
at the centre of debate. Liberal, radical and socialist feminisms are becoming less 
important as the ideologies on which they were based wane.^
A more interesting way of understanding contemporary feminism than the socialist, 
liberal and radical trichotomy is suggested by Sandra Harding, who classifies 
feminisms by their epistemological approach rather than their politics, dividing them 
into feminist empiricism, standpoint feminism and postmodern feminism.^ Feminist 
empiricism is roughly equivalent to liberal feminism, and involves researching the 
role and experiences of women in areas from which they have been excluded. This 
was an important part of the groundbreaking feminist work in the 1960s and 1970s.^® 
Standpoint feminism argues that there is a distinctly feminist way of thinking which 
is based on different patterns of female socialisation. This will be discussed below in 
relation to the work of Nancy Hartsock. Postmodern feminism is radically 
anti foundational, holding that gender distinctions are based on discourses. These 
ideas will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, which will look at 
poststmcturalism, the philosophical foundation for postmodernism.^^ Although these
Equality’ in Mary Lyndon Shelly and Carole Pateman (eds) Feminist Interpretations and Political 
Theory (Cambridge: Polity 1991). This essay raises many o f  the themes o f this chapter, starting from 
the identification o f  a problem in the Vindication ‘in its unesasy alliance with the suspect notion o f the 
essential sexual neutrality o f the rational agent’ (p. 122).
® See Anthony Giddens Beyond Left and Right: The Future o f  Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity
1994) for an account o f  this process
’Sandra Harding The Science Question in Feminism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press 1986)
The work o f  Jean Bethke Elshtain, who is discussed below, is an important example o f  this 
approach.
* ‘ On the specifically feminist elements o f  this debate see Linda J. Nicholson (ed.) 
Feminism/Postmodernism  (London: Routledge 1990), and the formidable contributions o f  Judith
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epistemological positions are vigorously contested, both at the meta-theoretical level 
and in relation to research programmes, some general points about the direction of 
feminism can be drawn out.
Feminist accounts of epistemology tend to argue that Cartesian rationality legitimises 
masculine authority by forcing us to think in terms of rigid distinctions between pairs 
of terms. This tradition is based on fundamental dichotomies between, for example, 
reason and emotion or care and justice, which many feminists claim are ideological 
and untenable. All of the characteristics that society has traditionally identified as 
positive, they argue, are associated with masculinity. The dichotomy between 
masculine and feminine defines the other divisions, and so a holistic and inclusive 
approach is only possible through a feminist critique. Unfortunately, masculinist 
ways of thinking and acting have been accepted as universal, and so their link to our 
conception of masculinity has been obscured, and the concems of women 
marginalised. Ideas of abstract or universal reason are all based on the imposition of 
masculine nonns. Alison Jaggar notes that this myth of dispassionate enquiry 
“promotes a conception of epistemological justification vindicating the silencing of 
those, especially women, who are defined culturally as the bearers of emotion and so 
aie perceived as more ‘subjective’, biased, and irrational. In our present social 
context, therefore, the ideal of the dispassionate investigator is a classist, racist, and 
especially masculinist myth.” *^ The altemative epistemology that she develops is 
based on a recognition of the importance of emotion in the development of 
knowledge, and the claim that women are particularly well placed to reconcile this 
particular dichotomy. Although this is sometimes essentialised as a natural attribute
Butler -  for example, Gender Trouble (London: Routledge 1999) and The Psychic Life o f  Power 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997)
A good account o f  how these dichotomies were established is provided by Genevieve Lloyd, ‘The 
Man o f  Reason’ in Ann Gairy and Marilyn Pearsall (eds) Women, Knowledge and Reality: 
Explorations in Feminist Philosophy (New York: Routledge 1996). Hers is a thoughthil and nuanced 
account that shows greater historical sensitivity than many in its awareness o f the emergence o f the 
rationalist tradition from the renaissance, and its subsequent mediation thr ough the romantics, among 
others.
Alison M. Jaggar, ‘Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology’ in Alison M. Jaggar 
and Susan Bordo (eds) Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions o f  Being and Knowing 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press 1990)
of women, feminists’ political experience has cautioned them against approaches that 
claim to represent any ‘natural order’. More often, it is grounded in the particular 
experiences of women, either qua women or qua the oppressed, as Alison Jaggar 
has explained: “Women’s work of emotional nurturance has required them to develop 
a special acuity in recognizing hidden emotions and in understanding the genesis of 
those emotions. This emotional acumen can now be recognized as a skill in political 
analysis and validated in giving women a special advantage in both understanding the 
mechanisms of domination and envisioning freer ways to live.”'^
This approach reaches its apotheosis in feminist standpoint theory, most cogently 
developed by the Marxist feminist Nancy Hartsock. She argues that, “The concept of 
a standpoint structures epistemology in a particular way. Rather than a simple 
dualism, it posits a duality of levels of reality, of which the deeper level or essence 
both includes and explains the ‘surface’ or appearance, and indicates the logic by 
means of which the appearance inverts and distorts the deeper reality.”^^  This is an 
ingenious fusion of the feminist critique of dichotomous thinking and the Marxist 
critique of ideology, but Hartsock synthesises these elements into an original theory 
incorporating psychoanalysis, which starts from women’s socialisation. Her use of 
Marxist categories is largely analogous, as she tears them away from their roots in 
materialist social theory and recasts them in the context of feminist thinking about 
socially constructed gender roles. Marx identified the proletariat as the agency for 
change because of its role in the production of commodities; Hartsock discusses the 
social importance of women as deriving from their role in the reproduction of human 
beings. She then adds psychoanalysis to this synthesis, claiming that,
The details o f this debate are beyond the scope o f  this study, but it illustrates the variety o f  feminist 
approaches. See, for example, Alison M. Jaggar, ‘Love and Knowledge; Emotion in Feminist 
Epistemology’ in Ami Garry and Marilyn Pearsall (eds) Women Knowledge and Reality: Explorations 
in Feminist Philosophy (New York: Routledge -1996). See also the debate between Helen E. Longino 
and Kathleen Lennon in Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. LXXI 1997, 
‘Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology’
Jaggar Love and Knowledge p. 105
Nancy C. M. Hartsock, ‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically 
Feminist Historical Materialism’ in Sandra Harding and Marrill B. Hintikka (eds) Discovering Reality: 
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology and Philosophy o f  Science 
(Dortrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1983)
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The more complex female relational world is reinforced by the process of 
socialization. Girls leam roles from watching their mothers; boys must learn 
roles from rules wliich structure the life of an absent male figure. Girls can 
identify with a concrete example present in daily life; boys must identify with 
an abstract set of maxims only occasionally concretely present in the form of 
the father.
Her conclusion is that the process of socialisation leads men to view the world in 
terms of hostility and opposition, whereas the female experience leads women to 
view the world relationally. Hartsock believes that relational experiences are more 
valuable, and should be generalised across society.
A distinct feminist epistemology creates a secure basis for feminism as a distinct way 
of theorising about the world, rather than a merely political claim for equal rights on 
the basis of another ideological system, be it Marxism or liberalism. The centrality of 
epistemology is well expressed by the legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon, who has 
claimed that, “The point of view of a total system emerges as particular only when 
confronted, in a way it cannot ignore, by a demand from another point of view . . . .  
When seemingly ontological conditions are challenged from the collective standpoint 
of a dissident reality, they become visible as epistemological. Dominance suddenly 
appears no longer inevitable. When it loses its ground it loses its grip.”^^  This makes 
a strong and clear case for the importance of understanding feminist theory on the 
basis of its epistemology, but it also flags up the issue of agency, which will be 
discussed in more detail below. Previous radical approaches have tended to be based 
on the idea of active agency, engaging with and transforming the world. This 
approach is quite fundamentally challenged by feminist epistemology, which bases its 
claims at least in part on the fact of subordination rather than the possibility or 
capability of transcending that subordination. The model for feminist political
ibid, p. 295
Catherine A. MacKinnon Toward a Feminist Theoiy o f  the State (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard
University Press 1991) p. 239-240
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practice thus emerges as the marginalised victim possessing the characteristics of 
caring and nurturing, rather than the active agent engaging and transforming/^
Taking feminist epistemology seriously shifts the ground of politics and provides a 
new basis for thinking about what constitutes political action. Of course, there is 
always the danger that the study of epistemology becomes an end in itself, but writers 
like Nancy Fraser have consistently reminded feminists of their political 
responsibility towards the issues of injustice and inequality.^® Even in Intemational 
Relations, which was noted as a comparatively retarded discipline in terms of the 
impact of feminism, we can see evidence of political commitments deriving from 
epistemological positions.
The Feminist is International?
Characterising feminism in relation to debates about epistemology helps to 
understand the nature of feminist theory today, but it is not at all obvious how this 
relates to Intemational Relations. At one level, it is important to consider ideas at the 
highest level of development before considering their incorporation into the study of 
particular issues and debates. However, the connection is explicitly drawn out in the 
work of Kimberly Hutchings, who has incorporated an understanding of feminist 
epistemology into the study of Intemational Relations. She discusses the work of 
standpoint theorists like Nancy Hartsock, which she rejects as counterposing one 
exclusive approach to another. Instead, she argues that, “Knowledge has to be
This contrast is clearest in the case o f Marxism, but historically liberalism has also had a strong 
sense o f  agency, developed through the idea of, for example, civil rights campaigns. More recently, as 
suggested in chapter 4, liberalism has understood agency in a more emaciated way. A possible 
counter-example is feminist ideas about citizenship, and particularly Hannah Arendt’s work on the vita 
activa, (see The Human Condition, Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press 1999) which has generated a 
large secondary literature and informed much feminist writing on democratic theory. Space does not 
permit a full discussion o f this issue, but a critique can be developed along the lines suggested in the 
discussion o f  démocratisation in chapter 7, arguing that many writers understand democracy as a 
process o f  educating citizens rather than o f  citizens actively shaping the direction o f  their polity.
Nancy Fraser, ‘Equality, Difference and Democracy: Recent Feminist Debates in the United States’ 
in Jodi Dean (ed) Feminism and the New Democracy: Re-siting the Political (London: Sage 1997) 
makes this point in the context o f  the debate about ‘difference’ feminism, concluding that, ''''cultural
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redefined as a partial and tentative thing, because the subject/object of knowledge is 
never complete and is always shifting.” ’^ Hutchings suggests that, “This is not going 
to make a universal theory of the intemational possible, but it does ground the 
possibility of a meaningful dialogue, because the relation is already concretely in 
place, mediating both the subject and object of knowledge.”^^  This brings us back to 
the title of her article, which links the personal and the intemational. Although a 
totalising theory may be impossible (and perhaps undesirable), we can engage in the 
normative investigation of social phenomena, an approach inspired by 
phenomenology, but developed in the context of an understanding of Foucault.^^ 
Following from this approach, the first question that must be considered is the nature 
of the political community that we are intervening in. Feminism, as discussed above, 
has a built-in hostility to dichotomous and exclusionary thinking, and this has often 
led feminist scholars in intemational relations to adopt a cosmopolitan approach.^"  ^
Before making a hasty jump into International Relations, however, it is helpful to 
consider the analogous feminist writing on the division between the public and 
private spheres, which could be considered a more developed form of a similar 
argument.
Traditional accounts of politics have rested on an often unstated assumption about the 
division between a public sphere of political action and social interaction where 
norms are derived and enforced, and a private sphere of family life where our most 
intimate relationships are conducted and where we set our own standards and mles, 
albeit in the context of social pressures. This haven in a heartless world was the 
enviromnent in which children were socialised and families conducted their own
differences can only be free ly  elaborated and dem ocratically mediated on the basis o f  social equality' 
(p. 107, emphasis in original).
Kimberly Hutchings, ‘The Personal is Intemational: Feminist epistemology and the case o f  
Intemational Relations’ in Kathleen Lennon and Margaret Whitford (eds) Knowing the Difference: 
Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology (London: Routledge 1994) p. 160 
ibid, p. 160
This approach is developed in International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era
(London: Sage 1999), Part II.
See Kimberly Hutchings, ‘F 
and Roland Danmeuther (eds) Cosmopolitan Citizenship (London: Macmillan 1999).
eminist Politics and Cosmopolitan Citizenship’ in Kimberly Hutchings
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affairs/^ In the public sphere, by contrast, we leam to be distmstful, to expect 
perfidy and dishonesty as well as honour and righteousness. Feminists have 
challenged this account in a number of ways. On the one hand, they have argued that 
the public sphere has been defined so as to exclude women. On the other, they claim 
that the private sphere is far from being a harmonious haven; rather, it is an arena 
where women and children can be abused, and men are protected from public 
sanction. By challenging the strict division between the public and private spheres, 
feminists have been able to rethink ideas the nature of the political community and 
about the nature and scope of politics, questioning rigid divisions between the state 
and civil society and implicitly undermining traditional accounts of intemational 
relations and the politics of security. Whereas conceptions of politics have been 
historically based on the possibility of external threats or internal subversion that 
threaten the very basis of the polis (usually the state), the feminist challenge to the 
public/private division suggests that we should re-focus our attention on inter­
personal r i s k s . T h e  best example of this is the discussion of domestic violence, 
which involves the exercise of the most basic form of power, bmte force, at the most 
basic level, the interpersonal. Feminists have politicised this issue by arguing that it 
has gone unchallenged because of the division between public and p r i v a t e . A  form 
of harm which predominately affects women is allowed to happen because the 
public/private distinction dominates our understanding of the political. If we now 
extrapolate this insight to the intemational, we can see that the discourse of 
sovereignty also embodies a particular understanding of what is inside and what is 
outside the political. It assumes that the internal exercise of sovereignty should not
See Cliristopher Lash Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged  (New York: W, W. Norton 
1995)
O f course, there has been a great deal more to politics than this, but the protection o f the political 
community has always been fundamental, from early modem political theorists who were immediately 
concerned with the threat o f  disintegration (Machiavelli, Hobbes), to nineteenth century writers who 
were either concerned to bring down the state (Marx, Bakunin) or with the defence o f traditions against 
subversion (Burke, de Maistre) or extending liberties to expand the pool o f people loyal to the state 
(Mill, Bentham).
There is a huge literature on this. Some o f  the most important writings are, Marianne Hester, Liz 
Kelly and Jill Radford (eds) Women, Violence and Male Power: Feminist Activism, Research and 
Practice (Buckingham: Open University Press 1996), Sue Lees Ruling Passions: Sexual Violence, 
Reputation and the Law  (Buckingham: Open University Press 1997)
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be challenged externally; the implication is that sovereign states should not get 
involved in ‘domestics’ like female circumcision.
Feminists can challenge this in two ways. Some simply reverse the male/female 
dichotomy, placing the ‘feminine’ virtues ahead of the ‘masculine’ virtues -  opening 
the private sphere, developing an ethic of care rather than right, and promoting values 
of nurturing and peace instead of conflict and wai*.^  ^ The other, more moderate, 
approach is to balance the discussion by incorporating feminist insights into 
mainstream concepts. This involves a more inclusive politics that brings together 
both sides of the male/female dichotomy, synthesising elements of both debates. 
Within feminist political theory, and especially in women’s studies, the foimer 
approach is influential, not least because of the nature of academia and the siege 
mentality which has developed as a result of mainstream academia taking a long time 
to seriously consider feminist contributions.^^ In International Relations, however, 
the latter approach is perhaps more important. Two writers who stand out, for very 
different reasons, are Jean Bethke Elshtain and Cynthia Enloe. Elshtain has explicitly 
called for mediation between feminist and mainstream debates, in relation to the 
discussion of the public and private spheres. Enloe has applied feminist ideas to 
empirical investigations of security, expanding the agenda to take into account the 
wider understanding of politics that feminists have developed. The next section will 
consider the successes of feminist scholars in getting across these ideas in 
International Relations. It will begin by looking at security, as this has traditionally 
been one of the most important aspects of International Relations, and so it is a basis 
for assessing the impact and success of feminism in setting a new agenda. A 
discussion of law will follow, as feminists have been extremely important in the
For example, Sara Ruddick M aternal Thinking: Towards a Politics o f  Peace  (London: W omen’s 
Press 1990)
See Daphne Patai and Noretta Koertge Professing Feminism: Cautionary Tales from  the Strange 
World o f  Women’s Studies (New York: Basic Books 1994) and Christina Hoff-Summers Who Stole 
Feminism? How Women Have Betrayed Women (New York: Simon and Schuster 1994) for a critique 
o f the discipline o f women’s studies. Two other celebrated critics o f  mainstream feminism are Camille 
Paglia Sex, Art and American Culture (London: Penguin 1993) and Katie Roiphie The Morning After: 
Sex, Fear and Feminism (Boston: Little, Brown 1994) and Last Night o f  Paradise: Sex and Morals at 
the C entuiy’s End (New York: Random House 1998). All are generally regarded as anti-feminist by 
many that they criticise.
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development of critical legal theory, which has already had a considerable impact on 
the legal processes in Britain and North America. This has many implications for 
International Relations, and for international relations, as international law is rapidly 
developing in new directions and critical legal theory is having a significant role in its 
framing. Then the main theme of this study, sovereignty, will be considered. Two 
more general issues arising out of feminist work will be considered in the conclusion; 
the re-definition of International Relations, and the possibility of basing critical social 
theory on subaltern epistemology.
Security
The extension of the definition of security that is associated with post-positivist 
approaches is particularly marked in feminist writings. It is often claimed that 
conventional accounts of security are profoundly gendered, excluding the concerns of 
women in favour of a macho culture of militarism. As one prominent feminist writer 
has argued, “ ‘national security’ is particularly and profoundly contradictory for 
women.”^^  One does not need to be versed in feminism to accept that security is one 
of the more obviously gendered concepts in International Relations. International 
Relations has traditionally worked with an assumption that security should be 
understood primarily (even exclusively) in terms of the military defence of the state. 
Against this, feminists argue for a more rounded and inclusive understanding of 
security which emphasises the denigrated values of care and compromise that have 
been discredited by their association with femininity and hence with weakness. This 
approach to security requires a “more accurate understanding of existing insecurities: 
it requires politicizing structural violence as historically constituted -  as contingent 
rather than natural -  and specifying some of its implications and consequences.”^^  It 
now becomes clear why feminist epistemology is so important. The broad definition 
of insecurities that feminists have adopted is similar to the ideas of risk that Ulrich
V. Spike Peterson, ‘Security and Sovereign States: What is at stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?’ 
in V. Spike Peterson (ed) Gendei'ed States: Feminist (Re) Visions o f  International Relations Theory 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1992 p. 32 
Peterson, Security p. 49-50
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Beck and Anthony Giddens propose , but  the feminists derive them specifically from 
the experiences of women. Since women have historically been excluded from the 
public sphere, they have not had a stake in national security, and the insecurities that 
they have perceived have been interpersonal and local. Feminists suggest that we 
shift the focus of security away from grandiose notions of protecting the nation and 
dispense with our myths of noble warriors in favour of a more feminised and holistic 
approach which takes seriously the experiences of women and bridges the 
dichotomies between public and private, local and global. It is a theory which owes a 
great deal to the study of radical feminist politics, such as the Greenham Common 
Women’s Peace Camp, and is a concrete example of how theory can derive from the 
experiences of women. Another dimension to the feminist critique of security, 
however, is that it implicates the discipline of International Relations through its close 
ties with security studies. The fact that the (predominately male) discipline of 
International Relations accepted a narrow definition of security uncritically points to 
the need to pay more attention to feminist writings than many in the International 
Relations community have been prepared to do.
Among feminist writers, Elshtain’s writing is closest to mainstream concerns, and her 
call to incorporate women’s experience is posed in tenns that those with a more 
conventional approach to security can relate to. She argues that masculine 
approaches to security are embodied in academic International Relations;
Characteristic of modem professional discourse in its most recent incarnations 
. . .  is a proclamations of scientific knowledge; a presumption that politics can 
be reduced to questions of security, conflict management, and damage control; 
a patina of ‘aseptic, ahistorical and anodyne tenninology’ (‘window of 
vulnerability,’ ‘collateral damage,’ ‘crisis management,’ ‘escalation 
dominance’) and a profound insouciance concerning the will to power,
see Chapter 7
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including the promise of control over events, embedded in the concepts and 
tropes that comprise the discourse in the first place/^
Although she is well aware that women -  and feminists -  have been implicated in the 
legitimation of the hoiTors associated with armed civic virtue, Elshtain offers us an 
alternative based on the incorporation of women into civic life, stretching as far as 
conscription in times of crisis. Her conservative disposition means that she has less 
of a problem with essentialised womanhood than other feminist writers do, and she 
believes that by adding feminine virtue to a civic ethos we can achieve a more 
humane and secure society.
Elshtain is a well-respected political theorist, but is treated with suspicion by some 
feminists for her alleged conservatism. For a less controversial feminist account of 
security, we must turn to one of the first feminists to look at International Relations, 
Cynthia Enloe, who goes further than Elshtain in trying to apply a feminist approach 
to security to expose the hidden biases and fill the lacunae of International Relations 
from a feminist perspective. She re-writes the conventional stories about security by 
giving voice to the excluded actors who are unacknowledged in conventional 
accounts. More than this, she has played an important part in broadening anti-war 
politics to include the forgotten victims, like the military wives whose plight is 
described in Does Khaki Become You? '^  ^ Although her work is less theoretical than 
Elshtain’s, we can derive a number of theoretical implications from her studies. In 
Bananas, Beaches and Bases, s h e  has discussed actors like diplomatic wives and 
banana growers whose activities are essential for the operation of the supposedly 
‘higher’ politics of diplomatic negotiation, international finance and war. Concluding 
her discussion of these issues, she writes that, “Ideas about ‘adventure’, ‘civilization’, 
‘progiess’, ‘risk’, ‘trust’ and ‘security’ are all legitimized by certain kinds of 
masculine values and behavior, which makes them so potent in relations between
”  Jean Betlike Elshtain Women and War (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press 1995) p. 89 
Cynthia Enloe Does Khaki Become You?: The Militarisation o f  Women’s Lives (London: Pluto 
1993), chapter 3
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governments.”^^  Enloe’s feminist critique is remarkably similar to the accounts of 
risk developed by sociologists such as Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, which I 
discuss in chapter 7, which raises the question of whether these ideas are simply 
accounting for changed circumstances rather than embodying a distinctive feminist 
approach. Indeed, a common criticism of Enloe is that her empirical bias prevents her 
from justifying her adoption of a feminist perspective. Discussing the Iran Contra 
Investigation, for example, she claims that the men who were testifying defended 
themselves by claiming that it is a dangerous world, implying that they need to 
protect it. She notes that,
No one questioned this portrayal of the world as permeated by risk and 
violence. No one even attempted to redefine ‘danger’ by suggesting that the 
world may indeed be dangerous, but especially so for those people who are 
losing access to land or being subjected to unsafe contraceptives. Instead, the 
vision that informed these male officials’ foreign-policy choices was of a 
world in which two super-powers were eyeball-to-eyeball, where small risks 
were justified in the name of staving off bigger risks -  the risk of Soviet 
expansion, the risk of nuclear war. It was a world in which taking risks was 
proof of one’s manliness and therefore of one’s qualification to govern.
Perhaps this was true of this investigation, but today the high politics of the great 
powers is characterised, at least in part, by the feminised approach to risk that Enloe 
is proposing.^® This is a theme that she has developed, and in her most recent book 
she has claimed that women require a level of “elemental security” in order to engage 
in theorising, suggesting that safety is a prerequisite for emancipatory politics, and
Cynthia Enloe Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense o f  International Politics 
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press 1990) 
ibid. p. 200 
ibid. p. 12
O f course, realpolitik has not disappeared. However, great-power foreign policy is increasingly 
showing signs o f  adopting a more feminised approach, which goes deeper than mere rhetoric. See, for 
example, the concern about rape in war, the proliferation o f  apologies and the increasing emotionalism  
o f  leading politicians, and the politicisation o f  female circumcision and third world domestic violence, 
discussed in chapter 6.
98
perhaps even that it is a basic right.^^ In this argument, she is implicitly going a long 
way to answer this criticism, and pointing the way towards an approach that is 
specifically feminist.
Through these arguments, security is thus recast as the outlook of individuals rather 
than an abstract measure of the nation’s safety. Through this lens, issues like 
domestic violence are likely to have as much impact on security as the balance of 
terror between two opposing states. Enloe argues that.
Nowhere is men’s violent behavior toward the women and children in their 
households merely private. As Central American women are making clear, 
nowhere is such behavior merely national, either. Domestic violence is 
international insofar as it has become integral to any regime’s attempt to assert 
its control over those sectors, which may want their society to develop quite a 
different relationship to the international order. Thus, to reform any country’s 
police force to make it part of a genuine international peace process will 
require placing domestic violence on the agenda of new police training and 
development.'^®
Following on from the discussion of public and private above, this quotation shows 
how the issue of security is used to redraw not only the boundaries between public 
and private, but also between national and international. This turn away from a strict 
division between politics inside and outside the state is an important dimension of the 
feminist approach to sovereignty, but before developing this analysis, a discussion of 
feminist approaches to law will provide a more secure foundation from which to 
understand the discussion of sovereignty.
Cynthia Enloe The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End o f  the Cold War (Berkeley; University 
o f California Press 1993) p. 38. There is a large literature on the idea o f  basic rights, but the most 
influential recent work is probably Henry Shue Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign 
Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980)
Enloe, Morning After p. 127
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Law
Feminist scholarship has been particularly important in the sphere of legal theory, 
with writers like Catherine MacKinnon inspiring legal refoi*ms as well as 
reconceptualising legal relations/^ The basis of the feminist critique of law lies in the 
recognition that fonnal (legal) equality can coexist with actual inequality. At this 
level, the point is unarguable. By and large, women in the west enjoy full legal 
equality with men, and yet they continue to receive less pay, on average, than men. 
This sort of inequality cannot be explained in terms of the denial of formal rights. 
This is why feminists like Catherine MacKinnon and Carol Pateman argue that social 
inequality raises questions about the adequacy of legal equality, and legitimises their 
demands for partisan legal intervention on behalf of victims such as w o m e n . B o t h  
theorists have re-told stories fi'om conventional political theory thiough feminist 
lenses to make this point, in MacKimion’s case adopting Marxist categories and in 
Pateman’s book, The Sexual C o n tra c t,re-writing social contract theory. Pateman 
argues that, “Juridical equality and social inequality -  public/private, civil/natural, 
men/women -  form a coherent social stmcture. If the complicity of feminists and 
socialists with contract is to end, attention must turn to subordination and the 
contradiction of s l a v e r y . P a t e ma n ’s argument derives its power fi*om the fact that 
in spite of the success of the early feminist programme of achieving formal equality, 
inequalities clearly persist. She moves on fi'om this insight to attempt to show that 
formal equality is a chimera that actually fonns a banier to the achievement of 
equality. Alongside the social contract, she argues, we must be able to tell the story 
of the sexual contract and the slave contract.
Canadian feminist Catherine MacKinnon has developed an approach to law that is 
distinctly feminist, reposing the central categories of legal theory in feminist terms. 
She argues that, “abstract rights authorize the male experience of the world.
With Andrea Dworkin, she helped to draft an anti-pornography ordinance in Minnesota and the 
Canadian legal codes against pornography.
This point is held in common with many critical legal theorists whose work is discussed in below. 
Carol Pateman The Sexual Contract (Cambridge; Polity 1988)
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Substantive rights for women would not. Their authority would be the currently 
unthinkable: nondominant authority, the authority of excluded truth, the voice of 
silence.”'^  ^ She is aware of the arguments against using the law to secure equality, but 
she counters with emotional testimony from victims rather than a substantive 
response that takes seriously the question of addressing feminist claims to a 
masculinist legal establishment.
MacKinnon does, however, go even further than Pateman in sketching out what a 
society would look like if we adopted a legal approach which rejects formal equality. 
She is quite prepared to argue against guarantees of formal equality like free speech 
in order to “open a space for subordinated voices, those shut down and shut out 
through the expressive forms inequality t a k e s . I n  her schema, the law is a political 
tool which can either remain a fig leaf disguising the operation of male power, or it 
can be harnessed for an oppositional politics by oppressed groups. After the 
Canadian government adopted an anti-pomography law which she drafted with 
Andrea Dworkin she concluded that, “this was not big, bad state power jumping on 
poor powerless individual citizen, but a law passed to stand behind a comparatively 
powerless group in its social fight for equality against socially powerful and 
exploitative groups . . . .  What it did was make more space for the unequal to find 
voice.”'*^
The basis of this argument is her distinction between radical legal theories based on 
ideas of difference and those based on inequality. In her first book she argued that, 
“Where difference doctrine searches for the perfectly balanced rule, an inequality 
theory reaches for a political strategy to guide legal intervention on behalf of the 
powerful against those who are not likely to relinquish their place. If the problem is 
inequality, the target is determinate acts, however unconscious, which preserve the 
control, access to resources, and privilege of one group at the expense of another.
Pateman op.cit. p. 229 
Toward a Feminist Theory p. 249
Katherine A. MacKinnon Only Words (London: Harper Collins 1994) p. x 
ibid. p. 74
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The only remedy is redistribution.”'^  ^ Redistribution sounds like a conventional leftist 
argument about political economy, but MacKinnon takes categories derived from 
socialist and Marxist discussion of economic inequality and re-poses them in terms of 
legal inequalities. Indeed, tliroughout her writings MacKinnon never seriously 
examines the argument that the law could be an inappropriate arena for the fight for 
substantive equality.'^® Instead, she responds to criticism with emotive testimony 
from abused and mistreated women, gaining the moral high ground, but never 
questioning that her approach is the correct response to their plight. This fonn of 
political conectness has gained her many enemies, who find it easy to dismiss her 
work. This is unfortunate, as it is extremely creative and interesting, although, as will 
be argued later, inimicable to the ends that she espouses.
Nancy Hirschmann has adopted a similar approach to formal equality in re-writing 
the history of political theory from a feminist standpoint: “the phenomenon of 
unequal starting points or bargaining positions raises serious problems for consent 
theory that go beyond gender to race and class. Since liberal consent theory works 
from stated premises of formal equality, gross substantive inequality will ensure 
political inequality, not only in political voice in detennining the laws but also in the 
ways the laws apply to people.” ®^ Her argument draws strength from the fact that the 
operation of law is unequal in societies marked by inequality. Not only do the 
disadvantaged have less opportunity to participate in the political process of 
formulating laws, but the law discriminates against them in practice. The judiciary 
generally penalise oppressed groups more severely, and this can only partly be 
explained by their having relatively less access to the law, dispensed as it is by 
expensive lawyers and barristers. This is the point of Anatole France’s claim, 
invoked by Elizabeth Kiss, that ‘the law, in its egalitarian majesty, forbids rich and 
poor alike to sleep under b r i d g e s B u t  the final point that Hirsclimann makes
Catherine A. MacKinnon Sexual Harassaient o f  Working Women: A Case o f  Sex Discrimination 
(New Haven: Yale University Press 1979) p. 127 
For example, taking up the arguments o f  Neumann and Kirchheimer, discussed below. 
Rethinking Obligation p. 115
Anatole France Le Lys Rouge (New York: French and European Publications 1964), quoted in 
Elizabeth Kiss ‘Alchemy or Fool’s Gold?: Assessing feminist doubts about rights’, p. 14 in Mary
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implicitly raises a problem with the feminist approach to law that she does not draw 
out. Since the formally equal legal system discriminates against the socially 
disadvantaged in practice, MacKinnon and others argue that the law should be 
changed to reflect inequality. However, if they are right that the most important thing 
is social inequality, then there is no reason why the law will not continue to reflect 
inequalities while the social inequality that it is based on goes unchallenged.^^ The 
argument here is that there is a logical separation between formal and informal 
discrimination. It is still worth striving for formal equality alongside other, extra- 
legal interests. This is, of course, diametrically opposed to MacKinnon’s approach 
because she limits herself to reforms tliat can be achieved using the law as her tool, 
rather than appealing directly to citizens. As it must be conceded that substantive 
equality cannot be achieved through legal equality, she is forced to argue against legal 
equality itself rather than see it as part of a bigger project involving her fellow 
citizens.
It is noteworthy that these ideas have only just begun to filter into International 
Relations, and that the theorists that have been discussed in this section are from 
different disciplines. They have, however, begun to be incorporated. Feminists in 
International Relations have not yet discussed these ideas in any depth, but 
MacKinnon has discussed some of the international implications of her work in her 
Oxford Amnesty L e c t u r e . S h e  argues that human rights are based on male 
experience, and so, “when men use their liberties socially to deprive women of theirs, 
it does not look like a human rights violation. But when men are deprived of theirs 
by governments, it does.” '^* Following on from the theory of law that she developed 
in Toward a Feminist Theory o f the State, MacKinnon argues that state power 
legitimises the exercise of male power. In International Relations, a feminist
Lindon Shanley and Uma Narayan (eds) Reconstructing Political Theory: Feminist Debates 
(Cambridge; Polity 1997)
Ironically, this is exactly what happened with the Canadian anti-pomography law that MacKinnon 
drafted with Andrea Dworkin. John Fekete M oral Panics: Biopolitics Rising (Montreal: Robert Davies
1995), explains that these laws were used against the same groups who have always been victimised by 
the legal authorities -  initially a lesbian bookshop in the case o f  the anti-pomography legislation.
Catherine A. MacKinnon, ‘Crimes o f  War, Crimes o f Peace’ in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley 
(eds) On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books 1993)
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response to this is to take seriously the issues cuiTently outside current international 
law like domestic violence. Given her penchant for bellicose rhetoric, however, 
MacKinnon concentrates her argument on the issue of rape as a war crime, which is a 
more logical extension from current international agreements regulating the conduct 
of war. Developing Susan Browmniller’s argument that men hold power over women 
through rape,^^ MacKinnon believes that rape is not an incidental by-product of war 
but a weapon used by men against women during war.
Feminists are defensive at the accusation of cultural imperialism, but once law is seen 
as a tool to remedy inequality then inteiwention becomes less problematic. This 
paradox is even more acute in discussions of sovereignty, which will be considered 
below. Although she endorses the value of cultural diversity, MacKinnon claims that, 
“cultural survival is as contingent upon equality between women and men as it is 
upon equality among people.”^^  This claim, clearly following her discussion of law, 
leads to the dismissal of the significance of sovereign boundaries, as sexual equality 
is implicitly seen as trumping claims to self-detenuination. Hence, the idea of 
sovereignty is eroded in the interests of other, more important ends. This is closely 
linked to the feminist discussion of law in the domestic context, where the legal 
subject is undermined in the interests of defending group rights and achieving 
equality. In international relations, the ‘subject’ of the sovereign state is undermined, 
in MacKinnon’s argument, in the interests of cultural groups within and across state 
boundaries, and certain goods like sexual equality, which she values above legal 
equality between legal subjects and sovereign states. This is the context for the 
feminist discussion of sovereignty in International Relations, although as we will see 
many of the most interesting writers here have mediated these demands with a greater 
sensitivity to the charge of cultural imperialism that many legal scholars have 
demonstrated. However, the legal discussion provides an important context as the 
(limited) defence of sovereignty by writers like Elshtain does not involve a defence of
ibid pp 92-93
Susan Brownmiller Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (Harmondswortli: Penguin 1975)
Catherine A. MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law  (Cambridge Mass. 
Harvard University Press 1987) p. 68
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sovereignty, but sensitivity to cultural diversity. This implies a deep 
cosmopolitanism, which accepts sovereignty in so far as it is consistent with the 
defence of cultural diversity, but disallows it when it contravenes certain standards of 
behaviour. The next section will look at how these themes have been developed in 
discussion of sovereignty in International Relations, and the conclusion will assess 
the implications of this approach.
Sovereignty
Although feminists have been perhaps more muted in their criticisms of sovereignty 
than other post-positivists they still reject the rigid dichotomies of inclusion and 
exclusion that historically have characterised the discourse of sovereignty. 
Ecofeminists have been particularly hostile to the invocation of sovereignty as a 
defence against evolving international environmental norms, but their criticism is 
tempered by the realisation that processes of globalisation are accelerating 
environmental degradation as well as undermining sovereign autonomy. One reason 
for this is that of the feminists writing about sovereignty in International Relations are 
fairly conservative by comparison to those writing about epistemology and law. 
Elshtain is the exemplar of this, with her Catholic background and promotion of a 
limited fomi of patriotism based on civic identity. More important is the sensitivity 
of feminists to difference, and their reluctance to countenance anything that might be 
thought of as culturally imperialist. However, most of these feminists do not respect 
sovereignty over issues like female circumcision, which suggests that their defence of 
sovereignty may be more muted than a superficial reading would indicate. The 
biggest difficulty in reading this work is that it is not clear which elements are 
specifically feminist, and which are simply part of a wider cosmopolitan tradition. 
Hutchings has argued that feminism should be cosmopolitan, but it is not clear what 
is distinct about a feminist understanding of cosmopolitanism.^^ It could refer to the
Kimberly Hutcliings, ‘Feminist Politics and Cosmopolitan Citizenship’ in Kimberly Hutchings and 
Roland Dannreuther (eds) Cosmopolitan Citizenship (London: Macmillan 1999). This chapter 
develops an understanding o f  a feminist concept o f  citizenship, and why it is most appropriately 
understood as cosmopolitan citizenship, but its development o f  a feminist cosmopolitanism is a
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nonnative basis that their cosmopolitanism derives from, or to the issues that they 
identify as important.
Cynthia Enloe’s application of feminist thought to empirical studies concentrates on 
the issues that feminist should be concerned with. She hints at one reason why 
feminists might be more sympathetic to the idea of sovereignty than many of the 
other post-positivist approaches that have been discussed in this thesis:
Nationalism has provided millions of women with a space to be international 
actors. To learn that one’s culture is full of riches, to leam that outsiders 
depend on coercion not innate superiority to wield their influence, to 
recognize bonds of community where before there were only barriers of class 
and party -  this has been empowering. National consciousness has induced 
many women to feel confident enough to take part in public organizing and 
public debate for the first time in their lives. Furthermore, nationalism, more 
than many other ideologies, has a vision that includes women, for no nation 
can suiwive without culture being transmitted and children being bom and 
nurtured.
Although many third world women would probably prefer to partake in the benefits 
of western civilization rather than indulge themselves in Enloe’s cultural relativism, 
she surely has a point when she claims that national liberation movements schooled 
women in the practice of politics, and broke down parochial patriarchy. Even in 
countries where women are treated appallingly today, like Algeria, women played a 
full and active role in the struggle for liberation.^® Just as the Leninist demand for 
self-determination was premised on the belief that nationalism was a progressive 
force when nations were oppressed, Enloe realises that third world feminism emerged
secondary concern. It argues that a fuller understanding o f  citizenship demands a reconceptualisation 
o f political community. In other words, we can gain a richer feminist understanding o f  citizenship if  
we adopt a cosmopolitan approach, but it is less clear that we can reach a specifically feminist position 
on cosmopolitanism.
Enloe, Bananas p. 61
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out of the struggles for national independence, and that this can continue to play a 
progressive organising role for women. However, Enloe does not draw out any 
general feminist lessons about the importance of sovereignty for normative 
International Relations. Her writing is an interesting and useful correction to the 
biases of other approaches, and is a salutary warning against dismissing every aspect 
of nationalism as backward, but it does not amount to a theoretical discussion of 
sovereignty.
Elshtain has written more directly on the role of sovereignty in the modem world. 
She puts forward a partial defence of sovereignty based on an account of civic 
patriotism. In an article that can be read as a postscript to Women and War, Elshtain 
traces the genealogy of ideas about sacrifice. She concludes that,
the sacrificial political identity I have traced is very much a relational, 
embedded, interdependent self. Care -  caritas -  sacrifice: these are ancient 
themes, not new ones; primal constmctions not modem discoveries. What we 
require is a complex moral universe, a world of justice and mercy, autonomy 
and caring, particular ties and moral aspirations. In such a universe, one 
adumbrated in the world of a Michnik or a Havel, fi*eedom and responsibility 
are living possibilities; the self is very much a modem identity, at once 
committed yet aware of the irony and limits to all commitments; prepared to 
sacrifice, but wary of all calls to sacrifice. This identity is, in the main, 
antiheroic. The hero emerges, when it does, as a modem form of "Hier ich 
stande. Ich kann nicht andersd The stress is on the "Ich\ and the 
presumption is that none should be commanded to do the supererogatory; 
none should be required to give the last full measure of devotion. But to live 
in a universe in which no one was prepared, in which no such Tch’ was any
59 I can think o f  no better illustration o f  this than the depiction o f women liberation fighters in Guillio
Pontecoiwo’s The Battle o f  Algiers, which was closely based on the events o f  the time.
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longer constructed and nothing was worth sacrificing for, would be to live in a 
moral universe impoverished beyond our poor powers of imagination.®®
This rousing conclusion puts paid to many a mindless caricature of feminist 
International Relations. Elshtain is certainly not guilty of merely inverting 
‘masculine’ values. She proposes a sophisticated and attractive vision of civic 
patriotism, and although it is rooted in an idea of a feminist ethic it is compatible with 
other approaches. Although her civic ethic is derived from an understanding of the 
feminist tradition, it also owes a great deal to a long tradition of writing about civic 
virtue in political theory going back to Plato. Elshtain is trying to create a dialogue 
between feminism and political theory by bringing different values together, echoing 
Beck’s political programme in The Reinvention o f Politics, where he quotes 
Kandinsky to argue for a politics of ‘and’ rather than ‘or’.®* She does this with great 
verve, drawing strength from a sustained engagement with both traditions and 
developing an interesting analysis of sovereignty. For all this, however, there is little 
there that could be described as a feminist approach in the way that, for example, 
MacKinnon represents a feminist approach to law.
In the end, it does not much matter that there is little from a distinctly feminist 
perspective on the role of sovereignty in normative International Relations. It would 
be more fruitful to understand it as a disposition towards cosmopolitanism that 
derives from a suspicion of rigid divisions between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and a 
certain alienation from state politics that excluded (and in some cases still excludes) 
women from its political processes for so long. Indeed, feminism can draw strength 
from the fact that it can freely adopt ideas from other perspectives, and develop an 
approach to international relations that takes cosmopolitanism as its starting point. A 
more important aspect of feminist thought, and one linked to its cosmopolitan 
disposition, is its approach to agency, which will be considered below.
Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice’ in V. Spike Peterson (ed.) op.cit. 1992 pp 
152-153, her emphasis
Ulrich Beck The Reinvention o f  Politics: Rethinking M odernity in the Global Social Order 
(Cambridge: Polity 1997), chapter 1.
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Conclusion
One of the main intentions of this section is to highlight the most interesting and 
important feminist work that has a bearing on International Relations. For this 
reason, I have saved most of my criticisms until the end, and concentrated on building 
up a strong case for feminist approaches and clarifying the issues at stake. Given the 
feminist emphasis on individual insight, I feel justified in ending with a more 
personal response than is usual in academic writing. First, however, it is important to 
acknowledge its strengths. The most interesting feminist work in international 
relations has introduced material from political theory that remains unfamiliar to the 
discipline. Elshtain, in particular, has shown the relevance of political theory for 
international relations as much as she has made a case for feminist theory. 
Furthermore, feminist scholars have played an important role in enriching our 
understanding of what counts as International Relations. However, although a 
number of examples of this were approvingly cited above, a note of caution should be 
sounded her, for although many scholars in the discipline still work with a rather 
emaciated conception of what it should be about, some feminists have gone too far 
the other way, and taken the approach of ‘anything goes’. A popular introductory text 
exemplifies this problem: “feminists claim that International Relations are about 
numerous phenomena which fundamentally affect the lives of women and men 
throughout the world and which, because of the primacy given to the ‘high politics’ 
of peace and security policy, have gone largely unnoticed, unrecognised and 
unanalysed.”®^ All sorts of problems affect women and men around the world, but 
International Relations becomes meaningless if we include all of them. There is 
plenty of scope for different understandings of what it might constitute -  political 
relations between states versus an economic emphasis, for example -  but there is a 
trajectory in feminism towards denying the importance of global determinants 
altogether in favour of a focus on the interpersonal. There is a disturbing irony that at 
a time when global determinants like Western foreign policies or the behaviour of the 
international market have a greater impact than ever before in human history, feminist
Sandra Whitworth Feminism and International Relations (London: Macmillan 1997) p. xi
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scholars turn their attention to the most immediate inter-personal issues. It is not my 
intention to (re)define a set of issues that International Relations ‘should’ be 
concerned with -  there is plenty of room for contestation -  but including everything is 
as corrosive as excluding everything.
This brings me to the main criticisms of feminist approaches, one based on its 
epistemology and the other on its account of agency, although they are closely tied 
together. First, an obvious criticism of feminist epistemology that any approach that 
privileges the insights of either women or the oppressed is even more exclusive than 
the putatively universal approaches that preceded them. This trivialises the approach 
somewhat, as they could argue that the main point is that the way that oppressed 
groups understand their own experiences is important, and should be taken into 
account in scholarly studies -  after all, no feminist scholars yet have based academic 
books or articles entirely on their own experiences. However, it still denigrates the 
activity of scholarship and has a corrosive effect on our attempts to understand the 
major dynamics of international relations. If we start from the accounts of diplomatic 
wives and banana growers we certainly get a new and interesting angle on 
international relations, but if we take feminist epistemology to its logical conclusion 
then we would all have to write exclusively from these perspectives.®^ Banana 
glowers and diplomatic wives have no special understanding of the global dynamics 
that shape their circumstances; indeed, the whole point of International Relations is 
that it looks at many different kinds of evidence to arrive at understandings that 
transcend the necessarily partial experiences of different groups. There is no clear 
basis for judgement in feminist accounts of epistemology. In the end, this means that 
they have to be exclusive, and it is hard to imagine how they could be combined with 
other approaches to International Relations.
This is not meant in any way as a criticism o f  Enloe. Her studies o f  banana growers and diplomatic 
wives are valuable contr ibutions to our understanding o f  the world, and she does not make a case for 
feminist epistemology. I am merely arguing that the kind o f  work that she does is not incompatible 
with more traditional diplomatic history.
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The second criticism of feminism is its account of agency, which will be discussed in 
more detail below. Against the idea of the human subject acting upon the world, 
feminists propose that we are interconnected through society, and owe duties to one 
another. Whilst this is a corrective to some banal and unmediated celebrations of 
agency, it produces a rather disturbing model of politics. Instead of acting upon the 
world on the basis of an understanding of our own interests, and with the presumption 
that we can make it better for ourselves, either as individuals or alongside others who 
share our priorities, a feminist understanding of politics suggests that we should act 
on others’ behalf. This brings us back to epistemology, since we are asked to try to 
understand the world on the basis of the experiences of the oppressed. This suggests 
a philosophically idealistic approach that understands the world as in some way 
identified with the experiences of victims, without any possibility of an external or 
universalist reference point. The politics that this creates consists of people 
contesting different good intentions towards the oppressed, but with no way of 
judging between them. Perhaps most worrying of all is that among all of these little 
narratives there seems to be no room left for challenges to dynamic global forces that 
determine all of our lives, since we have no way of accessing knowledge about them. 
It is perhaps a cheap shot, but it seems telling that feminist epistemologies have 
developed in universities at a time when women enjoy more formal equality than ever 
before, and middle class women in the West are barely worse off than men. Above 
all, endorsing this approach to politics demands a rather negative view of the 
prospects for equality, since it assumes that there really are no universal human 
interests, and that the politics of interest must necessarily lead to oppression. A 
critical universalist theory, on the other hand, would assume that, qua humans, we 
have many interests in common, and that it is by appeal to interest rather than pity 
that the world can be changed for the better.
In spite of these criticisms, it must be conceded that feminism has established itself as 
a vibrant and dynamic approach to international relations, and it has much more to 
offer than many of its detractors realise. Of course, my own reservations might 
simply derive from my socialisation as a man, and my prejudice towards
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universalism. But I think that it is right to maintain a sceptical attitude towards 
theories that allow no judgement on the basis of universal criteria. Anyone with an 
orientation towards humanism cannot but be moved by many of the classic works in 
the feminist canon, such as Wollstonecraft, or Marilyn French’s classic novel. The 
Women’s Room, which can be readily understood by any human being. Although this 
chapter has attempted a balanced analysis and offered some considered criticisms, 
one’s attitude towards these ideas seems necessarily to come down to a particular 
disposition, and so the task at hand is one of clarifying the fundamental issues rather 
than trying to formulate a decisive refutation.®'* I have suggested that the main issues 
at stake concern how we understand politics and how we think about the nature of 
knowledge itself. These are issues that will never (and, perhaps, should never) be 
resolved, but it seems to me that the feminist legacy of struggling for equality is best 
earned forward on the basis of the traditional values of universalism, agency and 
sovereignty that today’s feminists are attacking.
Critical Theory
So far I have been using the term ‘critical theory’ to lump together all of the recent 
radical approaches to international relations. But it also has a more specific meaning, 
referring to the writers associated with the Frankfurt School for Social Research, 
which was established in 1923 under the directorship of Karl Grünberg. I do not 
intend to cover the history of critical theory exhaustively as it is less controversial 
than the other approaches that I have discussed, and it has been better sei*ved by other 
studies.®^
On the development o f the Frankflu t School see Martin Jay The Dialectical Imagination: A history 
o f  the Frankfwt School and the Institute o f  Social Resear'ch, 1923-1950 (Berkeley: University o f  
California Press 1996), David Held An Intr'oduction to Critical Theory (Cambridge: Polity 1989) and 
Seyla Benhabib Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study o f  the Foundations o f  Critical Theory (New  
York: Columbia University Press 1986)
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Initially the school was associated with the Marxist tradition, but it was more 
receptive to other strands of social theory such as Freudianism. Writers like Heinrich 
Grossmann developed the Marxist critique of political economy in his neglected 
masterpiece, The Law o f Accumulation.^^ In 1931, however. Max Horkheimer 
became director of the institute and it developed a more distinct approach to social 
theory through the writings of men like Eric Fromm and Herbert Marcuse. Above all, 
Horklieimer’s successor Theodore Adomo established a critical approach to social 
theory that owed very little to the Marxist roots of the institute. This tradition of 
critical theory has had remarkably little impact in International Relations, in marked 
contrast to disciplines like psychology and cultural studies which are heavily imbued 
with their imprint. It is Adorno’s renegade research student, Jürgen Habermas, who 
has dominated the critical literature on International Relations.
Habermas offers a highly developed utopian scheme for an ideal society based on the 
nomi of free and uncoerced communication.®^ It is against this ideal that we can 
measure the legitimacy of our own society. Habermas begins by distinguishing two 
different kinds of rationality which are appropriate to different spheres of human 
activity. Instrumental reason is concerned with the most effective and efficient means 
for implementing objectives that have already been decided upon. This type of 
rationality is to be found in literature on management, for example, which is 
concerned to achieve the objective of maximising profits. Against this rationality 
HabeiTnas counterposes communicative action which is appropriate for determining 
the ends which a society aims for. This rationality is appropriate for the public sphere 
of deliberation where political and moral issues are determined. The history of the 
last two hundred years is read by Habermas as the extension of instrumental 
rationality into ever-expanding spheres, going beyond its legitimate application and 
squeezing communicative action out of the public sphere. To remedy this, Habermas 
proposes a model of communicative action that sets out the ethical demands on
^  Heinrich Grossmann The Law o f  Accumulation and Breakdown o f  the Capitalism System Being also 
A Theory o f  Crisis (London: 1992)
This is developed in Theory o f Communicative Action. On the development o f  Habermas’s thought 
see Thomas McCarthy The Critical Theory o f  Jürgen Habermas (London: Hutchinson 1978)
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speakers. To qualify as legitimate, statements must be intelligible, true, justified and 
sincere.®  ^ By this he means that statements conform to the technical requirements of 
grammar to the extent that they can be understood, that the factual content is con ect, 
that they embody a claim to normative riglitness and that there is no intention to 
deceive.
Critical theorists believe that positivism’s mimicking of the natural sciences is not 
merely misguided or wrong, it is dangerous and reactionary. Max Horkheimer 
explains that.
The traditional idea of theory is based on scientific activity as carried on 
within the division of labour at a particular stage in the latter’s development. 
It corresponds to the activity of the scholar which takes place alongside all the 
other activities of a society but in no immediately clear connection with them. 
In this view of theory, therefore, the real social function of science is not made 
manifest; it speaks not of what theory means in human life, but only of what it 
means in the isolated sphere in which for historical reasons it comes into 
existence. Yet as a matter of fact the life of society is the result of all the 
work done in the various sectors of production.®®
Traditional theory is concerned with solving technical problems, with formulating 
general laws, but not with reflecting on its own ideological role. The distinctive 
feature of critical theory is its of ideology. Apparently neutral scientific theory in fact 
disguises particular interests and bolsters the authority of a particular conception of 
social order. Critical theory exposes the ideological nature of these ideas with the 
aim of increasing human freedom. More recently Jürgen Habermas has posed critical
Anthony Giddens, ‘Jürgen Habermas’ in Quentin Skimier (ed.) The Return o f  Grand Theory in the 
Human Sciences (Cambridge: Canto 1997) p. 128 
Max Horkheimer Traditional and Critical Theory in Max Horkheimer Critical Theory: Selected 
Essays (New York: Herder and Herder 1972) p. 197
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theory, which aims at emancipation, against technical methodologies in the natural 
sciences and interpretative methods in the historical/hermeneutical sciences/®
These ideas have their roots in the French Revolution, when intellectuals allied 
themselves with the various competing factions which were divided into right and 
left. The very word ideology was coined in this period, and acquired its current 
negative connotations when Napoleon turned against the republicanism of the 
ideologues.^* In the nineteenth centuiy this culminated in Marx’s identification of 
ideology as false consciousness, and his linking of the concept to class interests that 
laid the basis for a critical social theory with an explicitly emancipatory intent. This 
theoretical tradition became caught in the political and intellectual mire of Stalinist 
orthodoxy, and in the 1920s and 1930s the basis for contemporary critical theory was 
established. In Germany, members of the Frankfurt School like Horkheimer fused 
Marxist theory with Freud’s work on the subconscious, and in Italy Antonio Gramsci 
wrote fiom his fascist prison cell of the need for cultural revolution and the 
development of a proletarian counter-ideology. Both of these theories have 
undergone a great number of revisions and re-workings, but they form the basis of 
contemporary critical theories. This chapter will concentrate on the German version 
of critical theory that has been the most influential in International Relations through 
the work of Andrew Linklater. This by no means exhausts the possibilities of critical 
theory, however, and there are also writers like Cox who have turned to Gramsci for a 
critical approach to contemporary international relations.^^
The application of critical theory to International Relations is a quite recent 
development. On one level, of course, these critical theories all have a critique of 
positivism, and the Frankfurt School in particular developed in self-conscious
Jürgen Habermas Knowledge and Human Interests (Cambridge: Polity 1986). Although Habermas 
has since moved beyond this formulation, it shows the self-understanding o f  the critical theorists 
See Jorge Larrain The Concept o f  Ideology (London: Hutchinson 1979), Terry Eagleton 
(London: Verso 1991)
Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’ 
Millennium (Vol 10 1981 pp 126 -  155) and ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An 
Essay in Method’ Millennium (Vol 12 1983 pp 162 -  176) Both o f these essays are reproduced in
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opposition to positivism. However, the account of post-positivism given in this thesis 
has emphasised the coherent normative vision shared by post-positivists over the 
methodological disputes that engage so much of their energy in debate with one 
another. From this point of view, critical theory would seem to assume much less 
importance as it derives from ideas that have been around for a very long time. 
Indeed, Frankfurt School writers like Neumann and Kirchheimer were used in an 
earlier section to defend traditional conceptions of sovereignty against post-positivist 
critics. The answer lies in the way in which contemporary critical theorists have 
rehabilitated their revolutionary legacy in an age devoid of revolutionary challenges. 
Marxism was based on concepts like human subjectivity, historical transformation 
and universalism. Today’s critical theorists are concerned with linguistic analysis and 
social inclusion.
Linklater’s writings will be the focus of this section. His work will be discussed 
together, although the emphasis in his writing has changed over his career. His first 
book, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International Relations developed a post- 
Marxist theory which drew on earlier writers like Kant and Pufendorf, and this was 
followed with Beyond Realism and Marxism^^ which pursued this theme with a 
discussion of realism which focussed on the English School. A postscript was added 
to his first book in 1990 dealing with Foucault and H aberm as,and  these thinkers 
have influenced his thinking in his latest contribution to critical international theory, 
The Transformation o f Political Community In this book he has moved a long way 
from the Mai*xist theories that were his foil in earlier works, and he draws instead 
upon the Habermasian turn in critical theory. This section will begin by introducing 
this tradition, before turning to the themes of critical theory in international relations, 
which will be discussed with one eye on the Marxist theories that they turned against
Robert W, Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair Approaches to World Order (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press 1999)
2"^  edition (London: Macmillan 1990)
Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan 
1990)
In Men and Citizens, op. cit.
The Transfor'rnation o f  Political Community: Ethical Foundations o f  the Post-Westphalian Er-a 
(Cambridge: Polity 1998)
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as the writers discussed in this section acknowledge a greater debt to Marxism than 
Habennas perhaps does.
Critical Theoty and Order
There are a number of parallels between critical theory and the English School, which 
become particularly apparent in their concern for order. Habermas writes that, 
“Because popular sovereignty no longer concentrates in a collectivity, or in the 
physically tangible presence of the united citizens or their assembled representatives, 
but only takes effect in the circulation of reasonably structured deliberations and 
decisions, one can attribute a harmless meaning to the proposition that there cannot be 
a sovereign in the constitutional state. But this interpretation must be carefully 
defined so as not to divest popular sovereignty of its radical-democratic content.”^^  
He is arguing that the law should no longer represent the general will as it was 
conceived by classical liberal theory. He believes that times have changed, and the 
legal and constitutional system must adapt itself to the fact that citizens express their 
political will in a different way. The law, essentially, should uphold a discourse ethic 
that constrains parties towards agreement and does not allow any one group to 
exclude any other. Once the sovereign has been removed, Habermas is able to say 
that: “The discrepancy between, on the one hand, the human-rights content of 
classical liberties and, on the other, their form as positive law, which initially limits 
them to a nation-state, is just what makes one aware that the discursively grounded 
‘system of rights’ points beyond the constitutional state in the singular toward the 
globalization of rights.”^^  In Habermas’s version of law the discourse ethic becomes 
the impersonal arbiter in every conflict situation. As it is above challenge, Habermas 
excludes any group that wants to challenge the rules of the game -  and in his vision 
of democracy it really is reduced to a game. Moreover, it is an idea which is
Habermas Between Facts and Norms p. 136 
ibid, p. 456
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amenable to co-option into the risk society thesis as it would have the practical effect 
of concretising the very prejudices that Beck and Giddens celebrate/®
The reduced horizons of today’s critical theorists sharply contrast with the 
Promethean visions of Mai"x and the other radical thinkers of earlier ages. This 
reflects the character of our age, as outlined in chapter two. On the level of individual 
behaviour, the risk consciousness that Beck and Giddens have describes leads to a 
stultifying cautiousness and aversion to even the most obscure risks. Theorists of 
reflexive modernity have consciously incorporated this outlook into their social 
theory, but critical theory perhaps represents the best unconscious assimilation of the 
politics of caution. International relations is an instructive example of this. Maixists 
have never developed a nonnative theory of international relations as they have 
followed Marx in believing that inequality and barbarism would only be ameliorated 
by the establishment of a global communist state. Marxists have instead analysed the 
relationship between economic exploitation and political oppression at the global 
level. Of course, there has always been a strong refonnist element in Marxist 
thought, but they have never developed an independent theory of international 
relations, drawing instead upon a liberal tradition of the amelioration of inequality by 
western paternalists. Linklater stands outside both of these traditions. He writes that, 
‘a post-Marxist critical theory of international relations must concede that technical 
and practical orientations to foreign policy are inescapable at least at this juncture. 
Such an approach must appreciate the need for classical realist methods of order and 
legitimacy in the context of anarchy.’^ ® This seems to follow Habermas’s distinction 
between instmmental and communicative action only to conclude that at present we 
must be content to apply instrumental reason to many problems in international 
politics because, he continues, ‘the project of emancipation will not make significant
This has been put into practice in the procedures for the Northern Ireland Peace Talks, which 
allowed unpopular groups who were more interested in consensus, like the W omen’s Coalition a 
disproportionate influence and forced parties towards a consensual solution. The important point to 
note is that the whole process was forced tlu'ough by the British and American governments, whose 
presence could not be challenged.
Andrew Linklater p. 32
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progress if international order is in d e c l i n e . I t  is at this juncture that Linklater 
brings together Frankfurt School critical theory with ideas about international society 
developed by the English School in International Relations. By claiming that order is 
the precondition for progress he moves decisively away from Marxist critical theory 
and almost to conseiwatism. Certainly, it is the very opposite of Marx’s insistence on 
the importance of international revolution proceeding from below.
Linklater’s privileging of international order should not be understood as simply a 
conservative project; we cannot doubt the sincerity of his desire for international 
justice. It does, however, undermine the possibilities for this change taking place, as 
he is relying on the agency of those with power in the international order as it is 
presently conceived. It is a surprising starting point for a ‘critical’ theory to say that 
its priority is the maintenance of order. The only way that we can make sense of 
Linklater’s bizarre statement is by contextualising his critical theory within the 
discussion of risk. Marx was only marginally concerned with the victims of his 
society, who he treated in a strikingly instrumental fashion. The poorest of the poor, 
termed the lumpenproletariat, were disdained by both Marx and his followers. People 
in the periphery were treated as uncivilised in the main, and Marx welcomed the idea 
that the benefits of western civilization could be extended to them through 
colonisation. Even the working class were treated instrumentally, as the universal 
agency that could bring about the revolution that he hoped would occur, raising the 
position of all classes in society. Linklater, in contrast to Marx but alongside many 
other critical theorists today, bases his criticisms of society on the kind of moralistic 
attachment to victims that Marx and Engels ridiculed as utopian s o c ia l i s m. Th e  
term that Linklater uses for these victims, in common with the New Labour 
government in Britain, is the ‘excluded’.
Theorising exclusion has become a growth industry in recent years and has been 
accelerated by the British Economic and Social Research Council prioritising it as an
ibid, p. 32
Most famously in Fredrick Engels Anti-Diihring (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1977), and especially 
in part three which has frequently been reprinted on its own as Socialism: Utopian and Scientific
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area that they are keen to fund and the New Labour government establishing the 
Social Exclusion Unit.^^ It is particularly important in the kind of post-Marxist 
project that Linklater is engaged in, as it de-prioritises Marx’s one-sided emphasis on 
class oppression in favour of the valorisation of the experiences of other oppressed 
groups. It also breaks the link between radical theory and historicism as, “The 
sensitivity to exclusion in the international system during the last century, and in 
modem societies in the last two hundred years, invites the more general observation 
that social inclusion and exclusion is important in all societies, irrespective of place or 
time.” "^^ The theme of inclusion and exclusion lends coherence to his critical project 
without resorting to the essentialism that played such a great role in the discrediting 
of Marxism. However, the theme of inclusion is quite different from previous radical 
projects, which have prioritised fundamental change over including people in the 
existing system, regardless of how much change is implied by inclusion. 
Démocratisation
The critical theoretic approach has been immensely influential in the burgeoning 
literature on démocratisation. Indeed, one of the first people to use the term 
démocratisation was the Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs.^^ David Held, one of the 
most important contemporary writers on démocratisation, has also been heavily 
influenced by the critical theoretic approach after writing one of the most-cited works 
on the Frankfurt School.^^ For writers like Andrew Linklater, démocratisation is at 
the centre of their political project. Once one rejects the Marxist account of agency 
and the need for revolutionary change in favour of an approach which appreciates the 
importance of international order the appeal of an idea like démocratisation becomes 
obvious. As was noted in chapter two, the idea of démocratisation is quite distinct 
from democracy as it implies the promotion of democracy by external forces, and 
theorists often attach a string of qualification to it as well. Linklater, for example, 
identifies démocratisation with Habermasian discourse ethics which can be applied to
One o f  the fii st acts o f the new Scottish Parliament was to establish a Social /«elusion Unit. 
Andrew Linklater, ‘The Question o f  the Next Stage in International Relations Theory; A  Critical- 
Theoretical Point o f  V iew ’ Millennium (Vol 21 1991 pp 77-98) p. 81 
Georg Lukacs The Process o f  Démocratisation  (New York; SUNY Press 1991)
David Held An Introduction to Critical Theory (Cambridge; Polity 1989)
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every level of society, regardless of its relationship to the state. In this section I will 
contrast this approach of contemporary critical theory with that of two earlier 
members of the Frankfurt School, Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer.
Many of the arguments for the extension of political community made by critical 
theorists and others mirror those of a number of broadly social democratic writers 
responding to the aftermath of World War II. The most notable members of this 
group are Karl Mannheim, who was discussed in chapter three, and E. H. Carr and T. 
H. Marshall. The importance of these figures is acknowledged by Linklater in his E. 
H. Carr Memorial Lecture on Carr and the transformation of political community. 
CaiT and Marshall were both implicitly responding to the social crises that tore 
Europe apart in the inter-war years, with the rise of fascist and communist movements 
across the continent which thrived on the sense of injustice at the peace settlement, 
both in tenns of the harshness of the Versailles Treaty to the vanquished and also in 
terms of the society that the victorious soldiers returned to. Far from homes fit for 
heroes, returning soldiers had to cope with social dislocation and later depression, 
apparently without gratitude from government or people. The welfare state was a 
partial solution to the problem of re-creating this breeding ground for demagogy. T. 
H. Marshall, for example, argued that as the eighteenth century had seen civil rights 
established and the nineteenth century had extended them to political rights, social 
rights were now demanded in the twentieth century. These arguments were the 
basis of the later discussion of démocratisation. Whereas in the past intellectual and 
social élites had seen their position threatened by mass democracy, and had therefore 
fought hard to resist any extension of the franchise or creation of new rights, now 
men like Carr and Marshall were claiming that the only way to prevent revolution 
was to promote the extension of democracy themselves.
The contrast between their approach and Linklater’s is instructive. Although they are 
all concerned with the extension of democracy, their differences are greater than their
Linklater E. H. Carr and Political Coimnunity
T. H. Marshall Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto 1987)
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similarities. For a start, there is no immanent danger of social disintegration today, 
and so whereas the post-war writers were concerned to avert the kind of social 
collapse that followed World War I, Linklater has the more modest aim of 
encouraging social inclusion. More importantly, and as a corollary of this, where 
post-war social democrats promoted the idea of economic democracy, today’s 
democratisers generally rule economics off the ag en da . L i n k l a te r  writes that, 
“Whereas Cair argued for new foiins of political community to protect social rights, 
current approaches are inclined to argue that the enlargement of community should be 
a vehicle for safeguarding civil rights - allowing appeals beyond the state to 
international courts of law, for example - and for supporting cultural rights whether 
by devolving power to local communities or strengthening the international protection 
of minority n a t i o n s . L e t  us now turn to consider the novel features of Linklater’s 
approach.
The first major departure is in his conception of the nature of rights, which are at the 
root of his concept of démocratisation. In this he goes even further in redefining 
rights than the post-war social democrats did. Whereas in the past rights were seen as 
demands for autonomy from the state, the social democrats were calling for the 
institutionalisation of state paternalism. Although the consequences of this were to 
prove deleterious to real rights, which could be assaulted more easily once their 
meaning was devalued, it was probably in the interests of welfare recipients and 
ultimately for society as a whole. The idea of disbursing resources is far from 
Linklater’s agenda, however. Perhaps rightly he seems to see it as hopelessly utopian 
to image global economic development and especially so if it involves significant 
resource transfers from the west. Instead, his understanding of rights is firmly in the 
moral sphere. Although he has a rather overblown concern for the future of 
civilization, he believes that, “communities will not survive unless their members are
Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge Mass; MIT Press 
1992) is one o f  the most influential recent treatments o f civil society, and is a good example o f  the 
exclusion o f  economic questions.
Linklater E. H. Carr and Political Community
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prepared to define their interests in the light of a more general good,” *^ This indicates 
first that his demand is upon citizens rather than states, and second that his interest is 
in the ethical rather than the economic sphere.
Démocratisation carries with it a host of assumptions including transparency and 
external monitoring which can only be applied unevenly in such a manifestly unequal 
international system as exists today. In other words, in an unequal world even 
universal ideals like human rights and démocratisation will only serve to reinforce 
inequalities. This has a particular salience in considering Andrew Linklater’s work as 
it is one of the insights that was lost in the flight fi*om Marxism. Moreover, it is in the 
nature of Habermasian critical theory to emphasise process rather than outcome, 
which lends itself well to the idea of démocratisation.
Démocratisation is an important concept in Linklater’s work. A broad understanding 
of democracy is one of the main features of Habermas’s critical theory, and in 
applying it to the international arena it acquires an additional importance. The post- 
Cold War concern with démocratisation on the part of the western foreign policy 
establishment reinforces this interest and bolsters the importance of Linklater’s 
writing, as it is an issue that the discipline is just beginning to explore. However, it 
also raises a number of key weaknesses in his approach. In particular, a largely 
unexplored question in all of this writing is the role of agency in achieving the 
objectives of démocratisation. As we have already noted, ethics is an important 
element of Linklater’s theory, and is a major component of all approaches to 
démocratisation. Without an account of agency, however, they become nothing more 
than ethical speculation and cannot claim to be politically engaged or particularly 
critical.
Sovereignty
Debates about sovereignty and nationality have divided Marxist critical theorists for a 
long time. Lenin’s pamphlet on imperialism established the claim to national self-
Andrew Linklater The Transformation o f  Political Community^. 1
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determination as a central plank of the communist programme.Marx i s t  critical 
theorists retained an attachment to this principle for most of the twentieth century, 
consistently supporting third world liberation movements which often proved to be as 
bad as their former colonial masters. Another branch of Marxist theory, however, 
maintained that we were entering an era of ‘ultra-imperialism’, which was leading to 
the socialisation of world governments.^^ Unsurprisingly, this approach lost much of 
its credibility after World War I, and especially after Wilson lent his support to the 
idea of self-determination, as part as a defensive strategy against the communist 
threat. However, as the twentieth century unfolded radical critics became
progressively more disillusioned by the demand for third world autonomy. Although 
they could agiee with the liberal critics of colonialism that colonial administration, as 
it was then constituted, was oppressive and undemocratic, and they often went as far 
as to subscribe to a version of revolutionary defeatism in their backing for Ho Chi 
Minh and Che Guevara, they could never live with the idea of wholly self- 
determining third world states. Never lacking in confidence for their own pet 
schemes, whether dams, irrigation and development or enviromnentalism, human 
rights and population control, western radicals could never leave the third world 
alone. After decolonisation this meant condemning indigenous third world
governments and calling upon their erstwhile oppressors in the west to save them 
from themselves.
It is in this context that we should approach Linklater’s work. He has transcended 
these debates by reducing nationality to one system of exclusion among many: “the 
nation-state is one of the few bastions of exclusion which has not had its rights and 
claims against the rest of the world seriously questioned.” "^^ His normative project 
must involve the legitimation of this international order through the discourse ethics 
that he advocates. This normative concern is tempered, however, by his desire for the 
maintenance of international order as the first priority for emancipatory theory. It is 
the reconciling of these two goals that creates the greatest difficulty for his critical
Vladimir I Lenin Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f  Capitalism  (London: Pluto Press 1996) 
For example, Karl Kautsky Selected Political Writings (London: Macmillan 1983)
Linklater Next Stage p. 93
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project in tackling the question of sovereignty, and it raises a number of problems 
common to Habermasian approaches more starkly than they appear when applied to 
other issues.
Linklater began his discussion of sovereignty by considering the tension between the 
duties that we owe to other as men, that is as members of the human race, and as 
citizens, that is as members of a territorially bounded political c o m m u n i t y . I t  is 
significant for a work of radical theory that he should deal with duties and obligations 
rather than rights, placing him in a tradition of ethical speculation rather than political 
action. Although Linklater has noted that, “Developments of an economic and 
technological nature have prompted the observation that men are not only members of 
insulated sovereign states but much more, namely participants within a web of 
economic and social practices which spill over and even dissolve the boundaries 
between states,"^^ he does not believe that the normative theory that he wants to 
develop can be build on these foundations. Rather, he returns to an earlier tradition of 
speculation about ethics in the work of writers like Kant, Pufendorf and Vattel. His 
discussion of sovereignty is based on ethical rather than empirical criteria, and this 
prejudice manifests itself in a tendency to read history as the unfolding of a moral 
idea. Influenced by the dialectical thinking of Marx and Hegel, he describes the 
intermingling of opposites in the modem state as embracing “two moral perspectives 
-  both ethical particularism and ethical universalism. It does so because the modem 
state recovered the values of political separateness and civic virtue while preserving 
the notion of a wider moral community to which men, as opposed to citizens, 
continued to owe obligations.”^^  It is not, therefore, an account of how the 
intemational system will have to modify itself to deal with the consequences of 
globalisation, but a guide to how we should behave as good global citizens.
Linklater’s Ph.D. thesis was published as Men and Citizens in the Theory o f  International Relations 
(London: Macmillan 1990)
^  Linklater Men and Citizens p. 6 
ibid. p. 41
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Despite his evident disdain for the principle of sovereignty, in the light of the failure 
of utopian projects for world government in the past Linklater stops short of offering 
an alternative. Instead, he concludes, “A pluralist intemational society strikes a 
balance between the principle of state sovereignty and universal principles of order 
and peaceful coexistence. A solidarist intemational society endorses the principle of 
state sovereignty but strives to balance it with a commitment to universal moral 
principles which address the injustices suffered by the victims of human rights 
violations, whether those be solitary individuals, indigenous peoples, or ethnic and 
other minority groups.”^^  It is interesting that he is so willing to endorse the principle 
of state sovereignty. Part of this must surely be defensiveness against the charge of 
utopianism, but it is also a genuine endorsement of the principle of order, which is 
currently based around sovereign states. Rather than abolishing states, he seeks to 
make them accountable to global norms of human rights. Again this reflects his 
attachment to Habermasian discourse ethics, which privilege noims about the conduct 
of discussion and démocratisation rather than the wholesale redesign of political 
institutions.
The end-point that Linklater reaches is that cosmopolitanism is the highest stage of 
human emancipation: “By imputing rights to one another within a world political 
system which exercises control over the totality of resources, members of the human 
species complete the move from particularism to universalism,”^^  This continues his 
theme of ethical progress with a normative vision of where we should go next. The 
question is how we should go about realising these rights within a framework of 
sovereign states that must be upheld as part of his defence of intemational order as 
the precondition for progress.
Linklater Transformation p. 176 
^  Linklater Men and Citizens p. 201 
Linklater Men and Citizens p. 26 
ibid. pp 26-27
Linklater Transformation p. 41 
Cox Gramsci, Hegemony p. 164 
Linklater Transformation p. 169 
‘°H bidp. 173
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Conclusion
Critical theory has an ambivalent relationship to its heritage in Marxist and other 
radical traditions. On the one hand, reference to the great radical thinkers of the past 
gives them a certain kudos, and the work of Marx and Engels in particular is so 
voluminous that it lends itself to selective interpretation and plundering for 
decontextualised quotations. Moreover, the dearth of radical ideas today invites the 
rehabilitation of older ideas. On the other hand, however, Marxist thought remains 
tainted with the association with Soviet Communism, and the very idea of 
revolutionary change is no longer seriously contemplated by either academics or 
political groups. The discussion of contemporary critical theoretic approaches to 
international relations has indicated the conservative nature of their alternatives.
Finally, in case there are any remaining doubts as to the ultimately conservative 
direction of Linklater’s project, we should return to his point about the maintenance 
of intemational order as the precondition for progress. If by this he means merely 
that he doesn’t want to see a lapse into anarchy then he cannot be faulted, but this is 
such an uncontested point that it would scarcely be worth making. Rather, the 
intention of this seems to be a waming against grand political projects, and a 
vanquishing of the spirit of Marxist critical theory. In the cold light of twentieth 
century history it seems that these projects have always been doomed to failure, and 
Linklater’s work should be read in the context of mapping out a more modest version 
of critique. It is unclear, however, if he realises just how much he has rejected, 
however. In affirming the need to uphold the present order in the world he is unable 
to distinguish between the powerful and powerless members of the intemational 
system; he is reduced to identifying ‘goodies’ and ‘baddies’ across the globe. The 
result of this is that he has no position from which to be universally critically of the 
intei*vention of the powerful against the powerless unless the violate the iron law of 
discourse ethics, and he cannot identify any group of people, whether within or 
between states, who could promote these discourse ethics. Instead, any interested 
party is free to pontificate as long as they do not violate the mles of discourse by, for
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example, proposing a holistic alternative vision with plans for its implementation. 
The result is a truly impoverished critical theory that, in its partisan endorsement of a 
particular utopia, lacks even the advantages of flexibility and historicity of the 
constructivist approach.
Having covered four of the most important critical approaches in Intemational 
Relations, the most striking thing is how uncritical they are. Competing theoretical 
structures, with varying degrees of elaboration, have been developed around a core of 
key themes, which emphasise the contingency of human rationality, the dependency 
of our relationships, and the limited nature of sovereignty. To adopt the language of 
traditional research for one moment, one of the policy implications of this scholarship 
could be that we need a high level of intemational regulation to constrain the actions 
of individuals and societies who might destabilise global society if left alone. This 
stands in stark contrast to earlier radicalism, which in both its idealist and its Marxist 
varients was based on a more positive vision of what humans are capable of if they 
are granted more liberty than they enjoy at present. To substantiate this claim, and 
mark out my own approach, I now tum to discuss the various ways in which post­
positivists have discussed agency.
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Agency
Central to all of the post-positivist approaches discussed here is agency, which I take 
to mean human capacity for conscious, purposive action in shaping our surroundings. 
Conservative approaches to society have tended to denigrate agency, instead seeing 
impersonal forces shaping destiny (as seen in the traditional approaches discussed in 
chapter 1). Radicals have therefore perceived a need to provide accounts of agency 
that stake a claim for humans to be able to shape their societies. This requires an 
account of what individuals can do, but at the political level agency becomes 
collective -  individual wills bound together for common goals. This is particularly 
relevant for sovereignty, which can be taken as being a term for collective 
subjectivity.
Here I conclude these two chapters, and introduce the rest of the thesis, by discussing 
in tum the approaches to agency taken by the post-positivist theories that I have 
introduced. Poststmcturalism receives only a summary treatment as it is widely 
acknowledged to be opposed to any strong sense of the subject. I suggest the other 
post-positivist theories are also unable to provide a sufficiently robust notion of 
agency to support their critical claims, and that we must look elsewhere for a radical 
account of sovereignty in intemational relations.
Poststructuralism
Poststmcturalism can be treated briefly, because it is openly hostile to strong accounts 
of agency. Superficially, poststmcturalism represents a reaction to stmcturalist 
approaches, associated with Saussure’s linguistic theories^°^ and the stmctural 
Marxism of A l t h u s s e r . R e a d  as an approach to subjectivity, however, we can see 
that stmcturalists and poststmcturalists were both grappling with the difficulty of 
social theory without subjectivity. Althusser developed a more ‘scientific’ variant of
Ferdinand de Saussure Course in General Linguistics (London: Duckworth 1990) 
For example, Louis Althusser and Etienne Reading Capital
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Marxism which ignored Marx’s early concern with issues like alienation and 
produced a theory devoid of the pervasive humanism in Marx’s own work. He 
concentrates on the importance of impersonal forces and his work lacks the urgency 
with which Marx approached the challenge of emancipation. Poststmcturalists are 
very critical of the determinism of stmcturalist approaches, but they continue to move 
further away from nineteenth century progressivist theories.
Poststmcturalism is above all associated with the assault on the subject. In place of 
what they see as the myths about rational man (sic), poststmcturalists pose a world of 
indeterminacy and of forces beyond our conscious control. As this is absorbed into 
approaches to social science, however, its rhetorical power is dulled by the realities of 
a world based on the assumption that we can, at least to an extent, take control of our 
destiny. In addition to this, poststmctural insights are often scarcely understood even 
by those who would identify themselves with this approach. It is a reductio ad 
absurdam of the critique of subjectivity that is more subtly developed in the other 
post-positivist theories that I discuss.
Constructivism
Constmctivism offers a stronger account of agency. It claims to offer a notion of 
agency that contrasts with the deterministic frameworks that are prevalent in 
Intemational Relations. In the context of liberal and realist accounts of International 
Relations, this claim can easily be sustained. Classical realism in particular treated 
agency as the actions of statesmen playing an ancient game according to well- 
established mles, with other people being brought on merely as a stage ai*my (and, in 
intemational politics, they were literally armies). As Ruggie has remarked in relation 
to neoliberal and neorealist accounts of agency, “actors, in the context of these 
models, merely enact (or fail to) a prior script”. Ruggie’s interest, in common with 
the other constmctivists, is in how actors can (re)write that script. In this section we 
will look at how this is explained, but first a note of caution. Bearing in mind the
ibid
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points made in the introduction to this chapter we can recognise that despite the 
attempts of the constructivists to introduce a richer sense of agency into intemational 
theory, it has been introduced from a philosophical and sociological tradition that has 
sought to decentre the self-determining, history-making subject in favour of an 
intersubjective constmction of linguistic convention. This is why (with Husserl) they 
emphasise ‘intersubjectivity’, which is a term often employed instead of society.
The constmctivist account of agency has been clarified and refined through 
Alexander Wendt’s debate with Martin Hollis and Steve Smith. In Explaining and 
Understanding International Relations, H o l l i s  and Smith counterpose two distinct 
methods of social scientific enquiry in Intemational Relations, those of explanation 
and understanding. Explanatory theories are broadly positivist, and involve the social 
scientist observing the phenomena that he is studying from outside, and describing 
them. Against this approach, they argue for social theory that tries to understand the 
object of investigation from the inside, an approach that owes much to the verstehn 
approach, to Wittgenstein, Winch and hermeneutics. This they identify as post­
positivist. The insider view that they flag up implies that agency is more important in 
intemational relations than is generally recognised because the way that individual 
agents understand their actions matters for intemational relations. This, however, is a 
corrective rather than an altemative; they recognise that there are always two stories 
to tell, the insiders’ and the outsiders’.
Wendt, on the other hand, tries to disentangle debates about agency and stmcture 
from those about levels of analysis, developing an argument which he made in an 
earlier article about agency.^*® Although he agrees with their account of the levels of 
analysis problem, Wendt disputes their position on the agent stmcture problem which, 
as he explained in an earlier article, “is really two interrelated problems, one
Martin Hollis and Steve Smith Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon 1991)
Alexander Wendt, ‘The agent-structure problem in intemational relations theory’ International 
Organization (Vol 41 No 3 1987 pp 335-370)
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ontological and the other epistemological.”*^ ’ While he separates epistemological 
and ontological problems, Wendt also suggests that Hollis and Smith’s distinction 
between explanation and understand is of limited usefulness, suggesting that, “ 
‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ accounts are both relevant to a naturalistic social science. 
The characterization of one as Understanding and of the other as Explanation seems 
to be a legacy of positivist conceptions of explanation that forced students of social 
life into a choice between rigidly defined alternatives -  a choice that on a scientific 
realist view need not be made.” ^^  ^ The choice between insider and outsider accounts, 
he argues, should be determined upon wholly pragmatic grounds.
The resolution that Wendt prefers is a holistic approach which realises that, “states’ 
identities and interests are in important part constructed by the process of interaction 
within anarchy.”  ^ He goes on to explain the consequences of this approach with 
reference to his own work on sovereignty:
A world in which identities and interests do not change is one in which the 
basic dynamics of interaction do not change; the distribution of power may 
evolve, and this may give rise to new dominant and subordinate players, but 
as long as states are treated as given, self-interested actors exogenous to 
process the fundamentally competitive character of world politics remains 
constant. A world in which identities and interests are learned and sustained 
by intersubjectively grounded practice, by what states think and do, in 
contrast, is one in which ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. States may have 
made that system a competitive, self-help one in the past, but by the same 
token they might ‘unmake’ those dynamics in the future.
'“ ibid. p. 339
' Alexander Wendt, ‘Bridging the theory/meta-theory gap’ Review o f  Intem ational Studies (Vol 17 
1991 pp 383-392) p. 391, emphasis in original
Alexander Wendt, ‘Levels o f  analysis vs. agents and structnies: part III’ Review o f  International 
Studies (Volume 18 pp 181-185 1992) p. 183, emphasis in original 
“ ‘‘ ibid, p. 183
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This quotation shows Wendt trying to shift the focus away from questions about the 
level of analysis that Intemational Relations should employ and towards the question 
of the relationship between agency and stmcture. The study of this dynamic 
relationship can shed light on the historically specific relationships between the 
phenomena that intemational relations is concemed with. Moreover, it raises the 
possibility of destabilising apparently etemal institutions like sovereignty. What is 
missing fiom this account, however, is any discussion of how these changes might be 
achieved, perhaps because Wendt’s communitarian approach favours leaving the 
resolution of political questions to the communities that they affect.
Although Wendt wants to put agency at the centre of intemational relations, he sees 
many constraints on it. Unlike many self-styled constmctivists who are influenced by 
Foucault, he does not think that because institutions are socially constmcted they can 
be arbitrarily reconstmcted as the constituted institutions become objective facts that 
themselves shape norms and because the actors whose practices gave rise to certain 
institutions may have a continuing interest in maintaining them.^^^ Agency is also 
constrained by socialisation, which sets the context for individual actions and beliefs 
but does not wholly determine them. Wendt suggests the circumstances in which 
identity can change: ‘The exceptional, conscious choosing to transform or transcend 
roles has at least two preconditions. First, there must be a reason to think of oneself 
in novel terms. This would most likely stem from the presence of new social 
situations that cannot be managed in terms of pre-existing self-conceptions. Second, 
the expected costs of intentional role change -  the sanctions imposed by others with 
whom one interacted in previous roles -  cannot be greater than its r e w a r d s . T h i s  
account follows from the stmcturation theory that he employs, which is “a relational 
solution to the agent-stmcture problem that concpetualizes agents and stmctures as 
mutually constituted or co-determined entities.”’ The nature of the mixture is to be 
detemiined by empirical inquiry into specific issues, like Wendt’s own discussion of 
sovereignty, but this sets out a clear and distinct theoretical framework within which
' Wendt, Anarchy p. 411 
ibid, p. 419
Alexander Wendt, ‘The agent-stmcture problem in intemational relations theory’ p. 350
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the issue can be approached. It is, moreover, a significant departure fiom neo-realist 
and neo-liberal accounts both in the nature of its approach to agency and in the fact 
that it has a specific focus on agency.
The relevance of these disputes about agency, which involve philosophy and 
sociological theory, is not immediately apparent in Intemational Relations, and so 
before we conclude a note should be made about the importance of debate. The 
article by Ruggie that was used to introduce this section concludes its section on 
agency by noting that, “ ‘making history’ in the new era is a matter not merely of 
defending the national interest but of defining it, nor merely enacting stable 
preferences but constmcting them”.”  ^ It is in the context of the fluidity of post-Cold 
War politics that the issue of agency becomes important, as agents are responsible for 
constmcting preferences and defining the national interest. Moreover, the 
intersubjective account that the social constmctivists give both allows scope for 
changing the ‘national interest’ to encompass the kind of humanitarian goals that they 
espouse, and provides a theoretical justification for the intellectual playing a major 
role in this process. It is during periods of change that the issue of agency is posed 
most starkly, and its theoretical clarification today is both a reflection of these real 
changes and also an important element in shaping them.
Feminism
Agency is one of the most contested and important concepts in feminist thought. 
Although the most dominant theme in feminist accounts of agency is the critique of 
Cartesian method, which implicates human agency and the rational subject in the 
domination of the ‘other’, there are other approaches that seem to elevate the idea of 
human agency.”  ^ These are more marginal to feminism, but enjoy an exaggerated
John G. Ruggie op. cit. 1998 p. 878 
' Many o f  the former were discussed under the section on epistemology. The latter is well 
represented by Patricia S. Mann, ‘Musing as a Feminist on a Postmodern Era’ in Jodi Dean (ed) 
Feminism and the New D em ocracy?: Re-siting the Political (London; Sage 1997), who argues that “we 
should stop worrying about issues o f  identity and refocus on issues o f  agency, or significant action.”
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importance in Intemational Relations through the impact of Elshtain’s writings. She 
celebrates the historical emergence of agency, “A towering achievement, tied 
inescapably to the public-private division, is the notion of politics as a form of action, 
an activity carried out by individuals with agency within and upon the world rather 
than creatures through or to whom things simply happen.”’^ ® This is important for 
the kind of normative project that Elshtain is engaged in because, “Man’s gain of 
partial autonomy, his emergence from the imbeddedness of ‘natural’ determinism, 
meant that henceforth an individual could be seen as praiseworthy or could be 
blamed.”’^ ’ However, there is nothing specifically feminist about this account. 
Although Elshtain has identified some of the most attractive features of historical 
accounts of agency and harnessed them to a contemporary normative schema, she is 
setting herself against mainstream feminist accounts of agency, which range from 
outright hostility to masculinist notions of subjectivity to a more nuanced feminist 
reappropriation which values caring and nurturing against autonomy and conflict.
This position is derived from a critique of dualistic thinking which argues that the 
subject can only exist in opposition to an objectified ‘other’. In western political 
theory, this has meant defining a masculine subject which operates in the public 
sphere and determines his own existence against a feminine other which is confined 
to the private sphere and is dependent upon male protection. The ecofeminist Maria 
Mies argues that, “self-determination of the social individual, the subject, was -  and 
is -  based on the definition of the ‘Other’, the definition as object, of certain human 
beings. In other words: autonomy of the subject is based on heteronomy (being 
deteimined by others) of some Other (nature, other human beings, ‘lower’ parts of the 
self).”’^^  This approach has been enormously influential across the social sciences, 
but it is often trivialised by writers who adopt the motif without understanding its
(p. 225) However, her defence o f  agency has the same limited character as that o f the critical theorists, 
and is susceptible to the same criticisms raised against them in chapter 6.
Jean Betlike Elshtain Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought 
(Oxford; Martin Robertson 1981) p. 13. This notion o f agency, apparently derived from Arendt, still 
seems hollow, since it seems to celebrate action for its own sake, devoid o f any bigger aspirations.
ibid, p. 13
Maria Mies, ‘ Self-Determination; The End o f  a Utopia’ in Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva 
Ecofeminism (London; Zed Books 1993) p. 223
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V,
derivation from a long tradition of political theory, and most notably from Hegel’s 
master-slave dialectic. In feminism, this was popularised by Simone de Beauvoir in 
The Second Sex}^^ which draws specifically on twentieth century interpretations of 
Hegel by existentialists and phenomenologists who secularised his work,’^  ^removing 
the transcendental elements which were so important for the nineteenth century left 
Hegelians, I will not attempt to contest the ‘real’ meaning of Hegel (whatever that 
was) here, but it is important to note the changing way in which his writings have 
been used in social criticism. Left Hegelians in particular claimed that the logic of his 
work suggested that society should be transformed beyond what he saw as the end of 
history, and they developed accounts of human agency that allowed for the possibility 
of us consciously changing our society. Their account of agency owed a great deal to 
Hegel’s theological concerns, where the sense of transcendence was clearest. Now 
that these ideas are less popular, the division between left and right Hegelians has lost 
its significance, as neither hold much hope for major social change. Instead of 
attempts at transcendence, there are pleas for inclusion. Instead of active subjectivity, 
there is passive victimhood.’^ ^
Other feminists have tried to rescue a more limited form of agency from the ruins of 
the Cartesian subject, but they ultimately undermine it even further by developing a 
form of agency based on victimhood along similar lines to those described above. 
This is clearest in the strands of feminism derived from psychoanalysis. Although the 
work of early psychoanalysts like Freud is not obviously concemed with undermining 
the subject, but rather with revealing another dimension of it, feminists have 
emphasised the elements of psychoanalysis which support their opposition of
Simone de Beauvoir The Second  (London: Picador 1988)
Notably Martin Heidegger, but in France this approach was popularised by Alexandre Kojeve’s 
influential lecture series, later published as Introduction to the Reading o f  Hegel: Lectures on the 
Phenomenology o f Spirit (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996)
The most articulate case for this re-working o f  Hegelian themes from a Hegelian perspective is 
made by Axel Honneth in The Struggle fo r  Recognition: The M oral Grammar o f  Social Conflicts 
(Cambridge; Polity 1996), especially chapters thr ee and five, which contain a number o f  feminist 
themes.
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Cartesian notions of subjectivity.’^  ^ Nancy Chodorow, one of the most influential 
feminist interpreters of psychoanalysis, has used object-relations theory, which was 
developed to account for the development of the self in the early stages of childhood, 
to argue that, “Psychoanalysis radically undermines notions about autonomy, 
individual choice, will, responsibility, and rationality, showing that we not control our 
own lives in the most fundamental sense. It makes it impossible to think about the 
self in any simple way, to talk blithely about the individual.”’ The context of her 
theory is important here -  the conclusions that she reaches about human subjectivity 
in general are based on an approach to psychoanalysis based on early childhood. The 
leap of logic is never quite bridged, and we are being asked to take as faith the 
relevance of socialisation and the development of gender roles as limiting our ability 
to act for the rest of our lives. The altemative project that Chodorow endorses is to 
“reconstruct a self that is in its very stmctures fundamentally implicated in relations 
with others.”’^  ^ This is the heart of the feminist critique of subjectivity. Instead of 
the sovereign, self-determining subject, Chodorow poses a model of mrer-subjectivity 
which moderates the ambitions and demands of the individual in favour of an ethic of 
care which respects and considers the interests of o t h e r s . T h i s  model has been 
perhaps most famously developed by the psychologist Carol Gilligan who has also 
studied the comparative developmental processes of boys and girls in order to critique 
the model developed by Lawrence Kohlberg, with whom she formerly collaborated. 
Gilligan argues that the stereotypes of development which Kohlberg worked with, 
“reflect a conception of adulthood that i s ..  . out of balance, favouring the
Indeed, feminists and their allies have mounted a sustained attack on Freud, particularly in relation 
to his alleged abuse o f patients. A good example o f  this is Jeffrey Masson The Assault on Truth: 
F reud’s suppression o f  the seduction theory (New York: Pocket Books 1998).
Nancy J. Chodorow Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (Cambridge: Polity 1989) p. 154. A  
useful brief statement o f  her approach is found in ‘What Is the Relation between Psychoanalytic 
Feminism and the Psychoanalytic Psychology o f  Women?’ in Deborah L. Rhode (ed) Theoretical 
Perspectives on Sexual Difference (New Haven: Yale University Press 1992) 
ibid, p. 156
The fact that the argument for an ethic o f  care rather than right was first made by that most 
masculine o f  philosophers, the Nazi thinker Martin Heidegger is rarely acknowledged. See Being and  
Time (Oxford: Blackwell 1996) Part I Section 6. This is not to say that it is indefensible; indeed, 
Stephen K. White develops a version o f postmodern feminism with explicit reference to Heidegger in 
Political Theory and Postmodernism  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991). However, this 
relationship may be more problematic than many feminists acknowledge.
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separateness of the individual self over connection to others, and leaning more toward 
an autonomous life of work than toward the interdependence of love and care.”’^ ^
This model is developed in Nancy Hirschmann’s book on consent theory.’ ’^ She 
cautions against masculinist notions of independent agency defined by antagonist 
relations with others, and develops an altemative, feminist perspective. Criticising 
traditional accounts of agency, she claims that, “because it is a reactive rather than 
relational autonomy that this agency embodies, it is also what justifies -  indeed, 
creates and perpetuates -  the radical and abstract individualism of liberal democratic 
theory, the market model of society, substantive theories that require the 
dehumanization, oppression, and nonrecognition of women, a theory that obligation 
can exist only by virtue of voluntary assumption.”’ Her altemative model is based 
on a mutuality of recognition.’^  ^ Its two central pillars are tmst and participatory 
democracy. It is a therapeutic style of politics in which, “citizens would be able to 
engage in self-reflection about their desires, preferences, feelings and empathetic 
responses in order to leam more about what their society and they as individuals need 
and want by observing and experiencing the mutual interaction between individual 
and society that conversation inspires.”’^ '’ This seems to be an updated version of the 
nationalistic slogan from Kennedy’s inauguration speech, ‘Ask not what your country 
can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country. ’ This minimalist account of 
agency as an ethic of care moves so far from what is traditionally understood by the 
term agency that it is perhaps more appropriate not to consider this as an account of 
agency at all. It is rather an argument about the kinds of obligations which we owe 
one another combined with a psychoanalytic account of the optimal conditions for the 
development of selves who can respond to the challenge that Hirschmann lays out. 
Far from an idea of agency based on subjectivity, this model implies that the values
Carol Gilligan In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Developm ent (Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press 1993)
Nancy J. Hirschmann Rethinking Obligation: A Feminist M ethod fo r  Political Theory (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press 1992) 
ibid, p. 228
This is shared with the feminist accounts o f  agency discussed above, and also certain critical 
theorists like Honneth. 
ibid, p. 255.
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required of subjects are closer to those of the slaves than of the masters in Hegel’s 
dialectic. This approach reaches its zenith in Vivienne Jabri’s appropriation of 
Kristeva’s idea of the ‘abject’. N e i t h e r  subject nor object, “The abject is that which 
must remain constitutively outside, rejected and ejected at one and the same time.”’^^
The feminist accounts of agency discussed in this section are an impoverished 
understanding of the possibility of human action when measured against the historic 
approaches inlierited from the enlightenment and from the experience of radical 
politics. With many of the other theorists discussed in this thesis, feminists have 
implicated the subject in the defeat and perversion of the radical projects that the idea 
was associated with, be it the degeneration of enlightenment universalism into 
rapacious capitalism, or radical Marxism into Soviet Stalinism. The various re­
workings or alternatives to the idea of agency, however, lack the sense of historical 
mission of the earlier theories. More importantly, in the absence of a belief in 
humanism and a sense of historical mission, radical politics is necessarily more 
whimsical. Politics has traditionally been anchored in a particular understanding of 
community, be it the working class, the nation or the party. Affiliations have always 
cut across each other, but they were underpinned on the basis of common interests. 
These ideas are frowned upon by feminists, who have tried to develop an altemative 
account of politics, based on women’s experience of exclusion, which cut across all 
of these boundaries.
Critical Theory
Agency is at the forefront of critical theory, which offers a nuanced account of 
agency that claims to rescue the subject from poststmctural assaults. This has 
historically been the great strength of critical theories in the past because, through 
identifying emancipatory agents, radical theorists could explain epochal changes 
where conservatives saw only individual humans acting in contingent situations.
Vivienne Jabri ‘(Uni)form Instrumentalities and War’s Abject’ Millennium (Vol 27 No 4 pp 885- 
902 1998) 
ibid, p. 896
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Moreover, the great appeal of radical theories was their attempts not only to promote 
utopian visions but also to describe the route to their realisation. When today’s 
critical theorists promote ideas like order and social inclusion it is clear that the utopia 
that they propose is not very far removed from reality, and that too much agency 
could be a bad thing. Their account of agency is correspondingly degraded.
As a result of historical and social developments, “men faced a world which was their 
own historical product; and they did so as agents capable of transforming the 
conditions of their social and political existence.”’ Thus, “Our experience of living 
in and among sovereign states could not simply be that of participating within a 
necessitous system of relations, but of confronting a social world in contradiction 
with our humanity.”’^  ^ This is lifted almost straight out of Marx’s account of the 
development of subjectivity, and goes on to adopt his notion of the possibilities for 
transformation being contained within the contradictions of the present system. From 
this common basis, however, Linklater aims to stifle the ambition of traditional 
Marxist theories of agency by restricting its role and operation.
The Habermasian elevation of dialogue is problematic for developing an explicit 
account of agency, and is frustratingly elusive on the question of how to bring about 
the social transformations that he describes. There is no shortage of platitudes about 
the desirability of free discourse, but little questioning of whom will arbitrate between 
the groups involved. One imagines an ageing Jürgen Habermas presiding over the 
United Nations General Assembly, gently rebuking the Iranian delegate for goading 
the Americans, while reminding the Saudis of the need to show more respect to the 
women serving coffee. The key thing is the ethical demand to respect one another’s 
position and to allow consensus to emerge on the basis of the force of the better 
argument alone. Linklater follows this demand with the observation that the 
consequence of his argument is that, “dialogic communities will be sensitive to the 
needs of the victims of the totalising project: namely, aliens beyond secured borders
Linklater Men and Citizens p. 26 
ibid. pp 26-27
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and a range of internally subordinate g r o u p s . T h e r e  is an interesting parallel here 
with Cox’s adoption of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, which “frees the concept of 
power . . . from a tie to historically specific social classes and gives it a wider 
applicability to relations of dominance and subordination,”’"’® which also follows 
Linklater’s identification of patterns of inclusion and exclusion as the defining 
characteristics of any social order. Although they reach their conclusions from 
slightly different directions, there is a common thread in their writing on agency 
which emphasises rules for interaction rather than celebrating the possibilities for 
action.
It would be stretching the point to argue that there is no account of agency among 
critical theorists, but only just. In their enthusiasm for developing conditions for fair 
discourse they have evaded the question of how it is to be implemented. Equally, the 
demand for inclusion overshadows the critique of the basis of the society into which 
they want minorities to be included in. It is a shallow form of criticism that can point 
only to the fact that in contemporary society not everybody’s voice is equal. More 
insidiously, it could be claimed that the inclusion of minorities into decision-making 
processes represents nothing more than the neutralisation of political opposition by 
groups who can have an input into the political process, but who receive no 
guarantees about the outcome. A classic example of this in practice is the Northern 
Ireland Peace Process, where every minority is now given an opportunity to 
participate, but none of them has any assurance about the realisation of their political 
objectives.
Although this is a rather cynical interpretation, which is perhaps an unfair reflection 
on the theorists that are under discussion, they do seem to have a real desire to avoid 
conflict. Linklater’s ultimate preference for order over political action is exposed in 
his commentary on E. H. Carr:
Linklater Transformation p. 41 
Cox Gramsci, Hegemony p. 164
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The very possibility of Carr’s post-Westphalian airangements exists as long as 
a majority of nation-states or the most powerful among them are committed to 
constitutional rule, deliberative politics, social welfare and universalistic 
moral beliefs which value radical cultural differences. The moral capital on 
which modem societies can draw for the purpose of creating post-Westphalian 
arrangements largely consists of these normative orientations. These are the 
qualities of modernity which make the unit-driven peaceful transformation of 
the intemational system possible.’"”
The consequence of this is a legalised politics, as we saw in the previous chapter with 
the constmctivists. Critical activity is directed at the mles of the game. But no matter 
how much more open the game is made, the people are merely playing to another’s 
mles in this scheme. It denies a constitutive role to agency in forming and re-fonning 
both itself and its surroundings. The implications of this will be traced in subsequent 
chapters, which will look at some of the political ramifications of critical approaches 
without a strong account of agency.
Linklater Transformation p. 169
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Concluding Remarks
These two chapters have surveyed the major challenges to traditional theories of 
intemational relations as applied to sovereignty. Focusing on agency in the final 
section has concluded the section by summarising my differences with these theories 
and cleared the space for my own distinctive approach.
The next chapters take the thesis forward by discussing historical and political aspects 
of sovereignty and developing a case for progressive Intemational Relations scholars 
to defend a more robust notion of sovereignty.
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4 Where Sovereignty Started
Part I showed that many critical scholars are hostile to a strong notion of sovereignty. 
This chapter develops my more positive view of sovereignty and shows that it should 
be seen as a right. First, I argue that the essence of a right is that it embodies the 
autonomy of a subject, and that this subject can be a collective body rather than an 
individual. The next section presents the historical evolution of this idea, in rather 
schematic form, arguing that both rights and sovereignty should be seen as tied in 
with the separation of the economic and political spheres that is specific to capitalist 
societies.
This chapter presents sovereignty in a historical context. Two ways of approaching 
this can be identified. One is to look at the evolution of the concept of sovereignty, 
how it has been used and what it has been taken to mean. The other is to look at the 
changing practice of state power, what the state has been able do in the name of 
sovereignty, and how its power may have been strengthened or eroded over history. 
Keeping with the aims of this study, this chapter concentrates on the meaning that has 
been attached to sovereignty, which is of course derived from its actual powers over 
time, and in turn can shape the way that sovereignty is exercised.
Sovereignty as a Right
Many of the approaches that have been discussed in Part I of this thesis started from a 
recognition of the wrongs that have been done to people. They have stressed the 
experiences of the victims of international politics and thus sought to make political 
interventions in international relations that will make it harder for such abuses to be 
perpetrated again. The chief implication of these ways of thinking is that we need a 
new way of approaching international relations that takes normative claims seriously 
rather than, as has often been the case in the recent past, ignoring the normative 
components of such questions.^ There is a widespread denial of the idea that scholars
’ See for example the claims in, inter alia, Chiis Brown International relations Theoiy: New  
Normative Approaches (Brighton: Harvester, 1992), Meiwyn Frost, Ethics in International relations
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can be neutral observers/ and an equally widespread revulsion at the barbarous 
practices that continue across the world, despite the onward march of technology, 
industry and wealth. Much of the blame is held to attach to the baleful effects of the 
doctrine of state sovereignty. The human rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson 
succinctly articulates this approach to sovereignty when he claims that “The 
movement for global justice has been a struggle against sovereignty.”^
The striking thing about this critical discussion of sovereignty, however, is that 
despite the different positions that are espoused, and the sense that the participants are 
engaged in a debate, the various contributions all effectively point towards the same 
conclusion. They all end up suggesting a range of remedies for the twin problems of 
identity and liberty that set qualifications upon the claim to, and exercise of, 
sovereignty. They are all searching for a way of arbitrating between claims to 
sovereignty by certain agents and demands for by other agents for ‘international 
intervention’ to uphold human rights. What is missing from these perspectives, 
however, is the idea that people could -  and perhaps should - emancipate themselves 
and that ‘emancipation’ at the hands of another is not really emancipation at all.
Historically, claims to sovereignty in the twentieth century have been associated with 
claims to self-deteiTnination."^ While the historical antecedents of such claims do not 
concern me (for the moment), it is worth noting that self-determination in twentieth 
century international relations is widely regarded as a right. Indeed, in many respects,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Daniel Warner, An ethic o f  responsibility in 
international relations (Boulder, Lynne Reiner, 1991), Steve Smith ‘The Forty years Detour’ in 
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, 21, 1992, 489-506.
 ^The most celebrated, and amongst the most influential versions o f  this claim can be found in Robert 
Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory ‘ in R. Keohane 
(ed) Neo-Realism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
 ^Geoffrey Robertson Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle fo r  Global Justice (London: Penguin 
2000) p. xviii
A brief historical account o f  the emergence and significance o f  self determination can be found in 
Antonio Cassese, International Law in a D ivided World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1989), p p l3 1-137. Significantly (for my later argument) Cassese points out that amongst the earliest 
advocates o f self-determination was Lenin in his Theses on the Socialist Revolution and the Right o f  
Nations to S elf Determination.
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as Rosalyn Higgins has pointed out, it has been seen as a foundational right/ Thus, 
while it is obviously tme that many of the arguments ‘post-positivist’ theories make 
about the problems of sovereignty turn on the alleged incompatibility of sovereignty 
and rights, sovereignty in contemporary international law is actually based on a right, 
the right to self determination. It may be, of course, that this right on occasion will 
clash with other claims. It is not the case, however, that there is no basis in ‘rights 
talk’ for sovereignty.^
Demands for human rights come in many forms. What concerns me here is the 
underlying claim that we have certain entitlements due to us by virtue of our 
existence as human beings. This claim itself has taken a very wide range of forms 
from natural rights and natural law versions to contemporary positivism and critical 
legal theory.^ However they are interpreted, the point of rights claims is to assert a 
particular kind of force against those agents that would deny or deprive that agent in 
possession of a right of the use of it. Briefly put, my argument in this chapter will be 
that sovereignty can be defended as a rights claim made by a collective agent for 
political autonomy and that other rights claims camiot be held to ‘trump’ it. This runs 
counter to the modem trend of interpreting rights as moral claims made by others on 
behalf of minorities or the oppressed.^
In the past, national self-determination was highly regarded, in spite of the fact that it 
involved violent means. Anti-colonialists who were condemned officially as 
terrorists were heroes to Western intellectuals and student radicals. They did not 
parade their victimhood, but demanded independence, asserted their autonomy and
 ^ See her argument in chapter 7 o f  Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use it 
(Oxford Clarendon press, 1994)
 ^The most thorough recent discussion o f the interdependence o f sovereignty and se lf  determination 
can be found in Antonio Cassesse, S elf determination o f  Peoples: A legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
’ For recent discussions see especially, Jeremy Waldron Liberal Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), Robert P George (ed) Natural Law Theoiy : Contemporary Essays (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992) and Jospeh Raz ‘Legal Rights’ in Ethics and the Public Domain  (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1994).
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took power for themselves/ Their aim was not the defence of their traditions, but 
modernisation and development/® Today claims for ‘sovereignty’ are more likely to 
originate from western intellectuals and take the form of calls for group rights in 
order to preserve traditional ways of life/^ The basis of this is not the confident 
assertion of their identity as a political subject, but the timid presentation of the 
wrongs done to them, parading their marginalisation as a way of claiming protection 
from others.
The main point to be emphasised here is that rights can be held by collective agents, 
not just individual agents. This understanding implies that there are no ‘natural’ rights 
held by persons, but only historically constructed rights won by agents, both 
individual and collective. Moreover, even rights that are owed to individual agents, 
are so owed only because of the existence of a context of collective agency which 
made the existence of such rights possible.
In much traditional liberal theory, of course, rights were solely seen as owed to 
individuals. Rights, we might say, embodied the claim to autonomy that was made by 
the enlightenment subject.*^ Civil rights, like the right to fi-eedom of expression or 
assembly, assert the right to speak, and importantly to hear, any argument or claim 
without them being screened by a higher authority. The right to vote is a demand to 
play an equal role in determining the government of a society. Claiming these rights 
does not require any positive action Ifom anyone else. No resources need to be
 ^Classic works include Franz Fanon The Wretched o f  the Earth (London: Penguin 1970) and Jean- 
Paul Sartre Colonialism and Neocolonialism  (London: Routledge 2001)
This is reflected in debates about economic and social rights and was incorporated into Roosevelt’s 
Four Freedoms speech (http://www.libertvnet.org/-edcivie/fdr.htmfi. which identifies freedom o f  
speech, freedom o f worship and freedom from fear, but also freedom from want, as essetial freedoms. 
' ’ Ecofeminist Vandana Shiva can be taken as illustrative o f  this. See, for example, Maria Mies and 
Vandana Shiva Ecofeminism (London: Zed Books 1993)
I use the term ‘enlightenment subject’ to convey two things. First I mean a new intellectual outlook 
that gave a fresh and independent role for human agency outside theological strictures and rigid 
structures o f political and intellectual authority. Second, I mean political actors that seized power on 
the basis o f  equality in the American and French Revolutions. For a development o f  these ideas see 
Slavoj Zizek The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre o f  po litica l ontology (London: Verso 1999).
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provided, beyond the token cost of organising an election/^ The only condition that 
is logically necessary for their exercise is that there are people to exercise them, 
people who want and will demand them against other authorities. Although these 
rights are held by individuals, however, it was only possible to claim them, and even 
to conceive of them, when individuals were in a position to associate together to 
demand them. In other words, the exercise of individual rights depends upon the 
existence of a collective agent that can guarantee and enable them, which in the 
modem world is the sovereign state.
Today, however, many new rights have made their way onto the political agenda. 
Minorities demand cultural rights, and social democrats demand welfare rights. 
While of course the claims are rights claims, they are qualitatively different from 
rights like freedom of speech because they embody demands for entitlement and 
protection. In other words, they are the very opposite of rights to autonomy. Instead 
of endorsing a claim to independence, these rights are effectively calling for 
dependence; dependence on external authorities for resources and protection. Even 
where there is a popular demand for these rights, they do not have the universal 
character of, say, the right to freedom of speech. Freedom of speech benefits 
everybody, whereas the right to welfare provision is specific. Furthermore, whereas 
freedom of speech costs nothing, many societies find it impossible to provide the 
range of welfare provisions that are regarded as ‘rights’ in the developed world. 
Where one set of rights is about autonomy and independence, the other is about 
dependence.
In recent theorising about rights it has become commonplace to draw upon Wesley 
Hohfeld’s distinction between four senses in which rights can be asserted; as
A classic statement o f this distinction is to be found in Isaiah Berlin Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1969).
Recent debates over multi-culturalism make the point very well. See on the side o f  social democracy 
Brian Barry Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity, 2001) and, on the side o f  multi-culturalism, 
Bikhu Parekh Rethinking Multi-culturalism  (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
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privileges (sometimes called ‘liberties’), claims, powers or immunities/^ Both 
privileges and powers take the form x has a right to a. Claims and immunities, by 
contrast, take the fonn x has a right that y  do a. thus we can say that self 
detennination rights are effectively privilege rights (either simple privilege rights or 
power rights). X (whether x is an individual or collective agent) has a right to self- 
determination and thus a political community with sovereignty. Many now standard 
human rights assertions, however - for example assertions to a right of rescue or 
humanitarian intervention (on which more later) - are effectively claim rights. They 
argue that x has a right that y (other states, the international community) intervene to 
protect rights putatively being violated.
Today, these latter rights are proliferating, but traditional autonomy rights are under 
assault. A good example of this can be found in debates about freedom of speech, 
where traditional protections of free speech are being attacked by those who want to 
protect the victims who may be harmed by injurious speech.^® New rights are 
ardently promoted, while at the same time there are popular demands to balance 
rights against duties, privileges against responsibilities.^^ In fact, these two processes 
are logically related by their similar misunderstanding of what a right consists of. 
Quite simply, a right delineates a sphere of human autonomy in which we are free to 
pursue our own desires. They are fundamental in a way that other claims, no matter 
how valuable in themselves, are not.
The claim to the ‘right to self-determination’ is, then, in Hohfeld’s term a ‘privilege 
right’. However, unlike the second group of rights it does not involve an ongoing
See the discussion in W esley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1919). A good recent discussion is the Introduction to 
Jeremy Waldron (ed) Theories o f  Rights (oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)
The traditional case for free speech protection is well put by Nadine Strossen Defending 
Pornography: Free Speech, Sex and the Fight fo r  Women’s Rights (New York: Abacus 1996). On the 
other side, most notable are feminists such as Andrea Dworkin who argues that free speech can be an 
injurous form o f  action. See, for example, Andrea Dworkin Pornography: Men possessing women 
(London: Women’s Press 1996)
These ideas are most clearly expressed in the more popular writings o f the communitarians, such as 
Amatai Etzione The Spirit o f  Community: The reinvention o f  American Society (New York: Simon and 
Schuster 1994)
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claim for resources or protection. Once the group that exercises the right to self- 
determination is defined and in control of its territory it does not need to rely on 
external enforcement of its right to independence. Of course, this does not mean that 
it retains independence. Another state could still invade, or an internal minority could 
secede, but in principle the right is defensible. By analogy, the right to free speech 
could be abrogated by statute, or restricted by the financial muscle of Fleet Street, but 
the right is, in principle, defensible without resources. It requires only a negative; 
that nobody acts to restrict it.*^
In what, then, does the right to self-determination consist? Two important 
distinctions must be made to clarify the status of this right. First, it must be separated 
from the liberal idea of rights attaching to individuals, whether by nature or by social 
convention. Rights are claimed by social subjects, which constitute themselves 
precisely in their assertion of autonomy. This often takes the form of individuals 
defending a sphere of existence apart from the society, where they can define their 
own conventions. This can include the claim that “An Englishman’s home is his 
castle” or the claim to speak freely without others deciding what we should be 
protected from. But the relevant agent can also be collective. In the case of self- 
determination the subject is the nation, broadly defined. It does not have to be an 
ethnic nation, but can be any group with a convincing claim to constitute a viable 
polity.
The second distinction that must be made is between the right to self-determination 
lying with the polis, and that associated with any minority culture. The distinction 
here is between a claim based on the self-creation of a polis, where a group 
establishes itself and pursues a claim on its own behalf, and a claim based on an 
appeal to others to recognise a group as culturally distinct, or oppressed. No matter
A  similar argument for grounding the fact o f autonomous political community in rights claims can 
be found in Michael Walzer’s work, most especially and Unjust Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1977). However, Walzer’s version fails to distinguish between claims rights and privilege rights and 
this weakens the overall argument, in my view.
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how legitimate the complaint of such a group, its claim to self-determination cannot 
assume the status of a right unless it can successfully organise itself.
Charles Merriam describes this process well:
As the position of the absolute monarch was no longer tenable, and the basis 
of the doctrine of popular sovereignty appeared to be destroyed, it was an easy 
step to declare the State itself the juristic person par excellence, to be the 
bearer of the sovereign right, exercised through its constitutional organs. The 
sovereignty of the State in international law had long been recognized; it was, 
therefore, comparatively simple to see in the State, as newly conceived in the 
organic and personal sense, the real sovereign.^®
This outline gives no easy rule as to how we should determine whether a claim to 
secession is made by a viable polis or merely a special interest group. No such rules 
could ever be devised, and the only aim of this presentation is to establish the basis of 
self-detennination as a right. It does not remove the obligation to exercise judgement 
in particular cases. This argument does not provides a carte blanche for every 
community to secede, creating thousands of states. In fact, it only establishes that 
there is, in principle, a right to do so. Just as the right to freedom of speech can be 
used stupidly, a small and practically unviable community could assert a right to 
secession. The onus is on those who oppose the exercise of this right to make their 
case.
I want to suggest that it is entirely plausible to accept the proposition that the 
assertion of self-determination rights by collective agents should enjoy the same 
degree of protection as any fundamental right and still hold that there is no necessary 
division between different states, as my analogy to free speech suggests. Of course 
this does not solve all problems. How, for example, do we deal with conflicts of
Charles E. Mexiiàm H istoiy o f  the Theoiy o f  Sovereignty Since Rousseau (New York: AMS 1968) p. 
128
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rights and there are always the problems posed by the existence of widespread 
cultural diversity and from the economic inequality that effectively denies many the 
pre-conditions for exercising rights. I will attempt to offer a way of resolving these 
problems later in this chapter after a further consideration of the historical debates 
that have attached to sovereignty, and in particular to some of the ways in which 
Marxist writers have treated the subject.
Let me sum up. This section has tried to offer a logical basis for an account of 
sovereignty that sees it founded on an account of rights consistent with the 
Hohfeldian account of certain rights as privilege rights. This argument suggests that 
collective agents can assert a privilege right to self determination as a ground for a 
strong conception of sovereignty that cannot simply be overridden by the assertion of 
other, claim rights, much the more common way of making rights claims in 
contemporary social, political and international theory. This, then, reinforces the 
points made earlier in the thesis (in chapters 2 and 3) about the relative weight we 
should give to agency and structure in International Relations theory. The point 
perhaps to stress is that this defence of sovereignty is grounded not on any intrinsic 
value of sovereignty as such but rather on the claim that in the contemporary context 
only sovereignty, understood as the assertion of a privilege right of self 
determination, can do justice to a peoples autonomy and thus guarantee their other 
rights.^® The next section turns to consider its chronological development, and links it 
to attempts to construct critical, historical accounts of international relations.
Evolution of Sovereignty
Traditional accounts of sovereignty have tended to treat it as a natural, or at least an 
unproblematic, feature of society. F. H. Hinsley began his influential study of 
sovereignty by returning to the tradition of Roman law.^* Since ideologies are 
constructed from inherited vocabularies, this is not wholly illegitimate. When
M y argument is thus different from those of, for example, David Miller, who grounds his defence o f  
sovereignty in versions o f  an appeal to the intrinsic worth o f community. See his On Nationality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)
F. H. Hinsley Sovereignty (London: C. A. Watts and Co Ltd 1966)
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renaissance and enlightenment thinkers began to formulate the new concept of 
sovereignty, they of course used familiar terms and examples. However the ideas of 
sovereignty that they began to work out are only trivially similar to ancient and 
medieval versions. It is true that different geographical entities have been 
hierarchically ordered, and have maintained relations with one another in the absence 
of an overarching authority regulating their interaction. But legitimacy was 
conceptualised in the modem system through mutual recognition.^^ It was possible -  
indeed, normal -  to maintain authority through force, and for that authority to be 
recognised by others regardless of how that power is exercised.
The emphasis for recent scholars has been to show that sovereignty is a contingent 
and multi-layered phenomenon, and that it is therefore susceptible to multiple 
criticisms and change.^^ One approach to this involves rescuing the universalist 
implications of the doctrine of sovereignty when it first evolved from the stmggles 
against absolutist mle. It contrasts the universalist rhetoric with the reality of social 
stratification and inequality. The contrary approach looks not at the social inequality 
that fiaistrated the universalist doctrine of sovereignty, but at the very doctrine itself. 
It is associated with a variety of critical perspectives that can be grouped together in 
that they treat sovereignty as a practice of exclusion associated with modernity. The 
first approach adopts the doctrine of sovereignty, and criticises the inequitable social 
conditions that prevent its realisation. The second approach sees the idea of formal 
equality, which underlies sovereignty, as the problem. This chapter argues that the 
second approach, which has been popularised in International Relations by the post­
positivists, especially by Rob Walker and David C a m p b e l l , i s  insufficiently 
historical to provide a basis for a progressive critique.
See the argument in Alan James Sovereign Statehood  (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1986). See also 
the discussion in Robert Jackson, Quasi-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1992)
For one particularly significant post-positivist account o f  sovereignty which emphasises the ideas 
fluidity and hybridity see Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy o f  Sovei-eignty (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994)
See especially Walker Inside/Outside: international relations as po litical theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993) and David Campbell National Deconstruction: violence, ju stice  
and the war over Bosnia (Mirmeapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1998)
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For example. Walker has argued that “State sovereignty is in effect an exceptionally 
elegant resolution of the apparent contradiction between centralization and 
fragmentation, or, phrased in more philosophical language, between universality and 
particularity.”^^  He goes on to explain that “the principle of hierarchical 
subordination gradually gave way to the principle of spatial exclusion” as the forces 
of modernity undermined the medieval world-view. The constmctivist Nicholas 
Onuf has outlined a similar conceptual history of sovereignty, which he sees as 
“ineluctably tied” to modemity.^^ Common to this approach is the idea that 
modernity, which developed from the enlightenment, is based on a false universalism 
that generalised the European experience. Ideas like the sovereign state unjustly 
privilege one form of spatial organisation over others, imposing a unitary vision that 
does not respect difference. However, rather than give way to relativism, scholars in 
this tradition tend to resolve these contradictions with some minimal level of 
universality derived from human rights norms.
However, the critical presentation of sovereignty as the outcome of practices of 
exclusion finds little support in the historical record. As Robert Jackson reminds us, 
“the modem world of sovereign states was instituted as an escape from ... ideological 
orthodoxy and political hierarchy”.^  ^ The claim to sovereignty has long been 
associated with the call to freedom and a belief in universalism. This point of view is 
put forward by the Frankfurt School theorist Franz Neumann:
By attributing sovereignty to the state, formal equality is attributed to all states 
and a rational principle is thus introduced into an anarchic state system. As a 
polemical notion, state sovereignty in intemational politics rejects the 
sovereign claims of races and classes over citizens of other states, thus 
limiting the state’s power to people residing in a specific territory. The notion
25 R .BJ. Walker, ‘Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge o f World Politics’ Alternatives 15(1) 1990 
pp 3-27 p. 10
 ^ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1998) p. 113 
Robert Jackson The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World o f  States (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2000) p. 169
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of state sovereignty is thus basically antimperialist [sic]. The equalizing and 
limiting functions of this doctrine appear most strikingly when contrasted with 
the National Socialists’ racial imperialism (which rejected state sovereignty 
for racial supremacy) and with the doctrines of the sovereignty of the 
intemational proletariat, represented by the Third Intemational.^®
As is well known, the French revolution created the vehicle for the entry of serious 
doctrines of popular sovereignty in the modem world.^® Citizens were not defined by 
ethnic descent. Nobles with ancient ties to France fled, whereas foreigners in France 
could be counted as citizens. The English radical Tom Paine even became a deputy.^® 
However, it is obviously not the case that sovereignty has been simply a universalist, 
egalitarian doctrine. The problem for a theory of sovereignty is to account for both its 
universalism, which critical theorists today neglect, and its exclusive, reactionary 
side, whose potential was underestimated by its early proponents.
The tension between universalism and particularism in enlightenment thought is 
encapsulated by Kenan Malik:
The declaration of the Rights of Man seemed to imply that all humanity 
should be accorded ... rights. Yet, in practice, those rights were enforced and 
defended through the mechanism of a nation state. In other words in order to 
be able to exercise universal rights, one had to belong to a nation, to be a 
citizen. But guaranteeing rights through national citizenship by definition 
excluded those rights from all who were not citizens. Through the 
development of capitalist society, the nation-state became the mechanism for
Franz L. Neumann The Concept o f  Political Freedom  in William F. Scheuerman (ed) The Rule o f  
Law Under Siege: Selected Essays o f  Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer (Berkeley: University 
o f  California Press 1996) pp 213-214 
O f course, ideas about popular sovereignty did not start with the revolution. They had been extant at 
least since ancient Athens, but the revolution provided the first large scale adoption o f  these ideas in 
practice.
See Jolm Keane Tom Paine (London: Bloomsbury 1996)
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protecting rights, but in so doing denied those very rights to others. The rights 
of ‘man’ and the rights of a citizen seemed necessarily contradictory.^^
The nub of the problem is to be found in the tension between absolute and unqualified 
universalism in enlightenment view of the rights of man, the immiseration of the poor 
and the rise to power of a new, largely middle class, elite. In fact, it was this very 
élite that put forward the ideology of equality most forcefully; “in this particular 
historical conjuncture, in distinctly non-capitalist conditions, even bourgeois class 
ideology took the form of a larger vision of general human emancipation, not just 
emancipation for the bourgeoisie.”^^
The democratic moment created by the French Revolution was transitory. The 
concept of the ‘nation’ was amorphous, a shorthand for the political community 
within the state. But it quickly acquired a life of its own in iiTationalist approaches 
that tried to make sense of the tension between universalist idealism and particularist, 
exclusive reality. The situation soon arose where “The sovereign is not the will of the 
people at large, but the reason of the nation as embodied in the constitutional 
authorities. ... reason was substituted for will as the basis of genuine authority.” ®^ 
The theme of ignorant masses needing reasoned guidance is already present in post­
revolutionary thought in France.
For much of the nineteenth century sovereignty retained this ambiguity. In Mai*x, for 
example, the existence of sovereign states was a fundamental barrier to human 
liberation. This is shown in some famous passages of the Communist Manifesto, 
where he celebrates the achievements of capitalist society, “The need of a constantly 
expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of 
the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions
Kenan Malik The Meaning o f  Race: Race, H istoiy and Culture in Western Society (London: 
Macmillan 1996) p. 69
^^Ellen Meiksins Wood The Origin o f  Capitalism  (New  York: Monthly Review Press 1999) p. I l l  
Charles E. Merriam History o f  the Theoiy o f  Sovereignty p. 83 and 84
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e ve r yw he r e . An d ,  further, “In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions 
of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of 
distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self- 
sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of 
nations.... [the bourgeoisie] creates a world after its own i m a g e . I t  ends with a 
call to arms for the proletarians of all countries to come together to overthrow current 
social conditions.
He accounted for the development of the sovereign state as an outcome of a change in 
the mode of production from feudalism, where the expropriation of surplus was 
carried out directly and visibly by political authorities, to capitalism, where 
expropriation was carried out through a veil of equality created by formally equal 
contracts between capitalists and workers. This appropriation, Marx argued, is extra­
political, and capitalist society is characterised by the separation of political and 
economic functions. This point has been re-stated by Ellen Meiksins Wood, who 
correctly points out that this separation of economics and politics is best understood 
as the depoliticisation of economics.^*’ It is this separation that gives rise to the state, 
which apparently operates in the interests of all society, but in fact defends the 
interests of capital against its class enemies.
The separation of politics and economics is neither absolute nor static. It is a 
contingent relationship that is negotiated over time. In the twentieth century the state 
has come to play an ever-larger role in the economy. During the two world wars the 
state directed the economy in the interests of the war effort, and state spending failed 
to fall back to pre-war levels after both wars. More recently, states have been 
markedly less enthusiastic about taking responsibility for the economy, promoting the 
free market on a rhetorical level at least.^^
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin 1985) p. 83 
”  ibid. p. 84
Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘The separation o f the “economic” and the “political” in capitalism’ in 
Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1995)
See Alan S. Milward The European Rescue o f  the Nation State (London: Routledge 1999)
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The separate states that emerge with the development of the capitalist world market 
divide humanity into nations rather than classes, subsuming all other interests into the 
national interest in times of crisis. The importance of the ‘Blitz spirit’ was amply 
demonstrated in the farcical attempts at re-creating it through the fiftieth anniversary 
commemorations in the 1990s. Nationalism develops as an ideology that ties 
capitalists and workers together against the citizens of other states, frustrating the 
progress of humanity as a whole.
Writing from a rather different standpoint, Robert Jackson also makes this separation 
between politics and economics the basis for approaching intemational relations:
“State sovereignty is not a sociological idea or an economic notion as it is 
sometimes eiToneously made out to be. It is sometimes said that states are 
losing their economic sovereignty to intemational capital markets. That claim 
is conceptually confused. The expression ‘economic sovereignty’ is a 
conflation of two different concepts that are best kept in separate 
compartments if we wish to be clear. A better term might be economic 
autarky ... Sovereignty is a legal notion in actual practice: that is, as used by 
practitioners. That is not to say that sovereignty and economics are unrelated. 
Obviously they are related. It is merely to point out that the relation is a 
contingent relation and not a conceptual relation.” ®^
From this, he justifies political conditionality in terms of the freedom of contract, 
“Members of intemational society are fully entitled to use their financial aid or 
technical assistance to reward or punish foreign governments. They are perfectly 
within their rights to lay down domestic conditions -  such as the protection of human 
rights or respect for the mle of law, or the holding of democratic elections -  in 
exchange for intemational aid. If the government of the target country cannot accept
Robert Jackson The Global Covenant-p. 109; see also p. 251
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those conditions they are free to refuse them.” ®^ This claim will be discussed in 
chapter 7, while this chapter will explain how these phenomena came to be treated as 
separate.
The separation between politics and economics first developed in England. This is 
not the place to attempt to explain why this process occurred, but before anywhere 
else in the world England developed a national, capitalist market in agricultural 
surplus. The people to benefit most from this were the nobles rather than the peasants 
or the bourgeoisie, and they understood that it was in their interests to give up some 
of the feudal privileges enjoyed by their continental counterparts. Ellen Meiksins 
Wood has explained that.
As purely economic power increasingly displaced politically constituted 
property, and as landlordly wealth was increasingly based on economic rents 
from productive free tenants rather than on surplus extraction from feudal 
dependants, even lords began to see the advantages of a property form 
effectively denuded of extra-economic ‘embellishments’, whether in the shape 
of juridical privileges or prescriptive liabilities. In the end, feudal forms of 
lordly property gave way and the customary rights of peasants were 
extinguished, leaving the classic ‘triad’ of English agrarian capitalism -  
landlords, tenants, and propertyless wage-labourers, bound together by purely 
‘economic’ relations."^ ®
In pre-capitalist societies, economic activity was based on unequal relationships, 
where political power was used to create economic wealth. Although this took many 
different forms, and did not usually take the form of direct enslavement, there was a 
formally unequal relationship between people who produced goods and those who 
profited from them. As capitalism developed, however, this gave way to an exchange 
between equals, where there was a legal contract between employers and employees.
ibid. p. 312, and also defended on p. 365
Ellen Meiksins Wood The Pristine C ultw e o f  Capitalism  (London: Verso 1991) pp 51-52
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The modem conception of sovereignty developed from this differentiation of powers, 
and not, importantly, from the centralisation of political power in absolutist states/* 
In other words, Britain rather than France was the model of the sovereign state. It is 
on this basis that theories of the modem sovereign state have been constmcted.
These developments in the relationship between politics and economics shaped the 
origin and early development of sovereignty. In the literature of Intemational 
Relations, however, these ideas are usually divorced from this historical analysis and 
treated rather as resources that can be plucked fr om their historical context to support 
new theoretical approaches or contribute to the contemporary disciplinary debates. 
Inasmuch as context is considered, the main writers who developed the idea of 
sovereignty are held to have been concemed with the problem of order, which is of 
central importance to more recent theories of intemational relations."*  ^ Indeed, 
Intemational Relations historically focused on political order between sovereign 
states without delving too deeply into the ways in which economic forces can 
impinge on political order.
The idea of the sovereign state emerged slowly from a number of related debates 
about the legitimate scope of temporal and ecclesiastical power, as the European 
monarchies vied with the Pope throughout the middle ages. The argument the I am 
making is that these strands were brought together by the emergence of a capitalist 
economy, and in particular the separation of political authority from the sphere of 
production. Such debates can be traced back to the ancient Greeks, to the medieval 
scholastics, and to many others. To see their real effect in intemational relations, 
however, it is more appropriate to consider a more recent starting point. Specifically I 
begin with the debates about the rights of Europeans over the New World colonies, as 
they pushed the issue of the right of property to the fore. Anthony Pagden notes, “the
Justin Rosenberg The Empire o f  Civil Society: A Critique o f  the Realist Theoiy o f  International 
Relations (London; Verso 1994) chapter 5 
Although an important and influential coiTective to this is found in the Cambridge School o f  
intellectual history, in the figures o f  Quentin Skinner, Richard Tuck, John Dumi and others.
See NJ Rengger International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem o f  Order: Beyond 
International Relations Theoiy? (London: Routledge 1999)
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ovei*whelniing preoccupation of the crown and its advisors not with the question of 
sovereignty, although this, too, was by no means uncontentious, but with property 
rights.”'*'^  I will end before Locke, who has been thoroughly treated elsewhere,"*  ^ and 
is most obviously concemed with questions of economic rights.
The discovery of the New World challenged the pre-conceptions of the old, which 
was confronted with a land and society unknown to the classical sources that the 
scholastics relied upon, and which was not easily described or explained. When the 
Spanish and Portuguese conquests began the sovereign state, with sole authority over 
a territory, had not yet emerged. Instead of the scramble for territory that would mark 
the later conquest of Africa, there was a series of negotiations that involved debating 
subtle theological points and frequent deferral to the papacy. The fiction that their 
aim was to convert the natives was maintained throughout, and institutionalised in a 
Papal commission to Spain to convert them. J. H. Parry, who is one of the foremost 
chroniclers of this process, has noted that, “A thoroughly conquered people, in effect, 
has no legal rights except those granted to it, as of grace, by the conquerors; while the 
conquerors claim a new set of rights which require legal definition, with reference to 
new responsibilities ... A new situation calls for legislation -  no system of 
philosophy or body of custom will serve ... and legislation, to be effective and 
convincing, requires the assumption of sovereignty.”'*^
The question of the humanity of the people that they subjugated was debated with 
pious seriousness. Many participants of the debate used Aristotle’s concept of the 
natural slave as a starting point; others argued that they had an equal capacity to
Anthony Pagden Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and 
Spanish-American Social and Political Theoiy 1512-1830  (New Haven: Yale University Press 1990) 
p. 15
C. B. Macpherson The Political Theoiy o f  Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: 
Clarendon 1962), Ellen Meiksins Wood The Origin o f  Capitalism  (New York: Monthly Review Press 
1999)
J. H. Parry The Spanish Theory o f  Empire in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge University Press 
1940) p. 70
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receive the Gospel/^ The universalist element of the first approach to empire has 
been all-but obscured. Pagden notes that, “The history of the European empires in 
America is one of the reformulation of a constitutive element in European cultural 
and political thinking: the belief in the possibility of a universal human code of 
conduct.”'*® At this time, cultural differences were not associated with racial 
difference.'*®
Nicholas Onuf has explained that in the Renaissance there was a move away from the 
slavish devotion to classical models that their predecessors tended towaids, 
developing new ideas by using the vernacular rather than Latin. He writes that, 
“majesty, rule and agency had come together at the level once identified with princes 
and republics not just to create the sovereign state as something new but to eliminate 
all other political arrangements, at whatever level, from serious competition with the 
state.” ®^ Machiavelli was among the first to give shape to the newly emerging 
practices of intemational relations in the sixteenth century. The intemecine wars of 
the Italian states provided a fitting backdrop for theories of absolute sovereign power 
to be developed. He saw the influence of Virtu and Fortuna everywhere in society; 
Fortuna, the fickle woman, and Virtu the decisive man. An important study of 
renaissance Italy, which is attuned to the psychological impact of the social 
upheavals, notes that, “The wheel of Fortune was a fitting cipher for the widespread 
feeling, among the upper classes, that men had lost control over their lives. The 
image summed up the instabilities of the age. But more specifically, it was an 
ideological projection onto the events of history. It was an effort -  desperate, as we 
can now see — to make sense of the failure of the Italian mling groups.” *^ 
Machiavelli clearly implies the separation of the political and economic spheres in a 
famous letter where he writes that, “Fortune has decided that I must talk about the
See Lewis Hanke Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the M odem  
World (London; Hollis and Carter 1959)
Anthony Pagden Lords o f  all the World: Ideologies o f  Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500- 
C.I800 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1995) p. 200 
Margaret T. Hodgen Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Philadelphia: 
University o f  Pennsylvania Press 1964) passim, especially chapter 6 
Onuf, Sovereignty p. 438
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state-not knowing how to discuss wither the silk trade or the wool business, either to 
profits or losses.”^^
Maurizio Viroli draws out the logic of Machiavelli’s argument as implying that, 
“mling and legislating according to justice and reason presuppose the existence of the 
state as a dominion -  that is, a political stmcture having the power to exercise 
jurisdiction over a people in a territory.”^^  At this stage, in theory at least, we have 
arrived at the idea of the state as an entity possessing something like the modem 
notion of sovereignty. Chabod argues that in Machiavelli, “there is no further 
intervention on the part of God or the devil, the saints or the ‘enemy of the human 
generation’. Everything is determined by human agencies...” '^* Without this basis in 
human will, the modem idea of the sovereign state would have been impossible.
Although Machiavelli is one of the core thinkers in the realist canon, it is Jean Bodin 
who is generally credited with developing the theory of sovereignty in the Six Books 
o f the Commonwealth,^^ first published in 1576. Indeed, “sovereignty is the central 
fact in Bodin’s political theory”.^ ® Wood notes that, “The conceptual clarity of the 
French idea was a response to the absence in reality of an ‘absolute’ and ‘indivisible’ 
sovereign p o w e r . B o d i n  defines sovereignty as, “that absolute and perpetual 
power vested in a commonwealth”.^ ® However, from this apparently absolutist 
conception of sovereignty he proceeds to limit its exercise to a greater degree than 
some realists would today, claiming that both God’s law and the law of nations are its 
superiors.^®
Lauro Marlines Power and Imagination: City States in Renaissance Italy (London: Allen Lane 1980) 
p. 442
 ^Niccolo Machiavelli ‘Letter to Francesco Vettori in Rome’ in Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa 
(eds) The Portable Machiavelli (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1979) p. 65-66 
Maurizio Viroli Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998) p. 48 
^  ibid, p. 180
Oxford: Basil Blackwell n.d. Translated and abridged by M. J. Tooley 
Charles E. Merriam History o f  the Theory o f  Sovereignty p. 14 
Ellen Meiksins Wood The Pristine Culture p. 44 
Bodin p. 25
Chapter 8, “all the princes o f  the earth are subject to the laws o f God and o f  nature, and even to 
certain human laws common to all nations” (p. 28)
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Hobbes was the first great political theorist to write at a time when market relations 
pervaded all social relations/® Macpherson argues that Hobbes’ theory did not rely 
on hierarchy, because the market “established an inequality of insecurity”/* For 
Hobbes, “A political sovereign was necessary to guarantee order, by enforcing rules 
which would prevent the peaceful competition of the market turning into, or being 
supplemented by, open force. But the authority of the sovereignty could now be 
made to rest on a rational transfer of rights agreed upon by men who were equal in a 
double sense: their value and entitlements were equally governed by the market, and 
in the face of the market they appeared to be equally insecure.”®^
Hobbes’ concern in the Leviathan is obvious; he wants to avoid the anarchical 
situation that England got into during the Civil War (1642-49). There is no 
suggestion that we should return to a golden age of the past, and Hobbes is rather too 
cynical to imagine that a harmonious state of affairs could easily or permanently be 
established, histead, he provides reasons and arguments for why we should defer to 
the judgement of the sovereign. Contrary to the caricatured image of Hobbes held by 
those who have not read his work, he was not an apologist for power, and he did not 
argue for totalitarianism. His argument rests on the idea of free and equal human 
beings who freely contract together. From an unpleasant, but equal, original position, 
people originally contracted together to advance their own interests.®  ^ People enter 
into this contract for instrumental, self-interested reasons. In Chapter 18 of the 
Leviathan, Hobbes provides arguments for absolute obedience to the sovereign that 
are derived from the original contract. He argues that, “if he that attempteth to 
depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of 
his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: 
And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished 
by his own authority, he is also upon that title unjust.”®'* He argues against those.
^  C. B. Macpherson The Political Theoiy o f  Possessive Individualism  p. 89 
ibid. p. 89 
ibid. p. 89
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (London: Dent 1983 [1651]) Chapter 13 
^  ibid. p. 91
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such as Milton and Knox,®  ^who defended rebellion on the grounds of the higher law 
of God, that, “there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that 
representeth Gods person”,®® Here Hobbes is arguing that rebels cannot claim the 
authority of God, as nobody can claim to have reached agreement with God; rather, 
they must accept the authority of the sovereign, who represents God on earth. In this 
chapter, Hobbes provides a detailed and coherent argument for subjects to accept the 
will of the sovereign as identical with their own will.
The first person to systematically shift the focus of debate towards the relationship 
between political and economic power was C. B. Macpherson. According to Peter 
Gowan, “Macpherson transformed the received narrative of modem European 
liberalism, from Hobbes through Kant to Bentham and Mill, by arguing that what was 
nomiatively relevant about humanity -  its morally significant dimension -  was its 
equal subordination to the market.”®^ It is appropriate to sum up this section with a 
quotation from his Political Theory o f Possessive Individualism'.
to get a valid theory of political obligation without relying on any supposed 
purposes of Nature of will of God ... one must be able to postulate that the 
individuals of whom the society is composed see themselves, or are capable of 
seeing themselves, as equal in some respect more fundamental than all the 
respects in which they are unequal. This condition was fulfilled in the original 
possessive market society, from its emergence as the dominant form in the 
seventeenth century until its zenith in the nineteenth, by the apparent 
inevitability of everyone’s subordination to the laws of the market. So long as 
everyone was subject to the determination of a competitive market, and so 
long as this apparently equal subordination of individuals to the determination 
of the market was accepted as rightful, or inevitable, by virtually everybody, 
there was a sufficient basis for rational obligation of all men to political
See Quentin Skinner The Foundations o f  Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1979) for a sui“vey o f  these debates.
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan p. 91
Peter Gowan, ‘The Origins o f  Atlantic Liberalism’ New Left Review  2 (8) 2001 pp 150 -  157 p. 155
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authority which could maintain and enforce the only possible orderly human 
relations, namely, market relations.”®®
But it was of course Marx who is most associated with drawing together political and 
economic analysis, and it is to him that we now turn.
Marx and the right of sovereignty
The argument for treating sovereignty as a right that is presented in this thesis is, of 
course, far removed from Marx’s direct concerns for human emancipation through 
freeing human potential from the (primarily economic) constraints of capitalism and, 
as we have already seen, Marx shared in the general ambiguity towards doctrines of 
sovereignty in progressive nineteenth century circles. However, I will argue that 
seeing sovereignty as I have done here, maps on to Marx’s concerns at their most 
central because the right to sovereignty presented here derives from a concern for 
active human subjects. In his earlier work Marx had emphasised this in his criticism 
of idealism. In his celebrated Theses on Feuerbach, for example, he distinguishes his 
approach thus: “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of 
Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the 
form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, 
not subjectively.”®® Here Marx is explaining the novelty of his approach in terms of 
the centrality of the active human subject. Reality, for Marx, is the reality 
constmcted by active humans. Furthermore, his theory differs because “The 
materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets 
that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator 
himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is 
superior to society.”™ He reiterates the claim that history is made by people, and 
expands the theme by explaining that those who wish to impose an abstract will on 
the world (which could include ideas about human rights, or an intemational order 
policed by global bodies that are above the will of states) fail to realise that they, too.
C. B. Macpherson The Political Theoiy o f  Possessive Individualism  p. 272 — 273 
Karl Marx Theses on Feuerbach http://csf.colorado.edu/psn/marx/Archive/1845-Theses/70 ibid.
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are a part of the world, hiasmuch as Marx was concemed with people liberating 
themselves from social fetters -  political and economic -  this thesis is Marxist. 
Whilst it is necessary to clarify the relationship between my argument and what I take 
to be Marx’s, I do not go down the route of mapping my concems and methods to 
Marx’s.
Conclusion
This chapter has tried to locate the problem of sovereignty in both a conceptual and 
an historical framework, identifying the competing interests that have shaped it and 
offering an account of it that shows how sovereignty can be asserted as a right, 
deriving from self determination. The recent accounts of sovereignty and of the 
relation between rights and sovereignty that have been developed by post-positivists 
in hitemational Relations (and by others in related fields) are strikingly ahistorical 
and do not serve to ‘tmmp’ (to use Dworkin’s famous notion) the right to self 
determination understood as sovereignty. They are ‘historical’ chiefly in the sense 
that they deny that sovereignty is a natural way in which to organise society, and that 
they can point beyond it.
Retuming to Wood’s claim that the separation of politics and economics is really the 
depoliticisation of the economic is a good point from which to understand the tension. 
The economic sphere is never entirely depoliticised; nor, in capitalist society, can it 
be entirely politicised -  i.e., brought under democratic control. The question is about 
where the line is to be drawn. In Intemational Relations this point remains salient. 
Third world claims to sovereignty over natural resources were taken very seriously 
during the Cold War, but today they are largely ignored.^* Today, however, the 
growth of interdependence and more recently of ‘globalisation’ has been widely held 
to render such concems pointless. Neo-liberal political economy, borderless in 
essence and often in effect, is a dominant force in thinking through the logic of the 
contemporary intemational system. Opposition to neo-liberalism in academic and
See the discussion in Robert H. Jackson Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Third World (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 1990)
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policy debates in Intemational Relations is increasingly coming from ‘post-positivist’ 
theorists of various stripes, critical, post-structural, feminist and normative theorists 
all criticise these developments. However, their criticism tends to coalesce around 
claims about the ‘rights’ of the poor and about the requirement of the ‘rich’ to do 
something about it. The ‘global justice’ industry especially emphasises this.™ Yet all 
these accounts effectively present the relevant rights as claim rights (x has a right that 
y do a) and are silent about the privilege right of self determination whose face in the 
modem world has inevitably been sovereignty. The rest of this thesis will show that, 
however well intentioned, this silence has great costs and that only a clear and 
unambiguous privilege right of self determination, expressible in terms of sovereignty 
stands any chance of doing justice to both the autonomy and rights of persons in the 
contemporary world.
The most impressive contemporary version o f this claim can be found in Thomas Pogge’s W orld  
Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge; Polity, 2002) but see also Onora O’Neill Bounds o f  Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and the debates in Thomas Pogge (ed) Global Justice 
(Oxford; Blackwell, 2000).
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5 From Anti-Imperialism to Muiticulturalism
This thesis, then, presents sovereignty as a foundational privilege right that cannot be 
trumped by other claim rights, however important these might be in specific contexts. 
While of course a way needs to be foimd of accommodating such rights to sovereignty 
(an issue to which I shall return in later chapters and the conclusion) it is necessary first 
to confront the clearest negations of that right in the history and practice of international 
relations. I shall argue here that there are strong and weak forms of this negation -  
imperialism being the strongest forni of the negation, contemporary multi-culturalism the 
weaker form. I will, therefore, look at each in turn before concluding this chapter by 
summarising my argument that such attempted negations of sovereignty in fact do not 
cancel out its value.
Empire, imperialism and international relations
The study of imperialism occupies a curious place in the study of international relations. 
It is usually treated as synonymous with colonialism and by far the most serious attention 
to it has been paid by critics of colonialism.^ However, there has also been a smaller, 
though growing, attempt to look at ‘empire’ as a more general political form.^ But the 
changing ways in which imperialism has been understood have been central to twentieth 
century international relations. The challenge to imperialism issued by Hobson, Lenin 
and others early in the twentieth century held up the reality of inequality between the 
imperialist powers and their colonies against their claim to bring the benefits of 
civilization to others. These ideas were given material force by insurrections and
‘ The literature here is huge. A good general survey can be found in Lewis S Feuer Imperialism and the 
Anti-Imperialist Mind (New York: Prometheus, 1986). Discussions o f  particular Eiuopean imperialisms, 
focussing especially on the British, can be found in Vol V o f  the Oxford History o f  the British Empire: 
Historiogrpahy. Perhaps the best general treatment o f  the imperial mentality is in A.P.Thomton’s well
Doctrines o f  Imperialism  (London: John Wiley, 1965) and also his less general (again focussing on 
Britain) but still excellent The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies (Harmondsworth: Macmaillan, 1986 2"^ * 
edition). A rare, but excellent, ti eatment o f  imperialism in the formal literature o f  international relations is 
Charles Reynolds, Modes o f  Imperialism  (London: Martin Robertson, 1981).
 ^ Perhaps the clearest book, with a focus on international relations, is Michael D oyle’s Empires (New  
York: Cornell University Press, 1986). The most general and exhaustive, however, is unquestionably S. N  
Eisenstadt The Political System o f  Empires (Transaction books, 1993 (revised edition). An influential 
author o f the 1960’s and 70’s who argued that the best way to see the cold war was as a clash o f  empires 
was George Liska. See especially his Imperial America: The International Politics o f  Primacy (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).
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uprisings against colonial rule in the colonies themselves, a trend exacerbated by the 
organisation of colonial subjects into regiments to fight in World War Some defenders 
of empire resorted to increasingly vitriolic racist arguments, and their opponents often 
aped them with arguments about responsibility towards lower races."* Alongside this, 
however, was a recognition that the colonies could not be held forever, and the theme of 
managed withdrawal has run throughout the century. The literature on ‘end of empire’ is 
now almost as great as that of imperialism itself. At the beginning of the twenty first 
century, however, powerful states seem to have regained their mandate to intervene in the 
affairs of the third world, and once again they do so in the name of ‘civilization’ -  now 
perhaps more usually understood in terms of human rights, say, or democracy.^ Chapter 
6 of this thesis will look at this recent trend in more detail. This chapter, by contrast, will 
provide the background to that discussion by showing both how the meaning of 
imperialism has been re-interpreted as a cultural phenomena, hence allowing (even, 
perhaps on some readings requiring) former ‘imperialist’ states to intervene on 
‘humanitarian’ grounds to save victims from their own governments or from external 
circumstances. It will also clarify my thesis about the instrumental value of the right to 
sovereignty by distinguishing it from intrinsic claims about the value which inheres in 
cultural autonomy.
At the start of the twentieth century the absolute dominance of the sovereign state was 
fully established. The only question was of the kind of community that could be regarded 
as sovereign. Just as liberal societies have consistently withheld rights from certain 
groups, such as women, on the basis that they were not capable of exercising them, 
sovereignty was denied to people who Europeans regarded as backward. In itself, this 
did not undermine the idea of sovereignty. It can, of course, be applied unequally 
without being called into question as an idea. The idea only came to be questioned when
 ^ See Frank Furedi Colonial Wars and the Politics o f  Third World Nationalism  (London: I. B. Tauris 1994) 
This is particularly clear among the Fabians, e.g. Rita Hinden (ed.) Fabian Colonial Essays (London: 
George Allen and Unwin 1945)
 ^Geiritt Gong’s The Standard o f  Civilization in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) is a 
now standard analysis o f  the idea o f member states o f  international society having a behavioural standard to 
which all should subscribe. Jack Donnelly has recently suggested that ‘human rights’ are the new ‘standard 
o f civilization. See his ‘Human Rights: A N ew  Standard o f  Civilization?’ in International Affairs, vol 74, 
N o 1, January 1998, 1-24.
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imperialism was challenged by colonial nationalism and western radicalism. One way of 
responding to this was to deny the legitimacy of these movements, to separate respectable 
western nationalism from its pathological reflection in less advanced societies.*  ^ Another 
was to co-opt radical ideas to an establishment agenda, as Wilson did with his call for 
national self-determination.^
This was the temporal context in which the discipline of international relations also 
developed, of course.^ However, these concerns were not directly reflected in its early 
research agenda, which tended to focus more on utopian schemes for world peace and 
international organisation, or on problems of war and security. Radical writing on 
imperialism was not only outside the mainstream, it was often seen as unscholarly or 
merely journalistic or both. In fact, the critics of imperialism have been persistently 
misrepresented in International Relations. Conservatives and liberals alike have sought 
to deny the legitimacy of their claims, obscure differences between the critics, and accuse 
them of either naivety or malice.^ The most notable example of this -  though not limited 
to scholars of international relations, of course - is the tendency to see Hobson and Lenin 
as representatives of the same idea, because of Lenin’s well-known acknowledgement of 
Hobson. This saves the trouble of delving into Lenin’s other substantial source. Volume 
3 of Marx’s ‘Capital’, or any of the other 380 sources found in Lenin’s ‘Notebooks on 
Imperialism’.**^
Kenneth Waltz serves to demonstrate the misunderstandings prevalent in mainstream 
International Relations. He deals with the Hobson/Lenin theory of imperialism in a 
chapter of Theory o f International Politics entitled, ‘Reductionist Theories’.** He claims
 ^See Frank Fmedi Colonial Wars
 ^For discussions o f  W ilson’s ideas about se lf determination and their impact both in the US and more 
generally see Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference o f  1919 and its attempt to 
end war (London; John Murray, 2003)
* For good accounts o f the background assumptions o f the nascent discipline between the 1880’s and the 
1920’s (the point at which it became institutionalised) see, for example, Brian Schmidt The political 
discourse o f  anarchy: a disciplinary history o f  international relations (New York; State University o f  New  
York Press, 1998).
 ^This is a central theme in Furedi Colonial Wars 
Karl Marx Capital V o\ 3 (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1984), V. I. Lenin Collected Works Vol 39 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart 1968)
Kenneth N. Waltz Theory o f  International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill 1979) Chapter 2
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that we should expect that, “the assumptions of the Hobson-Lenin theory will be 
economic, not political”,*^  and advises that, “students will save much time and trouble by 
mastering the sixth chapter of Part I, where they will find all of the elements of later 
economic explanations of imperialism from Lenin to Baran and Sweezy.”*^  Indeed, he 
only concedes Lenin the merit of originality in two areas; he refused to accept Hobson’s 
claim that government policies could eliminate the drive to imperialism, and he believed 
that capitalism inevitably caused imperialism, which necessarily lead to war.*"* In fact, 
these two areas of disagreement are absolutely essential to grasp either theory.
Waltz feigns confusion at the claim that capitalism causes imperialism when, 
“hnperialism is at least as old as recorded history.”*^  To encounter such a claim from 
Waltz is strange, to say the least, when we refer back to his own claim in the preceding 
chapter, “That theoretical notions are defined by the theory in which they appear is easily 
understood.”*** Not quite so easily, it seems. Hobson is absolutely clear on this point:
the distinction between genuine Colonialism and Imperialism, important in itself, 
is vital when we consider their respective relations to domestic policy. 
Imperialism is the very antithesis of [the] free, wholesome colonial connection, 
making, as it ever does, for greater complications of foreign policy, greater 
centralisation of power, and a congestion of business which ever threatens to 
absorb and overtax the capacity of parliamentary government.**^
So how are these theories different? Hobson argues that imperialism is an irrational 
policy, “A completely socialist State which kept good books and presented regular 
balance-sheets of expenditure and assets would soon discard Imperialism; an intelligent 
laissez-faire democracy which gave duly proportionate weight in its policy to all 
economic interests alike would do the same. But a State in which certain well-organised
ibid. p. 20 
" ibid. p. 20 
ibid. p. 23
ibid. p. 25
16 ,Dia z jibid. p. 11
Jolm A. Hobson Imperialism: A Study (London: George Allen and Unwin 1954) p. 125
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business interests are able to outweigh the weak, diffused interest of the community is 
bound to pursue a policy which accords with the pressure of the former interests.”*^  And 
again, “The rich will never be so ingenious as to spend enough to prevent over­
production.”*^  Lenin, in contrast, sees imperialism only as contingently irrational -  
irrational, that is, in the context of the development of human society, but absolutely 
rational from the point of view of capitalist interests.
One obvious source of confusion in understanding Lenin’s theory is that it is written in an 
elliptical style to fool the censors. He points out that, “This pamphlet was written with an 
eye to Tsarist censorship. Hence, I was not only forced to confine myself strictly to an 
exclusively theoretical, mainly economic analysis of facts, but to formulate the few 
necessary observations of politics with extreme caution, but hints, in that Aesopian 
language -  in that cursed Aesopian language -  to which Tsarism compelled all 
revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up their pens to write a ‘legal’ 
work.” *^* Note that he does not say that imperialism is ‘merely’ economic, only that he 
has concentrated on that side of it.
The subtitle of Lenin’s work is ‘the highest stage of capitalism’, and to understand it fully 
one must begin from Marx’s description of the laws of motion of capitalist society in 
Capital. Lenin’s argument is that these laws are being subverted by capitalism itself in a 
state of crisis. He describes its evolution schematically thus, “the principal stages in the 
history of monopolies are the following: 1) 1860-70, the highest stage, the apex of 
development of free competition; monopoly is in the barely discernible, embryonic stage. 
2) After the crisis of 1873, a wide zone of development of cartels; but they are still the 
exception. They are not yet durable. They are still a transitory phenomenon. 3) The 
boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03. Cartels become one 
of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into 
imperialism.” *^ The picture that Lenin paints is of imperialism unfolding as free-market
ibid. p. 47-48 
ibid. p. 84
V. I. tuQnin Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f  Capitalism  (London: Pluto 1996) p. 1 
ibid. p. 17
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capitalism stagnates. In the end, he is clear that a quite distinct form of social 
organisation had emerged.
Briefly, according to Marx capitalism was a system of production where profits are 
extracted by purchasing labour for less than the value of what it produces. Those with 
capital are able to gain profits, while others are forced to sell their labour in order to 
suiwive. To defend their privileges, capitalists organise themselves into states, deriving 
their profit from production within states, importing other necessities and selling 
manufactured products abroad. Lenin’s starting point is that the rate of profit that can be 
extracted tends to fall.^  ^ In their efforts to counteract this tendency capitalists change the 
very character of capitalism. Lenin notes that, “Under the old capitalism, when free 
competition prevailed, the export of goods was the most typical feature. Under modem 
capitalism, when monopolies prevail, the export of capital has become the typical 
f e a t u r e . I n  other words, capitalists can get a better return on their capital abroad than 
in their own states. The problem with this, however, is that in their own countries the 
state exists to defend their collective interests. When they export capital they run the 
risks of expropriation, civil unrest and other uncontrollable factors.
However, although this is the general direction of Lenin’s argument, it should be noted 
that he was aware of the operation of other counteracting tendencies, even in the 
imperialist epoch. In a chapter entitled, “The parasitism and decay of capitalism”, Lenin 
writes that, “Certainly the possibility of reducing cost of production and increasing 
profits by introducing technical improvements operates in the direction of change. 
Nevertheless, the tendency to stagnation and decay, which is the feature of monopoly, 
continues, and in certain branches of industry, in certain countries, for certain periods of 
time, it becomes predominant.” "^*
Noted by Mara in Capital Volume 3 Chapters 14-16. See James Malone and Norman Lewis 
Introduction in V. I. Lenin Imperialism: The Highest Stage o f  Capitalism  (London: Pluto 1996) for a 
synopsis.
V. I. Lenin Imperialism, p. 61
ibid. p. 101
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This much was anticipated by Marx/^ Lenin gives these ideas shape by developing them 
in relation to the specific developments that had been taking place towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth; “If it were necessary to give the 
briefest definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly 
stage of capitalism. Such a definition would include what is most important, for on the 
one hand, finance capital is the bank capital of a few big monopolist banks, merged with 
the capital of the monopolist combines of manufacturers; and, on the other hand, the 
division of the world is the transition from a colonial policy which has extended without 
hindrance to territories unoccupied by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of 
monopolistic possession of the territory of the world which has been completely divided
But, beneath that cursed Aesopian language, it is possible to discern the political focus of 
Lenin’s argument: “Domination, and violence that is associated with it, such are the 
relationships that are most typical of the ‘latest phase of capitalist development’; this is 
what must inevitably result, and has resulted, jfiom the foimation of all-powerful 
economic monopolies.” *^' So, as markets expand, the political domination of the 
capitalist class is also expanded. In the nation-state this is represented by the bourgeois 
state, or ‘special body of armed men’, as Lenin had earlier described it.^  ^ The state 
upholds order and provides the necessary public goods to facilitate capitalist exploitation 
to continue unimpeded. As capital moves outside the jurisdiction of its own state, the 
market is not always upheld as the capitalists would wish. The state therefore follows 
national capital, ensuring that it is allowed to exploit foreign labour without impediment.
Against the liberal view of trade leading to peace, Lenin claimed that, “Imperialism is the 
epoch of finance capitalism and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving 
for domination, not for freedom. The result of these tendencies is reaction all along the 
line, whatever the political system, and an extreme intensification of existing
Capital Vol III (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1984) 
ibid. p 89-90
27 ibid. p. 22
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antagonisms in this domain also. Particularly acute becomes the yoke of national 
oppression and the striving for annexations, i.e., the violation of national independence 
(for amiexation is nothing but the violation of the right of nations to self- 
determination).” *^* It is this quite distinctive analysis that Lenin was able to formulate his 
demand for national self-determination.
But the misrepresentations of these theories are not simply due to error on the part of 
academics. Lenin would barely have merited a footnote in International Relations if it 
were not for the material force that his ideas achieved in the ferment of World War I, a 
time when the gieat powers were acutely sensitive to challenges to their empires. The 
most notable response to Lenin was Wilson’s attempt to co-opt his idea of self- 
detennination to a very different political agenda. His adoption of Lenin’s terminology 
has led to the obfuscation of the differences between their respective deployments of the 
tenn. However, the debate continues to be characterised by the debate between 
Wilsonian and Leninist ideas about self-determination.
Although Wilson has been widely criticised for his naïve optimism, not least by his own 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing, his notion of self-determination was strictly 
circumscribed in its application. Lansing famously mused that, “The more I think about 
the President’s decision as to the right of ‘self-determination’, the more convinced I am 
about the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be 
the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create trouble in many 
lands.” °^ But Wilson was already one step ahead of him. In the 1912 election campaign 
Wilson claimed, “I stand for the national policy of exclusion. The whole question is one 
of assimilation of diverse races. We cannot make a homogenous population of a people 
who do not blend with the Caucasian race.” *^
V.I.Lenin ‘The State and Revolution’ in V.I.Lenin Selected Works 3 volumes (Moscow: Progress 
Publications 1977), Volume 2 
V. I. Lenin Imperialism  p. 125
Robert Lansing The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton M ifflin 1921) p. 97 
quoted in Rubin Frances Weston Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The influence o f  racial assumptions on 
American for-eign policy 1892 -  1946 (Columbia S.C.: University o f South Carolina Press 1972) p. 32
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Liberal-sounding platitudes about freedom were always tempered by pragmatic 
consideration of the balance of power, and of American interest. For example, he 
claimed that “Free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such 
questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight 
with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
Indeed, American opposition to Wilson was not confined to reactionaries like Lansing. 
The anti-imperialist, William Allen White, echoed Lansing’s concerns. Noting that self- 
determination was intended for the peoples of central Europe, he wrote that, “when you 
preach freedom to a people ridden by despotism, and when you exhort these peoples to 
rise -  just because you happen to be fighting the particular despot who rules over these 
people ... millions of other people living under what the Anglo-Saxon regards as highly 
moral government in a most exemplary fashion, may loathe the exemplary fashion and 
regard your exponent of orderly government as a despicable tyrant. And the man may be 
your best friend.”^^  Another of the American anti-imperialists, Oswald Garrison Villard, 
wrote that the allied desire for démocratisation was, “imperialism of the worst kind”.^ "*
A sense of the fear that the Americans felt can be seen in a memorandum composed by 
Lansing:
in Russia disorganized and weakened by revolution appeared Bolshevism, the 
doctrine of a proletariat despotism. It is opposed to nationality and represents a 
great international movement of ignorant masses to overthrow government 
everywhere and destroy the present social order. Its appeal is to the unintelligent
Woodi'ow Wilson January 1918 quoted in Michael D. Callahan Mandates and Empire: The League o f  
Nations and Africa 1914 -  1931 (Brighton; Sussex Academic Press 1999) p. 18 
Quoted in Christopher Lasch The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution (New York: McGraw 
Hill 1972) p. 208; ellipsis in source.
Quoted in ibid. p. 168
177
and brutish element of mankind to take from the intellectual and successful their 
rights and possessions and reduce them to a state of slavery.^^
One gets a further impression of the extent of his fear of Bolshevism later, “It would be a 
godsend to the country if we could get away from the old party names of Democrat and 
Republican with their memories of partisan battles and bitterness, and organize a new 
party of earnest patriots devoted to the maintenance of democratic institutions and boldly 
hostile to the socialistic doctrines now being advocated.”^^  Here, democracy becomes no 
more than a slogan. A ‘democracy’ without parties implies a democracy without the 
representation of competing interests, simply a political system dedicated to its own 
defence against the horror of ‘socialistic doctrines’. A telling anecdote of his attitude is 
found in his Desk Diaries, where he notes that at a Cabinet Meeting there was “No real 
business. All politics.”^^  Another theme that comes up in his papers is the need to 
deploy nationalism against classism. Like Wilson, his view of the nation is explicitly 
racist; “The natural cleavage between nations is along ethnological lines. Kinship and 
common blood are the bases of community interest.”^^  And he cannot resist an anti- 
Semitic side-swipe, claiming that in the US Bolshevism is “largely in the hands of the 
Jews.”^^
Amo Mayer explains how “Wilson’s daring proposal for orderly change became the most 
decisive challenge to [Lenin’s] revolutionary ideology.”"*** Moreover, he notes that 
moderate social democrats in Germany were able to make a credible case against 
revolution by invoking the Fourteen Points, which were seen as a guarantee of fair 
treatment in the peace treaty. Christopher Lasch disputes Mayer’s emphasis, arguing that 
Wilson’s friends and enemies saw no distinction between their respective opposition to
Robert Lansing Memorandum on Absolutism and Bolshevism, June 12 1918, The Robert Lansing Papers 
Box 64
Robert Lansing Private Papers 26 July 1919 p. 12314 (sic) Robert Lansing Papers Box 64 
Robert Lansing Desk Diaries 6 November 1920 The Papers o f  Robert Lansing Reel 3 
Robert Lansing Self-Determination 6 June 1920 Robert Lansing Papers Box 64
Robert Lansing The Spread o f  Bolshevism in the United States July 26 1919 Robert Lansing Papers Box 
64
Arno J. Mayer Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins o f  the New Diplomacy 1917-1918  (Cleveland: 
Meridian 1964) p. 367
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closed diplomacy and espousal of an early political settlement of the war."** But today, 
discussions of self-determination focus on the application of Wilsonian principles, 
neglecting the more radical tradition that links the emancipation of nations to the 
emancipation of humanity."*^
The existence of imperialism does not as such negate the argument made in this thesis for 
sovereignty as a foundational right, which can be claimed even when it is not recognised 
in a particular social institution. But these debates about imperialism are relevant 
because they were conducted in terms that are conducive to the argument made here that 
states should be self-determining. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish the argument 
that I am making from varieties of Wilsonianism. In the same vein, I now move on to 
discuss more recent debates about autonomy that focus on cultural factors, again 
distinguishing my own position from them.
The cultural turn
Today debates about Western political and economic imperialism in the vein of Wilson 
and Lenin seem sterile. Anti-westemism seems confined to terrorists who enjoy no 
solidarity from Western people. The political impetus to join political struggle with the 
third world has been upstaged by sympathy campaigns from charities. But the term 
‘imperialism’ persists. The increasingly hollow shell of radical anti-imperialism has been 
maintained by post-colonial studies,"*  ^ although the content has changed utterly. Most 
commonly, however, imperialism is seen in cultural terms, as the imposition of a set of 
values and beliefs on another culture. The upshot of this argument is that the critique of 
imperialism is reversed; where anti-imperialism used to be a universalist doctrine, 
holding up the ideal of autonomy for all, it is now particularist, valuing cultural
Christopher Lasch The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution (New York: McGraw Hill 1972) 
passim, especially p. 65
Although modern studies do not necessarily focus on either tiadition, or even use the language o f self- 
determination, the ghosts o f  Wilson and Lansing can be seen in the tedious ongoing debate about whether 
this or that nation can legitimately secede, or how the principle can be reconciled with the desire for global 
order. David McCrone Sociology o f  Nationalism  (1998) is a useful guide to contemporary debates.
A good example is provided by Spivak. See Gayatri Chakiavorty Spivak, et al The Spivak Reader: 
Selected Works o f  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak  (London: Routledge, 1996)
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membership above all else. These arguments have become so influential that they have 
largely forced the idea of national self-determination off the agenda, to the point where 
arguments for collective autonomy can be disregarded even by critics of the 
multiculturalist approach, of whom I will have more to say later.
Once decolonisation had taken place, it was easy to suppose that imperialism too had 
been effectively eradicated. The endless discussions of the Soviet Union as ‘the last 
empire’ and the final collapse of colonialism that greeted the Soviet collapse in 1991 can 
be taken of additional evidence of this tendency."*"* When inequalities persisted, 
academics came up with the term ‘neo-imperialism’ to explain the ways in which great 
powers continued to exercise political influence after formal control had been 
relinquished."*  ^ Beyond some versions of neo-marxism, for example, dependency theory 
and world systems analysis however, little attention was paid to the economic aspects of 
imperialism that Lenin had seen as so important"* .^
The withdrawal from empire was managed very carefully. Local elites were cultivated, 
and radicals were culled -  often literally -  in colonial wars."*^  Added to the very low 
economic base that existed in most former colonies, the dismal performance of post­
colonial states is unsurprising. Ideas about cultural imperialism have been built on the 
foundation of the anti-colonialist defeat. The focus of anti-imperialist ideas has shifted 
from a critique of powerful states oppressing others to a critique of powerful 
communities oppressing others. And these communities need not be states. In the 
popular current jargon, they can be communities of discourse or cultural minorities.
A tendency among colonial elites that saw the revolt against imperialism as an irrational 
urge rather than a rational, self-interested desire to legislate for one’s self spread to more
For example, G.R. Urban End o f  Empire: The Demise o f  the Soviet Union (University Press o f America 
1993), Stephen Dalziel The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet Empire (Smithmark Publishers 1993)
For example Michael Barratt Brown The Economics o f  Imperialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1974)
Good examples o f  the dependencia approach can be found in Andre Gunder Frank Dependent 
Accumulation (Monthly Review Press Î998) and Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills The World System: 
500 or 5000 years  (London; Routledge, 1993). The locus classicus o f  world system analysis is, o f  course, 
Immanuel Wallerstein The Modern World System (3 vols Acadmic Press, 1976-89).
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radical scholars. In the inter-war period this took the form of denying the legitimacy of 
colonial nationalism. Unlike the respectable nationalism of the West, it was seen as 
irrational and impulsive."*  ^ This tendency has been maintained until the present. In a 
classic work on sovereignty of the 1970s, Raymond Vernon saw the opposition to 
American multinationals as being based on “a clash of national cultures” in the 
“advanced countries”, but as “ideological” elsewhere."*  ^ He explicitly separates ideology 
from self-interest, explaining that in third world, “hostility may spring more from 
ideology than from direct self-interest.” *^*
But the more important development has been that these ideas have spread from 
conservative imperialists to formerly critical liberals and radicals. Martin Shaw and 
Mary Kaldor, for example, believe that the character of politics, and of war has 
fiindamentally changed.^* Shaw, for example, castigates “a residual third world ideology 
according to which Western, especially American, ‘imperialism’ is the touchstone for all 
world politics. This approach recognizes neither the quasi-imperial character of many 
non-Western states nor the transformation of Western state p o w e r . R i c h a r d  Falk 
argues that, “A misleading impression may have been created, especially in Africa, that 
sovereignty is a status, once and for all, and not a process, evolving to incorporate 
responsibilities of states as well as rights.”^^  Again, the specifics of these arguments will 
be discussed more fully in chapter 6. What concerns us now is simply the point that the 
oppression of nations is now rarely interpreted as an act of political domination by more 
powerful groups against the less powerful.
See Furedi Colonial Wars 
'‘^ibid.
Raymond Vernon Sovereignty a t Bay: The M ultinational Spread o f  U.S. Enterprises (London: Longman 
1976) p. 204 
ibid. p. 201
Mary Kaldor New and O ld Wars: Organized violence in a global era (Cambridge: Polity 1999; re­
published with a new afterward, 2001), Martin Shaw Theory o f  the Global State: G lobality as an 
Unfinished Revolution (Cambridge: Polity 2000)
Martin Shaw Theory o f  the Global State p. 261
Richard A. Falk Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit o f  Justice in a Globalizing World (London: 
Routledge 2000) p. 84
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‘Cultural imperialism’ and ‘post-colonial studies’ have thus become the new foci for 
radical critics who once opposed imperialism. Cultural imperialism can be defined as 
imposing one set of cultural norms over another, and it is generally seen as an act that 
anyone can be guilty of. The misrecognition of somebody’s group identity is seen as a 
fomi of hami that states should take account of in policy making. In its most banal form 
this is termed ‘political coiTectness’, but at a higher level the recognition of cultural 
identity is taken very seriously. It is a diffuse term that defies simple definition, but I will 
expand on some of its applications through discussing muiticulturalism below.
Opponents of cultural imperialism are anxious to distance themselves from third world 
nationalism. Donald Pease notes the emergence of ‘global-localism’, which sees 
imperialism as a phase of globalisation.^"* “Whereas critics of imperialism usually 
endorse a reading of the emergence of Third World colonies into nation-states as a more 
or less effective anti-imperialist project, global-localism construes Third World 
nationalism as itself a moment in colonial domination, and it understands social relations 
in the so-called Third World to be at once more complicated, unbounded, and 
interconnected than the anti-imperialist reading permits. This discourse thereafter insists 
that colonialism, nationalism, and imperialism be understood as interlinked phases in a 
decentred yet encompassing system.”^^  In a symbolic act of inclusiveness. Pease want to 
unite the discourses of anti-imperialism and global-localism, to capture the socio­
economic context for cultural domination.
Postcolonial studies is a term used to define an area of academic study. Again, its 
meaning is too general to be pinned down easily, but it covers the study of the ways in 
which one set of values maintains itself over others, and how new forms of power 
relations have continued to deny equality to liberated third world states. A standard 
textbook on postcolonialism notes that, “the dismantling of colonial rule did not 
necessarily bring about changes for the better in the status of women, the working class 
or the peasantry in many countries. ‘ Colonialism’ is not just something that happens
Donald E. Pease ‘N ew  Perspectives on U.S. Culture and Imperialism’ in Amy Kaplan and Donald E. 
Pease (eds) Culture o f  United States Imperialism  (Durham: Duke University Press 1993) 
ibid. p. 26
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from outside a country or people, not just something that operates with the collusion of 
forces inside but a version of it can be duplicated from within.”^^  By a sleight of hand, 
the author redefines colonialism as its manifestation, and argues that because those 
manifestations are replicated after the end of colonial rule, colonialism must still exist. 
Such logic is rife in post-colonial studies. This is inevitably detrimental to any attempt to 
understand the distinct, specific processes that give rise to oppression, calling it all 
‘colonialism’. The elision of terms that once had quite separate and specific meanings, 
and the expansion of what it means to be colonised or oppressed to cover many indirect 
forms of power characterises much post-colonial scholarship and is surely not a helpful 
way to seek to understand such complex and multi-faceted phenomena.
The difference between anti-imperialism and post-colonialism can be clarified through a 
discussion of Sartre, who straddles both traditions but has now been effectively 
incorporated into the post-colonial canon. Although he has been drafted into the post­
colonial studies canon through his introductions to Franz Fanon and Albert Memmi, he is 
not making the argument that his new allies attribute to him.^*' Rather than 
unconditionally valuing alien cultures, he writes, “As for our famous culture, who knows 
whether the Algerians were very keen to acquire it? But what is certain is that we denied 
it to them.”^^  Here, his dispute with the colonialists is not that they imposed French 
culture, but that they did not impose French culture. Further, he follows an earlier anti­
colonial tradition in writing that, “One of the functions of racism is to compensate the 
latent universalism of bourgeois liberalism: since all human beings have the same rights, 
the Algerian will be made a subhuman.”^^  Again, he is not arguing that the problem is 
that a western rights tradition has been forced on others, but that they have been denied it. 
Implicit in this passage is the idea that it would be better to treat Algerians as having the 
same universal rights as us.
Ania Loomba Colonialism/Postcolonialism  (London: Routledge 1998) p. 12 
Reproduced in Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Colonialism is a System’ in Jean-Paul Sartie Colonialism and 
Neocolonialism  (London: Routledge 2001) 
ibid. p. 41 
ibid. p. 45
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These claims do not fit easily with the post-colonial bent of the introduction to the 
volume in which this translation appears, which claims that, “Postcolonialism represents 
a name for the intrusion of. . .  radically different epistemology into the academy.” *^* This 
is not to suggest that many elements of post-colonial thought are present in Sartre’s other 
writings. It is, however, important to draw a line between universalist criticism and post­
colonial criticism.
If the above analysis is plausible it is reasonable to ask what in general accounts for the 
now obvious dominance of ‘cultural’ as opposed to ‘material’ conceptions of colonialism 
and all that goes with this. Perhaps the most important text for the cultural turn in general 
is Edward Said’s Orientalism.^^ And before turning to look at the significance in general 
of this turn for international relations and for conceptions of sovereignty it is worthwhile 
spending some time on this text and the ideas to which it has given rise.^  ^ Said invests 
Orientalism with an almost mythic power of its own. He writes that, “Orientalism is not 
a mere political subject matter that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or 
institutions; nor is it representative and expressive of some ‘Western’ imperialist plot to 
hold down the ‘Oriental’ world. It is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into 
aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an 
elaboration no only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two 
unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of ‘interests’ which, by 
such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, 
landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather 
than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, 
manipulate, even incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) 
world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding
Robert J. C. Young ‘Preface: Sartre: the “African Philosopher’” in ibid. p. xxiii 
Edward W. Said Orientalism: Western Conceptions o f  the Orient (London: Penguin 1995)
For a general assessment o f  Said’s significance for the cultural turn focussing specifically on his readings 
o f  imperialism see Keith Ansell Pearson, Benita Parry and Judith Squires (eds) Cultural Readings o f  
Imperialism: Edward Said and the Gravity o f  History (London: Routledge, 1998). The breadth o f  Said’s 
influence can be seen not least in the fact that the editors are respectively a professor o f Philosophy, of 
English and comparative literature and a political theorist.
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relationship to political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an imeven 
exchange with power”.
In taking the distinction between ‘self and ‘other’ as his starting point Said locates 
himself within a long tradition of social theory. In one of the most famous presentations 
of this approach, Hegel explained how our concept of self derived from a series of 
struggles against others. As the master subjugates the slave, the slave becomes aware of 
his difference from the master. "^* The master defines liis identity against an other, the 
slave. This development can be taken as a positive development, as it represents the 
emergence of conscious human subjects rather than an undifferentiated mass. Through 
defining ourselves, individually and collectively, against others, it is possible to form a 
positive sense of what we are. Before jumping ahead to Said’s criticisms of the way that 
this developed into a generalised pattern of exclusion, it is important to appreciate the 
positive side of this development.
However, Said treats the distinction between self and other as more than a way to account 
for the creation of identity. In his analysis it becomes a dynamic in its own right, 
operating across human history and defining the core and the periphery. This leads 
Kenan Malik to conclude that, “The category of the Other is ahistorical and takes little 
account of the specificities of time and place.”**^ All of this is in marked contrast to the 
critics of imperialism discussed above, who saw real, specific inequalities and injustices 
and developed theories to explain them. Said has developed a theory into which he is 
able to fit an analysis by employing the self-other distinction as a slogan. It implies a 
distrust of a robust projection of the self, individually or collectively, and a re-valuation 
of the culture of the other in its own terms. The logic of this position was developed and
“  ibid. p. 12
^  Derived from G. W. F. Hegel Phenomenology o f  Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Tr. A. V. 
Millar, but better known tlrrough Alexandre Kojéve Introduction to the Reading o f  Hegel: Lectures on the 
Phenomenology o f  Spirit (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996)
Kenan Malik The M eaning o f  Race: Race, History and Cultur~e in Western Societies (London: Macmillan 
1996) p. 222
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taken still further in Said’s almost as influential sequel, significantly titled Culture and
Imperialism. 66
These themes have been pushed much further in the broader discussion of 
muiticulturalism in political theory in general and in International Relations in particular. 
One of the most influential versions of this has been developed in the Canadian context 
by writers such as Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor. These writers argue that the need 
to preserve cultural groups must be incorporated into liberal thinking. It must be 
recognised at the outset that they are not endorsing a postmodern claim about a plurality 
of identities, but trying to incorporate ideas about the importance of group membership 
into liberal theory. Taylor, for example, writes that, “we give due acknowledgment only 
to what is universally present -  everyone has an identity -  through recognizing what is 
peculiar to each.”**^ Rather than indulging in speculation about the play of identities, they 
are trying to establish a basis for governing diverse societies without denying rights to 
minority cultures.
Taylor rejects the liberal claim to neutral treatment, arguing that, “Where the politics of 
universal dignity fought for forms of nondiscrimination that were quite ‘blind’ to the 
ways in which citizens differ, the politics of difference often redefines nondiscrimination 
as requiring that we make these distinctions the basis of differential treatment. 
Nondiscrimination is not rejected here, but redefined to mean that equal treatment might 
mean different treatment for certain cultural groups. Iris Marion Young makes a similar 
claim, noting that social movements of the new left shifted the meaning of oppression in 
the 1960s, “In its new usage, oppression designates the disadvantage and injustice some 
people suffer not because a tyrannical power coerces them, but because of the everyday 
practices of a well-intentioned liberal society.
^  London: Vintage, 1994.
Charles Taylor et al Multiciiltiirahsm: Examining the Politics o f  Recognition (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1994) p. 39 
ibid. p. 39
Iris Marion Young Justice and the Politics o f  Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990) p.
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This analysis frustrates any aspiration for a deep universalism. The aspiration for a 
thoroughly cosmopolitan polity is undermined by particular cultural claims. Young 
argues that ideas of equality and liberty that ignore difference have three negative 
consequences. First, they force minority groups to assimilate into a culture that has been 
defined by a privileged minority. Second, it allows privileged groups to avoid 
confronting the specificity of their own group membership. Thirdly she argues that, “this 
denigration of groups that deviate from an allegedly neutral standard often produces an 
internalized devaluation by members of these groups themselves.”*'**
Young explains the effects of cultural imperialism on marginalised groups; “To 
experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the dominant meanings of a 
society render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as 
they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the o t h e r . S h e  claims that it, “involves 
the universalization of a dominant group’s experience and culture, and its establishment 
as the norm.”*'^  Two points should be drawn out of this claim. First, imperialism is an 
intangible relationship, where victims experience ‘stereotyping’. Second, the argument 
relies on Young’s assertion that different groups will have profoundly different 
experiences of the world, and different cultures.
Young’s argument is a good example of how this approach can trivialise oppression, 
“Group oppressions are enacted in this society not primarily in official laws and policies 
but in informal, often unnoticed and unreflective speech, bodily reactions to others, 
conventional practices of everyday interaction and evaluation, aesthetic judgments, and 
the jokes, images, and stereotypes pervading the mass media.”^^  This implicates all of us 
in oppression, and suggests that we all have a role in overcoming oppression by reflecting 
upon our speech, body language and practices of interaction. She guardedly qualifies her 
statement by saying that this is how oppression is enacted, not caused.
™ ibid., quotation p. 165 
ibid. p. 58-59 
ibid. p. 59 
ibid. p. 148
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“Ideally a Rainbow Coalition affirms the presence and supports the claims of each of the 
oppressed groups or political movements constituting it, and arrives at a political program 
not by voicing some ‘principles of unity’ that hide difference, but rather by allowing each 
constituency to analyze economic and social issues from the perspective of its 
experience.” "^* It is unclear what kind of political programme could conceivably result 
fi'om such a coalition, or what kind of society. If each group can arrive at its own 
independent analysis, what kind of commonality could emerge?
The idea of cultural membership is at the heart of concepts of cultural imperialism and 
muiticulturalism, but despite a high level of agreement about the political implications of 
these theories, there is no coherent idea about what cultural membership consists in, or 
what we should take culture to mean. Will Kymlicka, for example, claims that, 
“[indigenous peoples] demand the right to decide for themselves what aspects of the 
outside world they will incorporate into their cultures”,^  ^in the context of a sensible point 
about the desire for modernisation on the part of traditional societies. But what could it 
mean to say that a culture will choose what it wants to incorporate from outside? He 
addresses the question directly in a reposte to Jeremy Waldron’s more universalistic 
conception of culture; “Liberal nationalists define cultures as historical communities that 
possess a societal culture -  that is, which possess a set of institutions, operating in a 
common language, covering both private and public life.”^^
The meaning of ‘culture’ is unclear in these approaches to cultural imperialism. It does 
not refer to a traditional idea of ‘high’ culture, popularised by Victorian idealists like 
John Ruskin and Matthew Arnold. It is perhaps most easily understood as the content of 
group identity, and of course the content of this is open-ended. It is whatever the groups 
themselves say it is. Organising a society around respect for cultural demands will 
inevitably encourage the proliferation of groups identifying themselves as oppressed 
cultures in order to claim the resources and recognition accorded to them. In other
ibid. p. 189
Will Kymlicka Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Muiticulturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2001) p. 141 
^Sbid. p. 211
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words, this approach challenges groups to formulate political demands in a way that links 
them to a unique culture, rather than forcing them to win the endorsement of the majority 
within a democratic polity. Although majorities can, and very often have, oppressed 
cultural minorities, they have also often gianted them rights.
These ideas have elicited of late some fierce criticisms.*'*' However, it is notable that 
these critics do not counterpose multicultural rights with the right to national self- 
detennination, but rather defend liberalism or versions of cosmopolitanism against 
muiticulturalism. Of the recent series of high profile cosmopolitan criticisms of multi- 
culturalism in particular and the cultural turn in general Brian Barry’s Culture and 
Equality is arguable the most rigorous critique, but it is also perhaps the least sympathetic 
to any form of collective self-determination.*'^ He contrasts his position with Michael 
Walzer, claiming that, “liberals are miiversalists: for them, there are no wogs, because 
everybody in the world is equally entitled to the protections afforded by liberal 
institutions, whether they actually enjoy them currently or not.” *^' He therefore does not 
make the distinction that has been vital to my analysis, between people demanding these 
rights for themselves, and people having these rights forced upon them.
The positions on imperialism of Wilson and Lenin were formulated at a time when 
geopolitics was dominated by great empires, and at a time when there were deep 
ideological conflicts between profoundly different ways of organising society. Whilst 
more modest and different in kind fi-om Lenin’s, Wilson’s version of self-determination 
would see peoples having political independence and territorial integiity -  that is, real 
statehood. The debates about cultural imperialism take place after the end of empires 
when the states created out of decolonisation were failing to deliver freedom and 
prosperity to their people. The focus shifted from the political and economic to the
^^Robert Hughes Culture o f  Complaint: The Fraying o f  America (London: Harvill 1994), Todd Gitlin The 
Twilight o f  Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars (New York: Henry Holt 1995); 
Brian Barry Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f  Muiticulturalism  (Cambridge: Polity 2001) 
^  Significant entries to the list o f  ‘cosmopolitan’ critiques o f  multi-culturalism would include Martha 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Developm ent (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), and Charles Jones Global 
Justice (Oxford: Clarednon Press, 2001), as well as Bany.
Brian Barry Culture and Equality p. 136
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cultural, addressing a quite different set of concerns and not addressing the concern raised 
in this thesis for sovereignty as a foundational right to embody the principle of autonomy.
Conclusion
This chapter has considered two approaches to imperialism that have shaped its treatment 
in hitemational Relations, the debates about self-determination and those about 
imperialism. Neither Wilsonian self-determination nor criticisms of cultural imperialims 
can uphold autonomy in international relations, as outlined in Chapter 4. The Wilsonian 
approach has been shown to be too much tied to considerations of power politics to 
consistently uphold sovereignty as a foundational right. The cultural approach does not 
have a convincing account of cultural membership and is therefore unable to give a 
credible challenge to power that is robust enough to protect autonomy as understood here. 
They are therefore red herrings for progressive internationalism.
The upshot of these discussions is that we do not have a vocabulary through which we 
can criticise great power intervention. We lack the terms with which we might be able to 
distinguish between the abuses committed by a great power in international relations, and 
the barbarism that is rife in poor and powerless countries. I am not trying to suggest that 
this is a linguistic problem; the whole thrust of this thesis is that it is a political challenge. 
But the changing political climate is clearly reflected in the way that ideas about 
imperialism have changed throughout the twentieth century. A return to the age-old 
approaches of Lenin and Hobson seems to me to be an evasion of the task at hand, which 
is to develop a new approach that is sensitive to the specific features of the world today. 
I take a first tentative step towards this in the next chapter, which examines the nature of 
inteiwention today.
One thing that must remain constant, however, is a continued adherence to a robust 
universalism that respects the right of others to decide for themselves how they live their 
lives, but that refuses the claim that they are likely to have values and traditions 
incommensurate with our own. My own identity cannot be assimilated into a 
multicultural society. If I want to identify myself as a human being, and see my culture
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as being the culture of all humankind, then I am excluded from the multicultural world 
that they envisage. The implication of Taylor’s thesis seems to be that I am an 
imperialist for trying to force my culture upon everyone else. It is not simply that 
theorists of muiticulturalism, minority rights and cultural imperialism fail to understand 
the political and economic dynamics of oppression. It would be more accurate to start 
from the fact that they disdain any attempt at conscious and decisive self-organisation 
whenever it threatens to step outside the strictly circumscribed liberal norms that they 
themselves espouse. The alternative that I am trying to develop assumes that all humans 
will want to partake of the same cultural, social and economic opportunities. But unlike 
both the imperialists of an earlier epoch, and the human rights activists of our own, I do 
not believe that the weak should be forced to accept these nonns. But the existence of 
these arguments and the material force that they have held over international relations 
does not itself negate the aspiration for autonomy. The next chapter examines this theme 
in more detail, by looking at recent debates about intervention into the affairs of other 
sovereign states.
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6 A New Interventionism?
If the most fundamental negations to seeing sovereignty as a foundational right are 
the various forms of imperialism and the ‘cultural turn’ in contemporary thought, 
perhaps the most important challenge to long standing views of sovereignty in the 
practice of contemporary international relations lies in the increasing prevalence of 
intervention in the international system. Of course, this is not new; intervention has 
long been a feature of international relations,* for all that the dominant view in 
international society and international law was that international society was 
predicated on a doctrine of «©«-intervention.^
However, as Lyons and Mastanduno have pointed out, while intervention has long 
been a feature of international relations, and while it has been carried out for many 
different reasons, one form is especially significant today. They call this 
‘international intervention’ and define it thus: “International intervention may be 
understood as the crossing of borders and infringements on sovereignty carried out 
by, or in the name of, the international community.”  ^ As they also point out, this 
form of inteiwention is easier to legitimate ‘since it more credibly be carried out on 
behalf of the shared values of a collectivity’."*
In the contemporary international system, certainly since the end of the Cold War, 
this form of intervention has become far more common than ever before and has 
developed a particular character, intimated by the name most obviously associated
' For general discussions o f  this phenomenon see, inter alia. Medley Bull (ed) Intervention in World 
Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Marianne Heiberg (ed) Subduing Sovereingty: Sovereignty 
and the right to intervene (London: Pinter, 1994), and Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds) 
Beyond Westphalia: State sovereignty and international intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1995).
 ^The best general treatment o f this idea is still R.J.Vincent, Non Intervention and the International 
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974)
 ^Lyons and Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia, p. 12.
Lyons and Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia, p. 12.
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with it, to wit ‘humanitarian’ intervention/ It is therefore this form of intervention 
with which I shall chiefly be concerned here since, as Stephen Krasner has pointed 
out, more traditional forms do not damage sovereignty as a principle -  though of 
course they do impinge on this or that aspect of sovereignty in this or that specific 
case/
This chapter thus looks at how the discussion of humanitarian intervention today 
shapes ideas about sovereignty and how certain contemporary ideas about sovereignty 
in turn open a space for humanitarian conceptions of international intervention. It 
begins by reinforcing the observation of Lyons and Mastanduno that post-Cold War 
humanitarian intervention is a phenomenon distinct from previous phases of 
interventionism. It then examines three key features of the new interventionism; the 
desire to help victims, the ‘civilizing mission’ and the search for a moral consensus, 
with reference of a number of controversial contemporary cases.
A New Interventionism?
Traditionally the recognition of sovereignty as a right held by states meant that non­
intervention was accepted as the norm in international relations. As I remarked 
above. The classic statement of this in the International Relations literature is John 
Vincent’s Non-intervention and the International Order? He writes that, “The rule of 
non-intervention can be said to derive from and require respect for the principle of 
state sovereignty.... If a state has a right to sovereignty, this implies that other states 
have a duty to respect that by, among other things, refraining from intervention in its 
domestic affairs.”® Following the ideas of the English School, discussed in Chapter 1 
above, he notes that, “The formal doctrine of sovereignty and equality of states
 ^The most thorough investigation o f  this phenomenon to date in Nicholas J Wheeler Saving Strangers; 
Humanitarian intervention in international society (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2000). I will return to 
Wheeler’s arguments later in this chapter. However, other useful accounts o f  the rise o f  humanitarian 
intervention can be found in Michael Joseph Smith ‘Humanitairan intervention: an over view o f  the 
ethical issues’ m. Ethics and International Affairs, vol 12, 1998 and JeffMcmahan ‘Intervention and 
collective se lf determination’ in Ethics and International Affairs, vol 10, 1996.
 ^See Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Stanford: University o f  California Press, 2000).
 ^R. J. Vincent Non-Interyention and International Order (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
1974)
* ibid. p. 14
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posited by the international lawyers are not doctrines set over against the practice of 
states but are features of the system.”  ^ But he recognised that the world was already 
changing: “Between a naturalism careless of state practice and a positivism that 
would simply render any and all state conduct as the law, international law has to find 
a middle way. In the present case, it is not yet clear that a middle course of 
humanitarian intervention has been traced between a virginal doctrine of non­
intervention that would allow nothing to be done and a promiscuous doctrine of 
intervention that would make a trollop of the law. And until that course can with 
confidence be traced, it is perhaps non-intervention that provides the more dignified 
principle for international law to sanction.”^^  This is ultimately a weak defence of 
non-intervention that recognises changes taking place in state practice. This has 
accelerated since the end of the Cold War.
Although it is widely noted that there has been a shift towards a ‘new 
interventionism’’  ^ since the end of the Cold War, an interventionism characterised 
especially by its purportedly humanitarian focus, many analysts have remained 
sceptical, arguing that intervention as such is fundamentally unchanged. Stanley 
Hoffmann, for example, speaks for many when he claims that the subject of 
intervention is, “practically the same as that of international politics in general from 
the beginning of time to the present.”’^  He argues that the problem of intervention is 
ultimately insoluble, and by following Talleyrand in equating non-intervention with 
intervention, he comes close to denying that there is any problem of intervention at 
all. Arguing that it is self-deteimination, and not sovereignty, that is the cornerstone 
of twentieth century international society, he sees the possible legitimation of action 
on behalf of self-determination.
However, if we focus on what we called above ‘international intervention’ there is 
also a good deal of evidence pointing to a distinct shift of emphasis in contemporary
 ^ ibid. p. 352 
ibid. p. 348-349
11 James Mayall The New Interventionism  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996)
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international relations. Perhaps the best overall assessment of the evidence is in 
Wheeler’s Saving Strangers, where he concludes that contemporary international 
society is moving from a ‘pluralist’ conception of intervention where interventions as 
such were common, but no threat to sovereignty, to a solidarist conception where, 
with human rights at the centre of the account, ever increasing limitations on 
sovereignty and legitimate, even perhaps required action by the international 
community, is increasingly a norm.’^
Therefore it seems reasonable to say that there is something quite distinct about post- 
Cold War intervention. Although the humanitarian claims made on behalf of 
intervention should not be taken at face value, the new rhetorical framework is 
important. As we will see, it creates the space for the emergence of a style of 
inteiwentionism that, unlike the traditional kind, formally subordinates sovereignty to 
something else.
That this new interventionism represents something new in international society is 
certainly often emphasised by commentators. Andrew Marr, for example, the BBC’s 
Political Editor, presented the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 thus; “Not for self- 
interest did we go to war. Rather we went to war to answer the call of our moral 
imagination, fuelled by the stories of Hitler’s horror, now repeated in Kosovo.”’"’ 
Such a view is obviously supportive of the idea that this was ‘an intervention with a 
difference’. Nicholas Wheeler echoes this in a more academic vein, approvingly 
citing Clinton’s comments on Rwanda, “putting out the inferno of genocide is in both 
the national and the global interest because failure to do so risks creating a contagion 
that will undermine the values of all civilized societies.”’^
Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The Problem o f Intervention’ m Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and 
Practice o f  International Politics {BovAdtr. Westview Press 1987) p. 178 
See the argument at the end o f  Saving Strangers Chapter 1
Andrew Marr ‘Chilling Intimacy o f  the Killer’ Observer (20 June 1999) quoted in Francesca Klug 
Values fo r  a Godless Age: the sto ty  o f  the United Kingdom's Bill o f  Rights (London; Penguin 2000) p. 
3
Nicholas J. Wlieeler Saving Strangers p. 303
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If there is something new going on here, wherein does its origin lie? For many, 
scholars and analysts alike, the answer seems obvious. At least since Nuremberg 
international institutions, especially those dominated by western states (effectively all 
of them), have been engaged in a process of gradually, to use a phrase of Henry 
Shue’s, ‘eroding sovereignty’.’^  The memory of the Holocaust,’^  the passing of key 
UN conventions, especially the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 and 
the genocide convention in 1947, the growth and spread of the global human rights 
regime,’^  the creation and enhancement of NGO’s dedicated to human rights like 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the end of the cold war and the 
growing impact of globalisation (on which more in the next chapter); all of these 
processes and events have helped to constrain sovereignty. Stephen Toulmin, at the 
end of his book Cosmopolis, suggests a powerful image that suits this view well; 
sovereignty is a powerful Gulliver increasingly tethered by many strands by the 
Lilliputian NGOs of human rights.’^  In particular the sense is very high that the 
atrocities that have been committed in modem times must not be allowed to happen 
again and that, if necessary the international community must act to prevent them and 
punish them when they have occuned.
Atrocities are often highlighted in debates about sovereignty and human rights as they 
have a powerful mobilising effect in the era of global television news. Moreover, 
there is a prevalent sense that something must be done to prevent medieval barbarism 
in the Internet age. However, as I now go on to discuss, the presentation of atrocities 
is sometimes one-sided.
See Henry Shue ‘Eroding Sovereignty’ in Robert Mckim and Jeff Mcmahan (eds) The M orality o f  
Nationalism  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997)
For an excellent discussion o f  the power o f  the memory o f  the holocaust in contemporary politics 
and society, especially in the US, see Peter N ovick’s The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2000)
For excellent treatments o f  this see, especially, Geoffery Robinson Crimes Against Humanity 
(London: Penguin, 1999) and Thomas Risse, Steven Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power o f  Rights: 
international norms and domestic change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The hidden agenda o f  modernity (Chicago: University o f  Chicago 
Press, 1992)
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Of course, atrocities have always been a part of conflict. Sometimes these have been 
devilishly planned and meticulously executed. More often, they have been the acts of 
individuals reacting to extreme circumstances.^’^ But discussions of contemporary 
violence and atrocities often do not pay sufficient attention to the social dynamics that 
lead to conflict. Mark Duffield, among the most perceptive analysts of the paradoxes 
of development aid today, notes that despite the readiness to blame conflict on 
indigenous groups in the third world, there are few detailed studies of these groups, 
“In the main, aid policy is content with brief pathologies of deviancy and 
breakdown.”^’ And the other side of these pathologies, which have demonised 
terrorists and fundamentalists, is the figure of the victim deserving of Western 
assistance.
Helping Victims
The ‘victim culture’ in modem westem societies has been widely remarked upon.^^ 
Less often noted is that there is effectively a growing ‘ victim culture’ in intemational 
relations, one which has led westem foreign policy to be re-directed towards the 
assistance of victims. Floods, famines, civil wars are now stable fare of intemational 
relations discussions. The global media covers one crisis after another, always posing 
the stark altemative -  stand by and watch, or go over and help these people. Again 
and again Westem news reports show third world demonstrators with slogans written 
in English, appealing not to their fellow citizens, but to the westem powers who seem 
to represent their greatest hope.^^
The cultural critic Slavoj Zizek has been one of the most perceptive commentators on 
this tendency, particularly in relation to the former Yugoslavia. He notes that a 
Kosovar refugee is “the ideal subject-victim in aid of whom NATO intervenes: not a 
political subject with a clear agenda, but a subject of helpless suffering, sypathizing
See, for example, Joanne Bourke An httimate History o f  Killing  (New York: Basic Books 1996) 
Mark Duffield Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging o f  Development and Security 
(London: Zed 2001) p. 140 
e.g. Robert Hughes Culture o f  Complaint: The Fraying o f  America (London: Harvill 1994)
^  The BBC website has numerous examples. See, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/world/asia- 
pacific/10354i.stm  for Hong Kong protests commemorating Tiananmen Square.
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with all suffering sides in the conflict, caught up in the madness of a local clash that 
can be pacified only by the intervention of a benevolent foreign power, a subject 
whose innermost desire is reduced to the almost animal craving to ‘feel good
again’...
The other side of this apparent benevolence, however, is that real independence is 
removed from the political agenda altogether. Zizek again; “it’s OK to help the 
helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but in no way are they to be allowed 
actually to cast off this helplessness by asserting themselves as a sovereign and self- 
reliant political subject, a subject with no need for the benevolent umbrella of the 
NATO ‘protectorate’...”.^  ^ Instead of discussing putative economic motives he 
recognises that powerful states can gain moral authority through intervention. 
NATO, a Cold War alliance created to defend Westem interests, can be made to 
appear benevolent.
This trend is most clearly seen in the discussion of rape as a war crime. Rape has 
been a feature of waiTare tliroughout history, and the mass rape by Japanese soldiers 
in Nanking was one of the great horrors of World War II. However, the discussion 
took a new tum with the outbreak of the war in Bosnia, where westem 
interventionists claimed that mass rapes were being perpetrated as part of a conscious 
Serbian policy.^^
The evidence for mass rape is, at best, slim. At the peace talks in Geneva in 1992 
Hans Silajdzic, foreign minister of the Sarajevo government, claimed that 30 000 
Muslim women had been raped. A Czech joumalist Jita Obzinova inflated the figure 
to 100 000 in December 1992, and claimed (falsely) that the Serbs had admitted 30 
000 rapes. In January 1993 the UN decided to investigate. Tadeusz Mazowiecki
Slavoj Zizek The Fragile Absolute — or, why is the Christian legacy worth fighting for?  (London; 
Verso 2000) p. 58 
ibid. p. 59
^  There was widespread press coverage o f  atiocity stories in Bosnia -  e.g. ‘Yugoslav forces use 
ancient ways to break civilian spirits’, Martin Kettle and ‘Serbs have rape camp, says Cook’, Nicholas
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spoke to 30 victims and 19 women who were pregnant, allegedly as a result of rape. 
His report concluded that there had been 12 000 victims. Newsweek chose 50 000 as 
its figure, based on 28 interviews and advice from German joumalist Alexandra 
Stigylmayi*. But in October 1993 the UN Commission for War Crimes in the Former 
Yugoslavia stated that there had been 330 documented cases of rape by the three 
sides. And in the TV documentary Special Envoy (4 Feb 1993) Jeremy Bony 
recorded that, “When I was 50km from Tuzla I was told: go to the grammar school in 
Tuzla, where you will find 4 000 rape victims. 20km away the figure shrank to 400. 
10km away it was only 40. When I was there I found only four women who wanted 
to give an account.”^^  What is remarkable is not the inflation of the number of 
victims, but the uncritical way in which propaganda was accepted by the Westem 
media.
Ustinia Dolgopol articulates the approach of many feminists to this issue. She 
describes the results of her interviews with the comfort women in Asia, “Consistently 
in these interviews, the women emphasised that the horrors they experienced did not 
end when the rapes ended. For them the emotional and psychological pain continued 
for the remainder of their lives. They described the enormous emotional burden of 
having to keep secret their experiences, the constant sense of shame ... During the 
interviews the women described the importance of receiving a full and frank apology, 
the necessity to receive compensation in recognition of the harms that they had 
suffered, the importance of accessing medical services and counselling. It was cmcial 
to the women’s sense of empowerment that those working with them understand their 
situation and have empathy and respect for them.”^^
Dolgopol proposes establishing a fund for reintegrating women and children into the 
community. Money could be spent on, “counselling, psychological and psychiatric
Watt, Ian Traynor and Maggie O ’Kane both Guardian 24/4/99 and quoting Robin Cook’s infamous 
claim that the reports o f rape camps have ‘the ring o f  corroboration’.
This material is collected in Rajko Dolecek ‘I Accuse’ Questions and Opinions Library 3 1999 and 
Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman ‘Rape and the Reporting o f Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 -  1993’ 
Dialogue 2 \  1997
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treatment, research into issues faced by women attempting to re-integrate into the 
communities after the infliction of rape and sexual assault, and public education 
campaigns to highlight the trauma experienced by those who have been raped and 
sexually assaulted. All work in this area must assist in restoring the women’s sense 
of self-worth and dignity.
Christine Chinkin argues that any rape committed during a war is a war crime.^’^ The 
argument is made on the basis that all rapes occur in the context of war, and so they 
should be tried as crimes of that war. But rapes also occur outside wars, and in many 
cases the boundary between rapes linked to war and those that are not will be 
indistinct. Chinkin errs on the side of classifying all rapes are war crimes to avoid 
this sticky problem, which provides a lever by which the restoration of order after war 
through a war crimes tribunal can extend its power over properly civilian matters in 
the interests of protecting individual victims.
The result is that intemational relations becomes inseparable from interpersonal 
relations. By treating people as individual victims with their own traumas to 
overcome it becomes difficult to conceive of groups of people as collective subjects. 
The focus of research in this area is on the problematisation of individual 
relationships in third world states, and Westem experts are presented as the people 
who can provide the necessary expertise to assist them in negotiating these 
relationships.
Even more powerless than the anonymous victims of rapes, however, are the children 
who are victims of intemational conflicts. In an address to the people of Kosovo, 
Tony Blair said, “What has given me pleasure more than anything else is to see the
Ustinia Dolgopol ‘A  Feminist Appraisal o f  the Dayton Peace Accords’ Adelaide Law Review  19 
(1997) pp 5 9 - 7 1  p. 6 8 - 6 9  
ibid. p. 70
Chr istine Chinkin ‘Rape and Sexual Abuse o f  Women in International Law’ European Journal o f
International Law  5 1994 pp 326 - 341
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young children here today living again in their homeland in peace.” ’^ And writing in 
The Daily Express, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook pledged to help the victims 
of child abuse, noting that, “The voice of children [is] too often ignored.”^^  He notes 
that an expert from Save The Children is already working at the Foreign Office, and 
that the government is setting up a ‘children’s select committee’ in the UK. Another 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office minister, Tony Lloyd, provides a clue to why 
senior ministers are so keen to hear the voice of the child. He writes that, “Grand 
phrases like ‘post-conflict resolution’ or ‘peace-building’ can sometimes obscure the 
sheer simplicity of what children perceive their needs to be.”
What John Lloyd and Robin Cook take to be an argument for listening to the voice of 
the child could reasonably be taken to make the opposite case. Children articulate 
simple needs and desires, but the conflict situations are complicated. Children cannot 
reasonably be expected to make sense of the historical, political and economic 
dynamics of wars; after all, few politicians seem capable of doing so. Listening to the 
voices of children can be used to justify any well-meaning and suitably vague scheme 
for humanitarian intervention or reconciliation proposed by any well-meaning 
outsider.
A recent textbook on conflict resolution notes that there is, “new scope for benign 
intervention and community building across intemational frontiers”, but claims that, 
“the key goal is to strengthen the conflict resolution capacity of societies and 
communities.”^^  They see “a shift from seeing third party intervention as the primary 
role of external agencies towards appreciating the role of internal third parties or 
indigenous peacemakers.” “Instead of using the blanket term ‘third parties’, with its 
implication of externality and detachment, [there is] a spectrum of agents ranging
Tony Blair ‘Prime Minister Addresses the People o f Kosovo’, transcript o f  address in Pristina, 
Kosovo 31 July 1999, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/speechtext.asp72703 
Robin Cook ‘My Pledge to Help the Victims o f  Child Abuse’ The Express 5 August 1999, available 
at http://w ww.fco. gov/uk/news/newstext.asp?2717 
Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The 
prevention, management and transformation o f  deadly conflicts (Cambridge: Polity 1999) p. 224
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from ‘uninvolved parties’, through ‘marginal concerned parties’ to ‘actively
influential concerned parties’.” "^’
The authors suggest that there is a need to address the ‘psycho-social’ dimension to 
conflict resolution.^^ They cite a debate about the applicability of Westem models of 
post-traumatic stress disorder to third world conflicts, noting that “In some cultures 
(for example, Mozambique), where misfortune and violence is often attributed to 
possession by bad spirits, there is scope for remarkably swift reconciliation through 
public cleansing ceremonies.
The point of this focus on the victims is brought out in Mary Kaldor’s acclaimed 
study of new wars.^^ She rejects the idea that the consent of local warlords is 
essential for peacekeeping operations, arguing that, “What is important is widespread 
consent from the victims, the local population, whether or not formal consent has 
been obtained from the parties at an operational l e v e l . T h e  idea that local people 
might consider themselves better represented by those that she identifies as warlords 
rather than the ‘intemational community’ does not seem to have occuned to Kaldor. 
The new approaches to intervention are posed in a language of care that few could 
find objectionable in their own terms, but which disempower political communities in 
the name of empowering anonymous victims.
Domestic reasons for the rise of humanitarian intervention
Humanitarian intervention is appealing because it appears to offer hope to oppressed 
people. The critics of humanitarian intervention tend to argue either that it neglects 
the national interest, or that its agenda is cynical and self-serving. This debate serves 
to obscure another important development that goes a long way towards accounting 
for the new direction in westem foreign policy. Since at least the end of the Cold
^  ibid. p. 18
ibid. pp 2 0 6 - 2 1 1  
ibid. p. 210
Mary Kaldor New and O ld Wars: Organized violence in a global era (Cambridge: Polity 1999; re­
published with a new afterward, 2001) 
ibid. p. 127
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War and at least until the world trade centre attacks in September 2001, westem 
societies in general and the US in particular have suffered from a lack of clear foreign 
policy direction, due in part to the absence of an extemal enemy and due also to the 
collapse of traditional parties of left and right/^ In this section I want to suggest that 
widespread demands for the re-forging of a moral or political community are being 
answered by the humanitarian impulse in intemational relations and that as a result 
what we might term the ‘cosmopolitan tum’ is achieving increasing salience in 
intemational relations/’’
As well as a means of promoting order and civility in the developing world, 
humanitarian intervention is a way of establishing a social bond within westem 
societies. The need to do something to alleviate camage abroad can be presented as 
being a moral imperative that is above politics. Whatever their disagreements about 
other things, the idealistic anti-capitalist protester, the concemed middle class 
professional and Tony Blair can all agree about the need to do something.
Of course, this process is also contradictory as interventionism often mns into 
domestic opposition from those who believe that intervention is not worth the cost. 
At an abstract level, these claims have some purchase. However, once the climate 
has shifted towards an interventionist stance over a particular issue, these claims tend 
to become marginalised. It is much more difficult for isolationist Republicans, for 
example, to oppose an intervention when American soldiers are already there and 
there is widespread support for the justice of the cause. Regardless of the residual 
conservative opposition to the new interventionism, it is proceeding apace, attaching 
itself arbitrarily to issues and areas of the world, embodying the spirit of doing 
something good rather than actually establishing a decisive resolution."”
I develop this point in the next chapter.
For discussions o f  cosmpolitanism in general see Nichoals Rengger ‘Cosmopolitanism’ in Roland 
Axtmann (ed) Understanding Democratic Ideas (London: Sage, 2003) and Martha Nussbaum, (ed) For 
Love o f  Coimtjy (Boston: Beacons Press, 1997).
This point should not need extensive elaboration, as nobody would claim that a clear end is in sight 
even in the most prominent targets o f  intervention such as Somalia and Bosnia.
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Criticising this development, David Chandler writes that, “The concern of many 
leading liberal commentators, like Mary Kaldor, Michael Ignatieff and David Rieff, is 
not so much with legitimising new forms of intemational regulation, but with the 
moral conception of society itself and the social and political engineering required to 
create responsible citizens.”"’^  In relation to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, he 
writes that, “The concern is not for the real suffering and loss of life of élite Westem 
airmen or Balkan civilians, but for the preservation of an ideal universality of moral 
community demonstrating sacrifice ... the real suffering is seen as a necessary tableau 
on which to constmct the ideal of moral community in the West.”"’^
I concur with Chandler’s claim that the motivation behind these interventionist claims 
is the need for universal moral community as well as the re-ordering intemational 
relations, but it is with the consequences of this process for intemational relations that 
this thesis is concemed with. The concept of the ‘intemational community’ fits the 
‘ideal universality of moral community’ that he describes very well. It conveys the 
idea that there are certain common norms that are shared by certain respectable 
intemational actors that can be enforced on others, while avoiding the obviously 
coercive implications of earlier forms of intemational organisation. The idea of a 
‘community’ seems more consensual than concepts of empire, or alliances of great
44powers.
Mary Kaldor expresses this desire most bluntly. She argues that, “An effective 
response to the new wars has to be based on an alliance between intemational 
organizations and local advocates of cosmopolitanism in order to reconstmct 
legitimacy. A strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ needs to identify with 
individuals and groups respected for their integrity. They have to be supported, and
Dave Chandler Human Rights and International Regulation: Reassessing the ethical agenda 
(London: Pluto 2003) p. 148 
‘^ Gbid. p. 1 5 1 - 1 5 2
^  See Michel Feher Powerless by Design: The Age o f  the International Community (Durham: Duke 
University Press 2000) for an interesting, though flawed analysis o f  the idea o f  an ‘international 
community’.
204
their advice, proposals, recommendations need to be taken seriously.”"’^  Seeing 
legitimacy as based on local consent would be to misread her argument. Legitimacy 
derives from the cosmopolitan norm. Local support is needed to ensure that 
cosmopolitan nonns are effectively enforced, not to create a genuine democratic 
dialogue. There is certainly no room for challenging cosmopolitan norms in this 
formulation. The idea of taking seriously the proposals of community leaders lays 
bare the elitist impulse of Kaldor’s argument. These partners in dialogue will be 
listened to respectfully, but they will not have any real power to upset cosy 
cosmopolitan norms. The apolitical nature of this is neatly formulated in the 
afterward, where she writes that humanitarian intervention “constitutes cosmopolitan 
law-enforcement and is thus more like policing than war-fighting.”"’^
But the concern for values is not limited to scholarly commentary. Many actors 
themselves admit that they are trying to forge a moral consensus at home out of 
humanitarian intervention abroad. Bill Clinton’s advisors have made this clear in 
their memoirs. Dick Morris, for example, writes that during the US operation in 
Haiti,
I advised him to center his comments much more on the moral outrages 
against Haitian women and children on the island than on the practical threat 
of the refugees who might come to the United States if Haiti didn’t become 
democratic. ‘You’ve got to get off the refugee issue and onto the human 
rights and values issues. You look weak when you are trying to stop refugees 
flooding us, but you look strong when you are “protecting children abroad” ... 
This is a theme I have developed from listening to the American people speak 
in the political polling I do. I am convinced that the American people want a 
foreign policy based on values, whereas the foreign policy advisers and the
Mary Kaldor New and O ld Wars p. 123 
ibid. p. 163
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NSC (National Security Council) people always want a policy based on 
interests.
Turning to the British context, Francesca Klug is explicit about the role that human 
rights can play in re-establishing common values:
Human rights values can never be more than a set of broad principles. 
Although they challenge many assumptions, they are not a substitute for a 
fully fledged ideology of or belief system which speaks to every faced of 
human life. As such they generally have the capacity to form the basis of a 
shared ethos without necessarily disturbing all other points of reference in 
people’s lives, whether these be political or religious or neither of these."’^
She continues, claiming that there is, “space for some ‘democratic’ involvement in 
where the boundaries between rights should lie.”"’^  In case there is any doubt about 
the limits of participation, she points out that, “the final decisions in actual cases must 
lie with the law courts”.^ ” Indeed, the only reason that Klug seems to advocate 
democratic involvement at all is because it is unlikely that human rights alone can 
“fill the values void in Westem societies.”^’ Further on, one gets a sense of King’s 
political vision when she lists the “big social issues of the day: tobacco-advertising 
bans; the outlawing of hunting; the debate over whether or not smacking is a 
legitimate punishment for a child; controls on the expenditure of political parties.
The point here is to emphasise that there are powerful forces within westem societies 
that can see in the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and all that tends to go with it 
powerful ways of reconnecting with otherwise disillusioned and increasingly cyncial
Dick M om s Behind the Oval Office: Winning the Presidency in the Nineties (New York: Random 
House 1997) pp 5 -  6
Francesca Klug Values fo r  a Godless Age: the s to ty  o f  the United Kitigdotn’s Bill o f  Rights (London: 
Penguin 2000) p. 148 
ibid. p. 149; my italics 
ibid. p. 149 
ibid. p. 150 
ibid. p. 182
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electorates. Coupled with the more general developments touched on above this is 
another reason why westem governments might seek to ‘erode sovereignty’ still 
further, at least outside the west itself.
Intervention and Démocratisation
One of the most positive hopes expressed at the end of the Cold War was that in the 
absence of superpower rivalry the third world would undergo a transition to 
democracy. The discussion about démocratisation has eclipsed the discussion about 
democracy in the way that govemance has become an omnipresent supplement to 
govemment.^^ Both of these new terms imply a flexibility and indeterminacy that is 
quite distinct from the much tighter definitions of the earlier concepts. However, this 
flexibility is one-sided. Démocratisation as a process is in many ways the opposite of 
traditional understandings of democracy, and is in fact more concemed with the 
means to achieve a desired outcome than to establish a framework for the demos to 
form and exercise their general will. Thomas Franck, for example, wants the right to 
democratic govemance to be written into intemational law, but when the only legal 
subjects capable of enforcing their rights are powerful westem states this proposal can 
only make a mockery of democracy.^"’ These ideas effectively pass law-making 
powers over to intemational bodies that are not accountable to the people that they 
govem, and impose extemal norms that cannot be challenged. This is not in itself a 
democratic development, even if it assists in creating a basic framework of order 
where there was anarchy or arbitrary justice previously. Once the principle of 
democracy is undermined in this way all guarantees are removed, and people are left 
at the whim of alien institutions.
For good discussions see James N  Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel (eds) Governance Without 
Government: Order and change in world politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
Inge Kaul, Isabelle Gmnberg and Marc A Stem (eds) Global Public Goods: International co-operation 
in the twenty) first century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Wolfgang Reinicke Global 
Public Policy: Governing without government (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1998).
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In common with the other ideas discussed in this chapter, this aspiration originated in 
the West and has been imposed with little comprehension of, or even interest in, the 
particular problems faced by different societies. They have little respect for the idea 
of autonomous agency in the developing world, and the institutions and procedures 
that have been put forward have served to limit the scope for third world people to 
lealise their collective aspirations.^^ In this section I shall focus on one particular 
version of the contemporary debate about democracy, that offered by Anthony 
Giddens and Ulrich Beck, since their work brings out most clearly the fears that are 
embodied in the discourse of démocratisation and how, as a consequence, this helps 
to embed the interventionist and humanitarian impulse in contemporary intemational 
relations.
Beck has popularised the idea that we live in a ‘risk society’ where we must organise 
ourselves to manage the consequences of the risks that we ourselves have created 
through high technology and industrialisation. Beck’s positive vision of a politicised 
risk society is closely bound up with a reconceptualisation of democracy, which was 
the subject of his latest book, significantly entitled Democracy Without Enemies. 
Beck argues that democracy has been institutionalised as a process of competition 
between interests, largely over economic issues and between classes. This is now 
dying through disengagement, as other issues, bound up with the risk society, are not 
dealt with under the narrow remit of traditional democracy. This is a popular theme 
in the literature on democracy, which has expanded in inverse proportion to 
participation in the political processes of westem democracies. The central problem 
that they are concemed with is that democracy is a form of govemment that relies 
upon the demos, the subjects who collectively compete over their political interests. 
Today, the competition no longer takes place in any real sense, leaving democratic
See Thomas M Franck Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1997)
For a critique that emphasises this point see Rita Abrahamsen Disciplining Democracy:
Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa (London: Zed 2000), one o f  the only studies 
o f  démocratisation to place third world agency at the centre o f  its analysis. The most far-reaching 
example is the administration in Bosnia. See Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin ‘Lessons from Bosnia 
and Herzogovina: Travails o f the European Raj ’ in Journal o f  Democracy, July 2003, Volume 14, 
Number 3 http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/KnausandMartin.pdf
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institutions as an empty shell, which Beck describes as consisting of “zombie- 
institutions which have been dead for a long time but refuse to die.”^^  This reinforces 
the disengagement of the demos and leaves governments and political parties without 
any clearly defined roles. The aim of much of the literature on démocratisation is 
therefore to re-engage the demos, which Beck wants to do through new social 
movements such as environmentalism and feminism.
Giddens argues that this can be achieved through ‘dialogic democracy’. He 
characterises democracy as having two functions: ‘On the one hand, democracy is a 
vehicle for the representation of interests. On the other, it is a way of creating a 
public arena in which controversial issues -  in principle -  can be resolved, or at least 
handled, through dialogue rather than through pre-established forms of p o w e r . H e  
describes this process as the ‘democratizing of democracy’ through the activities of 
self-help groups and social movements which can, ‘force into the discursive domain 
aspects of social conduct that previously went undiscussed, or were ‘settled’ by 
traditional practices. They may help contest “official” definitions of things; feminist, 
ecological and peace movements have all achieved this outcome, as have a 
multiplicity of self-help groups.’^ ” Giddens makes it clear that his interest in 
democracy is not the representation of interests but the resolution of issues with the 
minimum of conflict (‘dialogically’). The self-help groups that he identifies as the 
vanguard of the new democracy are given a role well beyond that that a ‘self-help’ 
group would ever want. Giddens aims to transform them into something quite 
different in the interest of a particular political project. This is perhaps unwittingly 
revealed in his qualification of the claim that they can contest official definitions of 
things with the word ‘help’. Rather than participating in a process of forming and 
imposing a general will by engaging in debate that aims to change the views of the 
electorate and their representative, Giddens sees the role of social movements as 
assisting in a larger project.
^  Democracy Without Enemies (Cambridge; Polity 1998)
Beck Reinvention o f  Politics p. 140, emphasis in original 
Anthony Giddens Beyond Left and Right p. 16 
ibid. p. 17, emphasis in original
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This project can be taken a lot further in intemational relations. Whereas the problem 
that Beck and Giddens are addressing in the internal context is political 
disengagement, the problems in intemational relations are more complex still. 
Theories of démocratisation are concemed about the lack of civil society and a 
democratic culture to a much greater extent than those dealing with exclusively 
national issues. Instead of trying to politicise the populous with appeals to new social 
movements and a common sense of fearfulness, intemational theorists of 
démocratisation see a much greater role for extemal agencies in setting the ground 
mles and educating the people. In Bosnia, for example, candidates are prevented 
from standing in an election unless they support the terms of the Dayton Agi eement.^’
Democracy, understood in this particular way, is thus now seen as the precondition 
for development (I shall suggest, in the conclusion to this study, that it has effectively 
replaced the ideal of development.) Abrahamsen argues that, “electoral democracy, 
while valuable, contains substantial limitations in terms of its ability to address issues 
of social justice in highly unequal societies”.^  ^ “Procedural or minimalist approaches 
to democracy are concemed with equal legal or formal rights, and tend to undeiplay 
the extent to which these rights can be r e a l i s e d . S h e  is exactly right when she says 
that, “It is likely that for the majority of poor people, democracy is valued not only 
because it offers the right to vote, but also because it opens up the political space for 
demanding social and economic rights.” '^* Although she is writing about the 
developing world, this claim is an equally important corrective to the formalistic -  
even ritualistic -  ideas about democracy prevalent in the developed world. Her 
conclusion is apposite to this study. “Domestic politics must be democratised, but 
intemational relations are left untouched and protected from the reach of the good 
govemance discourse. In this way contemporary development discourse can be said
ibid. p. 17
David Chandler Bosnia:Faking Democracy After Dayton  (London: Pluto 1999) is a good case 
o f the re-definition o f  democracy by the democratisers 
ibid. p. 68
study
 
ibid. p. 74 
ibid. p. 84
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to be part of the global govemance of the African continent, one of the ways in which 
present intemational stmctures and relations of power are maintained and reproduced. 
Accordingly, one of the main effects of the good govemance discourse, despite all its 
proclamations in favour of democracy, is to help reproduce and maintain a world 
order that is essentially undemocratic.”’’^
A tme, vibrant democracy involves the people taking control of their society and 
detennining its future through fighting for competing visions. It is this that has 
inspired people to fight for the extension of the right to vote; not because they were 
excited about the possibility of endorsing an existing altemative, but because they 
believed that the extension of the franchise would transform the existing options. As 
Abrahamsen has rightly emphasised, democracy is nothing more than a tool for 
achieving other important objectives. But démocratisation actually mles out many of 
these altematives by circumscribing what can be democratically decided.
Despite all the debate about democracy and démocratisation, the simple procedures 
put in place in Britain and America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
continue to serve today, with few changes. And this is despite the huge changes that 
have taken place in these societies since then. The espousal of simple procedural 
measures, such as those campaigned for by the Chartists and Suffragettes, is 
consistent with the idea of sovereignty put forward in this thesis, but ideas of 
democracy that put limits on democracy’s scope, or which try to impose a fully 
fomiulated model of voting systems and checks and balances go against the idea that 
I am putting forward of self-determination.
Autonomy versus intervention in international relations
Let me conclude this chapter by with reference to a very different way of putting 
together autonomy and intervention. In his essay, ‘A Few Words on Non- 
Intervention’, John Stuart Mill makes an argument for non-intervention that is
ibid. p. 147
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sensitive to democratic concerns that are significant today/^ His essay begins with 
the poor estimation of English foreign policy in Europe. The first reason identified is 
that statesmen claimed not to interfere where no English interest is concemed, and so 
“England is thus exhibited as a country whose most distinguished men are not 
ashamed to profess, as politicians, a rule of action which no one, not utterly base, 
could endure to be accused of as the maxim by which he guides his private life; not to 
move a finger for others unless he sees his private advantage in it.”^^  But Mill also 
notes that what is meant is not interest, but security.
Mill does not accept that intervention to do promote ideas, however laudable, is 
acceptable: “To go to war for an idea, if the war is aggressive, not defensive, is as 
criminal as to go to war for territory or revenue; for it is as little justifiable to force 
our ideas on other people, as to compel them to submit to our will in any other 
respect.”^^
He sees non-inteiwention as a foundation stone of intemational relations: “The 
doctrine of non-inteiwention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be 
accepted by all govemments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as 
the free states. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this 
miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help 
the right. Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if 
not always pmdent.”’’^  The only reason for not extending it to less developed peoples 
is that, “barbarians will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for observing 
any mles.” ”^ But for nations that have achieved statehood, non-intervention is held 
up by Mill as the best way to regulate intemational relations.
^  John Stuart Mill, ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’ in Collected Works VolXXI: Essays on 
Equality, Law and Education ed. John M. Robson (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press 1984) 
ibid. p. 114 
ibid. p. 118 
® ibid. p. 123 
™ ibid. p. 118
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We are very far in this discussion from the ideas discussed in this chapter. 
Humanitarian intervention is not being promoted as an altemative to defending the 
national interest, but as an extension, or re-defmition of it. Through a moral 
condemnation of the practices of poor states, ‘humanitarians’ bolster their own 
civilized credentials, without solving the problems of the very ‘strangers’ their 
inteiwentions purport to help.^’ Advocates of humanitarian intervention increasingly 
treat sovereignty as an entirely contingent matter. There is no belief that citizens of 
other states either could or should be able to organise themselves, as John Stuart Mill 
envisaged. Instead, their govemments, at least, are expected to submit to open-ended 
intemational monitoring and mentoring.
A criticism that is often conceded by those who favour intervention is that 
intervention is arbitrary. NATO will intervene against Serbia in Kosovo, but not 
against Russia in Chechnya. America will intervene in South and Central America, 
but not against China over Tibet. The most common response to this reality is to 
assert that it is better to do something than to do nothing, and that norms of 
humanitarian intervention are, in any case only just evolving. But given the scale of 
human rights abuses across the world, perpetrated by respectable members of the 
intemational community as well as so called rogue states, the few haphazard 
interventions there have been seem unlikely to make the sort of difference hoped for 
by their advocates, and instead threaten the one thing that might provide citizens in 
the countries involved with some real sense of empowerment, to wit the ability to mle 
themselves. Whereas realist explanations (as discussed in chapter 2) can easily 
explain both the failure to intervene, as well as cases of actual intervention -  
accounting for both in terms of the vagaries of the pursuit of interest - theories of 
humanitarian intervention are forced to pursue a logic that would dictate ever more 
intmsive monitoring, ever more global regulation and increasing numbers of actual
For an argument that interventions actually never succeed in helping their targets, and which shares a 
good deal else with the argument presented here see Caroline Thomas’ excellent chapter in Ian Forbes 
and Mark Hoffman (ed) Political Theory, International Relations and the ethics o f  intervention 
(London: Macmaillan, 1993).
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interventions world wide/^ Interventions, however, that will neither produce the 
positive results claimed for it, nor sustain a properly democratic intemational 
relations, but will, instead, remove the real possibility of increasing democracy in 
intemational relations in the only form that it has ever really been known, a 
democratically organised sovereign political community.
However, for this still to be a real possibility one final possible obstacle remains to be 
considered. The argument that in a globalising and in certain key sectors, at least a 
globalised world, such political autonomy is impossible. It is to this argument, then, 
that I now turn.
And these proposals have been around for a long time; see David Davies The Problem o f  the 
Twentieth Century: A Study o f  International Relationships (London; Ernest Benn 1930)
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7 Globalisation: A New World Order?
Everything we have discussed up to this point has been framed by the assumption 
that, at least in theory, it is open to us to assert sovereignty as a right should have 
priority over other rights, that sovereignty is the best and most effective way of 
enabling developing societies to empower themselves. Discourses of imperialism, the 
cultural tum, the new interventionism all seek to put limits on that assertion, or claim 
it is inappropriate, foolish or immoral in certain circumstances. However, none of 
these claims amount to an assertion that it is, in principle, impossible.
Increasingly, however, we find exactly this claim being made in perhaps the most 
protean of contemporary discourses in intemational relations, that of ‘globalisation’. 
This term has become a central site of debate in the social sciences today,’ as well as 
in the policy communities of states, intemational institutions and the wider public 
intellectual world.^ It is not only relevant to intemational relations; across the social 
sciences, and even the humanities, the term globalisation attaches to processes and 
theories in every area. The problem is that there is no general agreement about what 
it means, or what it implies. However, one central idea widely shared -  to be sure in 
various ways and to varying degrees -  in most of the leading accounts of 
globalisation is the claim that globalisation is profoundly affecting the independence 
and autonomy of the state as traditionally conceived and that, in order to cope with.
 ^Particularly influential treatments o f  the phenomenon in the wider literature o f  the social sciences, 
which often relate it to equally problematic notions such as postmodernism, would include Manuel 
Castells The Information Age 3 vols (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996-7) see esp. V o /1 The Rise o f  the 
Network Society. Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social theory and global culture (London Sage, 
1992); Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic o f  Late Capitalism  (London Verso, 
1991); Anthony Giddens PMnaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping Our Lives (London: 
Profile 1999); Martin Albrow, The Global Age: State and society beyond modernity (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996); Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Zygmunt 
Bauman, Globalizaiton: The human consequences (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); David Harvey, 
The Condition o f  Postmodernity: An inquiry into the conditions o f  cultural change (Oxford Blackwell, 
1989). Works by Giddens, Held and others also relevant here will be discussed in detail later in the 
chapter.
 ^Particularly good examples o f the public intellectual/policy debate on globalisation would include 
Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Haiper Collins, 1999); I Kaul et al (eds) 
G lobal Public Goods: International Co-operation in the twenty first cen tw y  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Wolfgang Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing without government 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1998)
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relate to or manage globalisation traditional ideas of sovereignty, such as those 
defended in this thesis, will have to be at the very least severely reconceptualised and 
quite possibly abandoned altogether.
If the claims of globalisation are correct, the project this thesis has embarked upon is 
doomed to failure. Thus in this final chapter before we move to a concluding survey 
of the claims this thesis has sought to develop, I will address a number of the 
discourses of globalisation and see if, in fact, there claims are warranted. It will come 
as no suiprise to find that the answer that will be offered here is that they are not.
The strategy will be as follows. I shall first offer a brief general account of the general 
literature of globalisation that will emphasise its generality and high level of 
abstraction and contend that as a result, globalisation claims are often so general as to 
be effectively meaningless. Following this, I will tum to the more important question 
of why it has become so prevalent and what the implications of this question are for 
contemporary discussions of sovereignty. Initially here, I shall retum to the 
arguments of Ulrich Beck’s and Anthony Giddens’ discussion of risk society. Here I 
argue that they use the concept of globalisation to develop a social theory with an 
extremely attenuated notion of human subjectivity, where global forces are 
effectively beyond our control -  a ‘mnaway world’ to use the title of Giddens’ much 
discussed Reith Lectures,^ and offer some criticism’s of this idea. However, it is 
important to see that many of the supposed ‘opponents’ of globalisation share many 
of the assumptions of its advocates and this makes a serious critique more difficult 
still, I thus tum my attention to the other ‘side’ of the globalisation debate, the anti- 
coiporate ‘anti-globalisation’ movement, which claims to represent a popular 
backlash against globalisation and is sometimes associated with a demand for greater 
sovereignty."’ I criticise aspects of these arguments and distance my own arguments 
from them by showing that their agenda shares, with many of the advocates of 
globalisation, a hostility to the forms of collective agency that this thesis espouses.
 ^ See Giddens, Runaway World, passim  
In North America these groups are called anti-corporate, but in Europe they are termed anti-capitalist.
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The next part of the chapter tries to make good on my earlier promise to provide an 
explanation of how in intemational relations theory at least, we have reached this 
stage and what the implications of this are. I develop two claims that I have made 
tliroughout this thesis, that liberation movements in the developing world have 
atrophied and that popular nationalism has evaporated in the West. I want to make 
clear that I am not suggesting a simple one to one correlation between these 
developments and the emergence of globalisation theory. Rather I am trying to 
establish the circumstances in which such ideas were able to take hold. By suggesting 
that such circumstances were in fact offshoots of a particular constellation of 
historical and ideational forces I hope to suggest why it is the case the ‘globalisation 
debate’ poses no real threat to the idea of sovereignty contained in this thesis at all.
Globalisation? Antinomies of a debate^
There is no clear agreement on the meaning of globalisation. On that much at least, 
there does seem to be some agreement. The amorphous nature of the concept 
paradoxically bolsters its legitimacy by allowing it to evade almost any specific 
criticism. Because globalisation is ubiquitous, it is effectively beyond challenge. For 
some this represents a theoretical advance. Anthony Giddens, for example, notes that, 
“Discussion of globalization is no longer concentrated on whether or not it exists, but 
on what its consequences are.”  ^ A similar claim is manifest in perhaps the best 
known general introduction to the whole gamut of globalisation debates, the 
collectively authored Global Transformation^. In that book, the authors suggest that 
there are tliree general positions on globalisation the first two of whom -  named 
hyper-globalisers and transformationalists -  accept the fact of globalisation, though 
they differ on the extent, character and implications -  and the final one is simply 
termed ‘sceptics’, a rather large group, one assumes.
 ^A useful overview o f  these debates is found in Malcolm Waters Globalization  2" edition (London: 
Routledge 2000)
 ^Anthony Giddens ‘Introduction’ in Anthony Giddens (ed) The Global Third Way Debate 
(Cambridge: Polity 2001)
 ^David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathon Perraton Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity 1999)
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As far as actual definition is concemed, there are many. Giddens, for example, 
defines globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
many miles away and vice versa”.^  David Held and his colleagues, in contrast, see it 
as “the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all 
aspects of contemporary life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the 
spritual”.^  Meanwhile, in perhaps the most sophisticated but also accessible, account 
of globalisation in the intemational relations literature, Jan Art Scholte suggests a 
succinct ‘core thesis’ about globalisation, to wit that it is the “transformation of social 
geography marked by the growth of supraterritorial spaces”,’” while also suggesting 
that this core thesis needs to be amended and qualified by a total of no less than 
thirteen sub theses! This surely suggests, to say the least, a problematic degree of 
imprecision in the original formulation.
Some have sought to see in globalisation as a relational notion. In Intemational 
Relations theory perhaps the most interesting author to focus on globalisation in this 
way is Ian Clark. His description of the relationship between sovereignty and 
globalisation seems on the surface more sophisticated, “sovereignty both traces, but 
also in tum shapes, the contours of globalization because both are rooted in changing 
state practice.”” However, if we pause to consider the content of this claim, it is 
again unhelpfully vague. He claims that changing state practice is at the root of 
changes in the nature of sovereignty that could be understood as almost definitionally 
true -  but then says the same about ‘globalisation’. But surely one cannot offer as an 
understanding of something an account that says ‘it’ is dependent upon state practice, 
since it is precisely what is to count as ‘it’ that is at issue. It would, of course, be 
foolish to claim that these are necessarily discrete processes. The problem is that 
Clark’s theoretical claims are simply too abstract without elaboration in specific 
contexts. To carry conviction, and in order to have a discussion of specific contexts
Anthony Giddens The Consequences o f  M odernity (Cambridge: Polity 1990) p. 64 
 ^Held et al. Global Transformations, P.2 
Jan Art Sholte Globalization: A critical introduction (London: Macmillan, 2000) P.8
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we need an understanding of what globalisation is (at least as a hypothesis) which 
would allow us to properly ask the question.
Most analysts accept that, thus understood, globalisation is necessarily a very broad 
phenomenon indeed and that in many respects it has been happening for centuries, 
possibly even millennia. The question that follows from this, of course, is whether 
contemporary globalisation is especially significant, and if so, in what way.
Of course, it would be foolish to deny that the world is more closely connected today 
that at any time in the past, and that the pace of change is accelerating. International 
travel is now commonplace, the Internet makes everyday contact between people on 
different continents possible, and huge volumes of foreign cunency are traded daily 
across technologically sophisticated international currency markets. But the novelty 
and implications of these changes can themselves be contested. Levels of foreign 
direct investment, for example, have only recently risen to the level that they were at 
before World War I,^  ^and although the internet has had an immense impact upon our 
lives, it is scarcely greater than that of the telegraph and telephone, at a time when 
instantaneous communication over great distances was unknown. Stephen Kem has 
gone so far as to suggest that, largely for these reasons, the period 1880 -  1914 as 
being the real era of ‘globalisation’.^ "^  The levels of cunency trading are cited with 
wearying regularity to prove that something new is happening, but the actual levels 
are almost impossible to measure, and their implications are in any case disputed. 
And on top of all of this, it is very far from clear that any of these features are 
irreversible. The scare over deep vein thrombosis (DVT) may yet be allowed to 
restrict air travel, demanding larger and thus less affordable seats, which, if you add
Ian Clark Globalization and International Relations Theory (Oxford; Oxford University Press 1999) 
p. 71
A point made much o f  by Held et al in Global Transfromations and, indeed, quite central to the 
specific sense they want to give to contemporary globalisation, but more so that later.
Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities o f  Governance (Cambridge: Polity 1996)
Stephen Kern Culture o f  Time and Space 1880 -  1914 (Harvard Mass.: Harvard University Press 
1986)
See Daniel Nassim Cowardly Capitalism  (London: W iley 2001) and Diane Coyle Governing the 
World Economy (Cambridge: Polity 2000) for analyses o f  this.
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this to the general crisis of aviation post 9/11 could easily lead to a reduction of this 
aspect of ‘globalisation’ rather than increasing volume. And from being a more or 
less unregulated sphere of freedom, the Internet has become the target of many 
governments’ efforts at control and content restriction.^^
All of this is to say, that the attempts so far made to define globalisation do not seem 
to have generated any particular consensus on what, actually, is going on and what it 
might mean. However, while the claim that globalisation is too general to be helpful 
has much to commend it, it does not by itself get to grips with what is behind the 
popularity of such theories. Justin Rosenberg’s recent critique of what he terms the 
‘follies’ of globalisation theory takes us rather further in this regard. He claims that, 
“In the logical structure of their argumentation, what presents itself initially as the 
explanandum -  globalisation as the developing outcome of some historical process -  
is progressively transformed into the explanans; it is the globalisation which now 
explains the changing character of the modem world -  and even generates 
“retrospective discoveries” about past epochs in which it must be presumed not to 
have existed.”'  ^ The advantage of Rosenberg’s approach for this thesis is that is puts 
agency at the heart of its critique, by showing that some of the key writers in the 
globalisation canon ultimately present globalisation as causing globalisation, a 
process without an agent. However, for my purposes I want to develop further the 
idea of globalisation as social process without agency. I do this by looking at the 
discussion of risk, which is an important subset of globalisation theory that 
Rosenberg covers in his chapter on Anthony Giddens. Rosenberg describes Giddens’ 
account as drawing a picture of “people on the one side and disembodied systems on 
the other, in which power itself ceases to be an organic category but is replaced by the 
purely technical variable of ‘risk’.”^^  Whilst I do try to show that Giddens’ idea of 
risk is indeed alien to the sense of human agency that I would encourage, I show 
below that there is more to the ‘risk society’ than the purely technical.
See The Economist ‘The Internet’s new borders’ V ol 360 N o 8234 August 1 2001
Justin Rosenberg The Follies o f  Globalisation Theory: Polemical Essays (London; Verso 2000) p. 3
ibid. p. 108
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Globalisation and Risk
The account of reflexive modernity that Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens provide is 
the most substantial and sophisticated theory of risk. Beck coined the term ‘risk 
society’ as the title of an influential book first published in Germany in 1986/^ but 
Giddens had already been working similar themes, and they have since collaborated 
in theorising the political and social implications of the risk society/^
Contrary to many of their followers in politics and the m e d i a , B ec k  and Giddens 
recognise that we are not in greater danger than we were in the past. Indeed, Giddens 
writes that, “Preoccupation with risk in modem social life has nothing directly to do 
with the actual prevalence of life-threatening dangers.”^^  The important change that 
has taken place in late modemity is that the nature of risk has fundamentally changed, 
and this has brought the tensions of industrial society into focus. In the past, the 
hazards that we faced were mainly natural, like floods, famines and diseases. These 
risks could be calculated and dealt with by individuals in their communities. 
Pollution, for example, tended to be a localised phenomenon that could be sensed and 
avoided by individuals. Industrialisation has changed this. On the one hand, it has 
achieved a greater control over natural hazards than was possible in past, and even 
come to terms with some of its own side effects, like the control of London smog 
with the Clean Air Acts in the 1950s. On the other hand, however, it has 
manufactured new and invisible risks. These risks are incalculable, uncontrollable 
and the responsibility of nobody. The political process in westem societies is still 
linked to the contests over the production and distribution of the goods that are 
created by industrial society. Industrial society, however, has moved beyond the
Ulrich Beck Risk Society (London: Sage 1992)
In Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash Reflexive Modernization (Cambridge: Polity 1994) 
they debate the finer points o f  thesis, and Beck has written the introduction to the German translation 
o f Giddens’ Beyond Left and Right.
Part o f  their significance, o f  course, lies in the fact that they are obviously and explicitly public 
intellectuals. Giddens is not only one o f  the most influential general social theorists o f  his generation 
he has recently held an influential position in UK society as dn ector o f  the LSE, and he also -  with 
David Held and Jolin Thompson, set up Polity Press in the mid 1980’s which has grown into one o f the 
major publisliing houses for the ‘globalisation industry’. Beck, through his newspaper columns in 
Germany and his environmental activism has also developed an influential ‘public voice’.
Anthony Giddens Modernity and Self-Identity: S e lf and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: 
Polity 1996) p. 115
221
level that these institutions were created to manage. Society today, Beck argues, is 
characterised by the production and distribution of ‘bads’, the side effects of 
industrialisation that nobody is held accountable for. At the moment, risk 
management is left in the hands of scientists and technocrats who continue to work 
with a model of instrumental rationality that is unable to reflect upon the ends that it 
is pursuing and cannot accommodate public concerns. The problem today is that, 
“No matter how small an accident probability is held, it is too large when one 
accident means annihilation.”^^  A nuclear power station, for example, could kill 
millions of people across the world in the event of an accident, but it is controlled by 
a small group of appointed managers according to standards and regulations set down 
by unaccountable experts. The new risks that we face are extremely unlikely, but 
their consequences are catastrophic and they cannot be comprehended or dealt with 
by individuals in traditional ways. Global danger has replaced personal risk. This 
change has important social consequences, which Beck and Giddens have examined 
from slightly different directions.
The most obvious consequence of the risk society for international relations -  and the 
centrality for both Giddens and Beck of globalisation - is that risk does not respect 
state boundaries, and people are conscious that this is the case increasingly so today. 
The implication of this version of globalisation is that we need to re-think politics at 
every level of society in the context o f global risks. Beck argues that there is a 
boomerang effect in the risk society that means that risks created by the activities of 
westem companies operating in the third world will come back to them in the form 
of, for example, patterns of migration and pollution. This idea has been expressed by 
the Real World Coalition, an umbrella group of voluntary and campaigning 
organisations in Britain, which argues that: “it is evident that what happens in the 
South can no longer be roped off from the experience of Northern societies. 
Increasing poverty, allied to increasing environmental degradation, is generating new 
fields of conflict and tension, and creating ever larger numbers of refugees and
^ Beck Risk Society p 29-30, emphasis in original
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m i g r a n t s . It is significant that broadly based campaigning organisations like 
Greenpeace have already adopted the language of reflexive modernity. Beck 
recognises this convergence of interest, and claims that the emergence of these groups 
is a result of the process of reflexive modernisation, and the potential solution to its 
problems.
Beck argues that the central political problem confronting the risk society is that 
nobody is accountable for the production of risks. The problem is not simply one of 
intransigence on the part of scientists and managers, however. The more fundamental 
problem of the risk society is how to reinvent politics in a way that can manage these 
problems. Beck is contemptuous of the political institutions and contests that 
continue to characterise westem parliamentary democracy, which he describes as “a 
rule-directed wrestling match o f parties over the feed troughs and levers o f power 
The really important political issues are decided at this sub-political level, where at 
present, “imiovation institutionalized as ‘progress’ remains under the jurisdiction of 
business, science and technology, for whom democratic procedures are invalid.”^^  
Alongside this, however, a more positive development is taking place as sub-political 
protest groups are politicising this arena and bypassing the moribund institutions of 
traditional democracy.
Indeed, while tradition politics is atrophying, new forms of politics and protest that 
engage with popular fears are burgeoning. Informal groups and networks like road 
protesters, environmentalists and self-help groups can be seen as the vanguard of the 
risk society. Whereas politics has traditionally been conducted by mass political 
parties with programmes which encompass the whole gamut of public policy, the new 
social movements identify a single issue, or group of issues, and publicise it with a 
relatively small group of people. Their aim is often to raise awareness and promote
The Real World Coalition The Politics o f  the Real World (London: Earthscan 1996) p. 43. Similar 
ideas are expressed by the equivalent global institution, the Commission on Global Governance in Our 
Global Neighbourhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995)
Ulrich Beck The Reinvention o f  Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order 
(Cambridge: Polity 1997)p. 135, emphasis in original 
Beck, Risk Society p. 14
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caution rather than to implement a manifesto in the way that political parties did. 
They are redefining the terrain of politics and influencing individual behaviour 
without necessarily forcing their will on the state. On the other hand, although its 
influence is exaggerated, there is a resonance for the old certainties which expresses 
itself in ‘fundamentalist’ movements, defined by Giddens as “tradition defended in 
the traditional way.”^^
Anthony Giddens has written extensively on the end of left versus right, the rise of 
the risk society and the sub-politics that it engenders.^^ The emphasis of his 
argument, however, subtly differs from Beck in that he believes that individuals have 
a greater grasp of their circumstances than Beck allows for, and are able to re­
construct their own identities in our de-traditionalised society. This does not mean 
that Giddens believes in a more ambitious political project than Beck. He believes 
that, “The Promethean outlook which so influenced Marx should be more or less 
abandoned in the face of the insuperable complexity of society and nature. A 
drawing back from the ambitions of the Enlightenment is surely necessary”.^  ^
Giddens sees his own analysis of the risk society as a positive reformulation of the 
emancipatory politics that he spent the early part of his career destroying in his 
Contemporaty Critique o f Historical Materialism.^^ This critique led him in a similar 
direction to Beck, and he also starts with the claim that, “the wholesale penetration of 
abstract systems into daily life creates risks which the individual is not well placed to 
conf ron t .Whereas  in the past people accepted the authority of impersonal systems 
without question, and through these systems they were able to deal with the 
uncertainty that they faced, the risk society undermines these traditions and breaks 
these bonds of loyalty. The positive side of this, for Giddens, is that individuals have
Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right (Cambridge: Polity 1994) p. 6
Anthony Giddens Beyond Left and Right: The Future o f  Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity 1994) 
is the most systematic statement, but the issues are also covered in Anthony Giddens Runaway World: 
How globalisation is reshaping our lives (London: Profile 1999) and Anthony Giddens (ed) The Global 
Third Way Debate (Cambridge: Polity 2001) 
ibid. p. 79
London: Macmillan 1981. This was the first volume in an eponymous trilogy, followed by The 
Nation State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity 1992) and Beyond Left and Right.
Giddens Beyond Left and Right p. 136
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a new freedom to construct their own biographies free from the parochial ties of 
kinship networks and traditional loyalties. He explains that,
The self becomes a reflexive project and, increasingly, the body also. 
Individuals cannot rest content with an identity that is simply handed down, 
inherited, or built on a traditional status. A person’s identity has in large part 
to be discovered, constructed, actively sustained. Like the self, the body is no 
longer accepted as ‘fate’, as the physical baggage that comes along with the 
self. We have more and more to decide not just who to be, and how to act, but 
how to look to the outside world.^^
The politics that this implies is welcomed by Giddens as more than a survival 
strategy. As a consequence of reflexive modernisation we are forced to engage with 
the world, endowing us all with greater scope for reflective action and self-creation. 
He sees this as the basis for a new sociality rather than of introspection. The limits of 
this model will be considered later, when we discuss the idea of agency in the risk 
society.
The notion of reflexive modernisation represents the most sustained and 
comprehensive attempt to understand and mould the level of consciousness that exists 
in contemporary society. But there is, of course, one central problem, one which is 
central, in fact, to the debate about globalisation in general. Essentially it is the 
problem of agency. Is globalisation and the risks that we must now face, such that we 
are, effectively powerless to change this situation?^^
Agency is one of the most contested issues in the sociology of risk. In answering the 
question of who the political subject of the risk society is. Beck writes that, “nobody
ibid. p. 82
O f course this does not necessarily mean we are completely powerless. We can still do things and, 
perhaps, change certain things. What we cannot change, on some readings at least, is the fact that all 
this is happening and what comes with this view.
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is the subject, and everybody is the subject at the same time.” "^^ He explains this 
cryptic statement by claiming that, “hazards, understood as socially constructed and 
produced ‘quasi-subjects’, are a powerful uncontrollable ‘actor’ to delegitimize and 
destabilize state institutions.”^^  This is an interesting context to his positive remarks 
on sub-political actors, reinforcing Giddens’ rejection of Promethianism. Beck 
implies that risks are endowed with a mystical ability to delegitimate human 
institutions. Like Frankenstein’s monster, the only solution is to reign in human 
hubris by supporting groups in civil society that organise politically around their 
fears. The policy prescription that flows from this is the ‘precautionary principle’, 
which holds that we should not engage in activities unless we already know what 
their side effects will be. This suggests a fear of managing risk as well as a fear of 
risk itself.
Whereas in the past agency was bound up with the idea of transformation, today it is 
linked to caution and conservatism. Beck, for example, argues for self-limitation as a 
liberating principle, claiming that “cheaper is more beautiful (more beautiful is 
cheaper), slower is more democratic, being more self-responsible is more fun.”^^  Far 
from a liberating notion of agency, the message of the risk theorists is that less is 
more, and we should organise politically to restrain ourselves. However, this is not 
conservative in the traditional sense, as Beck does see considerable scope for human 
agency to be exercised in new areas: “the more societies are modernized, the more 
agents (subjects) acquire the ability to reflect on the social conditions of their 
existence and to change them in that way”^^ . The idea of restraint and agency can co­
exist once the terrain of politics shifts to the control of risk rather than the control of 
society and production. Beck thinks that this is a positive development, but just as 
risks are beyond democratic control in society today, the issues that were contested 
most passionately in the past are excluded from the risk society in favour of self-
^  Ulrich Beck, ‘The Politics o f  Risk Society’ in Jane Franklin (ed) The Politics o f  Risk Society 
(Cambridge; Polity 1998) p. 19 
ibid. p. 19. Uhich Beck clearly thinks that this is an important point as it is repeated verbatim (but 
without acknowledgement) in ‘Organised Irresponsibility’ Prometheus (Vol 1 No 1 1998 pp 82-83) 
Ulrich Beck Democracy Without Enemies (Cambridge: Polity 1998) p. 166
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restraint. Similarly, when Giddens claims that, “the day to day actions of an 
individual today are globally consequential”, he does not assume that we can 
consciously control global society. His more modest project for human agents 
involves their participation in self-help groups and engaging in ethical practices when 
they go shopping. Giddens seriously regards this as a positive step towards the 
recreation of the self, which, although based on ostensibly introspective motives, is 
the basis for a new sociality. Indeed, the politics that he proposes seems to be a form 
of individual therapy rather than globally significant political action. Following on 
from our discussion of démocratisation, agency in the risk society is closely bound up 
with the movements that Beck and Giddens support. There is a self-serving political 
basis for their identification of agency with narrowly defined sub-political movements 
that in fact bypasses democratic decision-making.
Beck’s positive vision of a politicised risk society is closely bound up with a 
reconceptualisation of democracy, which was the subject of his latest book, 
significantly entitled Democracy Without Enemies?^ Beck argues that democracy has 
been institutionalised as a process of competition between interests, largely over 
economic issues and between classes. This is now dying through disengagement, as 
other issues, bound up with the risk society, are not dealt with under the nanow remit 
of traditional democracy. This is a popular theme in the literature on democracy, 
which has expanded in inverse proportion to participation in the political processes of 
westem democracies. The central problem that they are concerned with is that 
democracy is a form of government that relies upon the demos, the subjects who 
collectively compete over their political interests. Today, the competition no longer 
takes place in any real sense, leaving democratic institutions as an empty shell, which 
Beck describes as consisting of "''zombie-institutions which have been dead for a long 
time but refuse to die.”^^  This reinforces the disengagement of the demos and leaves 
governments and political parties without any clearly defined roles. The aim of much
Ulrich Beck ‘Self-Dissolution and Self-Endangerment o f  Industrial Society: What Does This Mean?’ 
In Beck, Giddens and Lash, Reflexive Modernization 
Democracy Without Enemies (Cambridge: Polity 1998)
Beck Reinvention o f  Politics p. 140, emphasis in original
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of the literature on démocratisation is therefore to re-engage the demos, which Beck 
wants to do through new social movements as we have discussed above.
Giddens argues that this can be achieved through ‘dialogic democracy’. He 
characterises democracy as having two functions: “On the one hand, democracy is a 
vehicle for the representation of interests. On the other, it is a way of creating a 
public arena in which controversial issues -  in principle -  can be resolved, or at least 
handled, through dialogue rather than through pre-established forms of power.”"*® He 
describes this process as the ''democratizing o f democracy through the activities of
self-help groups and social movements which can, “force into the discursive domain 
aspects of social conduct that previously went undiscussed, or were ‘settled’ by 
traditional practices. They may help contest ‘official’ definitions of things; feminist, 
ecological and peace movements have all achieved this outcome, as have a 
multiplicity of self-help groups.”"*^ Giddens makes it clear that his interest in 
democracy is not the representation of interests but the resolution of issues with the 
minimum of conflict (‘dialogically’). The self-help groups that he identifies as the 
vanguard of the new democracy are given a role well beyond that that a ‘self-help’ 
group would ever want. Giddens aims to transform them into something quite 
different in the interest of a particular political project. This is perhaps unwittingly 
revealed in his qualification of the claim that they can contest official definitions of 
things with the word ‘help’. Rather than participating in a process of forming and 
imposing a general will by engaging in debate that aims to change the views of the 
electorate and their representative, Giddens sees the role of social movements as 
assisting in a larger project. This project is the child of a small élite of people like 
Giddens and, no doubt, the higher echelons of the new social movements, but it is not 
a reformulated idea of democracy. It appeals to what is morally right, rather than 
what is the popular will. And it rigorously excludes those who fall outside their sense 
of what is proper for the public sphere.
Anthony Giddens Beyond Left and Right p. 16 
ibid. p. 17, emphasis in original42 ibid. p. 17
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The significance of these ideas, and the approach to globalisation they contain, for 
international relations is simply put in that; the risk society as they understand it 
demands global solutions. And thus sovereignty as it is generally understood -  and 
certainly as how I have understood it here -  stands in the way of this; it is part of the 
problem, not part of the solution. Specifically, the idea of risks that camiot be 
controlled by normal processes of human agency is contrary to the idea of 
subjectivity that is crucial for this thesis, as discussed in chapter 3, The social 
movements that Beck and Giddens celebrate are put forward at the expense of forging 
a common will based on the interests of independent subjects; it is this common will 
that is essential for a critical account of sovereignty in international relations, for 
without it there will be either formless anarchy or a civil society presided over by 
external arbiter -  or imperialism, as it was described in chapter 6.
Attacking globalisation from below
However problematic the ideas associated with globalisation are, some might say, 
they have had, from my perspective at least, one unexpected side benefit. They have 
helped to create a movement that is explicitly hostile to the claims of globalisation 
advocates and which is beginning to have real political clout. This movement sees 
itself as representing those who globalisation has ‘left out’ and it emphasises the 
empowerment and enabling of developing societies, as the argument of this thesis 
also does. Protests at the World Trade Organisation meeting in Seattle in November 
2000 and the World Bank meeting in Prague the next year have brought this 
movement to the attention of the media, and writers like George Monbiot, Noreena 
Herz and Naomi Klein have established themselves as theorists of the movement. In 
Britain they have been termed anti-capitalist, while in North America they are 
perhaps more accurately described as anti-corporate."*^
At times, groups associated with this movement come close to endorsing ideas of 
sovereignty and self-determination, The ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Seattle Declaration’,
George Monbiot Captive State: The corporate takeover o f  Britain (London: Macmillan 2000), 
Naomi Klein No Logo (London: Harper Collins 2000), Noreena Herz The Silent Takeover: Global 
Capitalism and the Death o f  Democracy (London: Arrow 2002)
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for example, calls for the recognition of, “Our inherent right to self-determination, 
our sovereignty as nations”."*"* It further argues that the appropriation of land and 
promotion of consumerism has caused, “not only environmental degradation but also 
ill health, alienation, and high levels of stress manifested in high rates of alcoholism 
and suicide.”"*^ Culture Jammer Kalle Lasn argues that you should, “Maintain your 
sovereignty”, but he means communities and individuals against corporations."*  ^
George Monbiot argues for the state to have more power to regulate, to circumscribe 
the power of corporations."*^
Part of the problem in such avowals, however, is the extent to which they do not fit 
well with the strong elements of irrationalism that the movement also displays. Lasn, 
for example, elevates the emotive over the thoughtful, celebrating immediate 
responses over considered reactions, arguing that, “Rage is a signal like pain or lust. 
If you learn to trust it and ride shotgun on it, watching it without suppressing it, you 
gain power and lose cynicism.”"*^ And he downplays the political and social elements 
of protest, representing protest as a strategy of self-realisation, “Direct action is a 
proclamation of personal independence.”"*® His motto seems to be, “Honor your 
instincts” ®^
Similar tendencies are visible in what has become established as a canonical text for 
the anti-globalisation movement, Naomi Klein’s No Logo. She moves from a 
relatively conventional critique of advertising and corporate power to a much more 
novel analysis of how to oppose the corporate take-over. Rather than rejecting the 
limitations that corporate power places on choice, she seeks to limit choice further, 
arguing for a particularly narrow localism. She writes that, “For a growing number of 
young activists, adbusting has presented itself as the perfect tool with which to
‘‘‘* In Kevin Danaher and Roger Burbach (eds) Globalize This!: The Battle Against the World Trade 
Organization and Corporate Rule (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press 2000) p. 84 
ibid p. 86
Kalle Lasn Culture Jam: How to reverse A m erica’s suicidal consumer binge — and why we must 
(New York: Quill 2000) passim, esp pp 1 5 3 - 1 5 5  
George Monbiot Captive State: The corporate takeover o f  Britain (London: Macmillan 2000) 
Kalle Lasn Culture Jam  p. 143 
ibid. p. 129
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register disapproval of the multinational corporations which have so aggressively 
stalked them as shoppers, and so unceremoniously dumped them as workers.” *^ Two 
striking aspects of this statement are worthy of note. First, the term ‘disapproval’. 
Not righteous hatred, not a considered analytic critique, but ‘disapproval’ is the word 
that she uses to describe the adbusters’ attitude towards corporations. It suggests a 
moralism derived from inner feeling, rather than one derived from a considered 
analysis. The second feature is that Klein seems to imagine that this disapproval 
springs from the way that corporations have ‘aggressively stalked’ people.
This curious modesty of aspiration is echoed by George McKay, whose discussion of 
‘DiY Culture’ celebrates, “practical collective experience around pleasure”, and 
quotes an ‘activist’ who claims that, “‘for me, these gatherings of people are 
something really important, that I need. An essential part o f resistance is the coming 
together o f p e o p l e Any actual political goals that protesters might have are 
subordinated to the goal of re-creating community in this argument, trivialising 
exactly what should be most important aspect of action, and sidestepping the need to 
analyse the issues that may underlie the protests.
The most noteworthy attempt to theorise these movements has come in the widely 
discussed work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, EmpireP  Its scope is 
ambitious, its reach wide but its arguments, I suggest, show very clearly some of the 
major weaknesses of the anti-globalisation movements approach to globalisation. To 
begin with, as many observers have noted, the book suffers from a somewhat 
overinflated style -  “Our analysis must now descend to the level of . . .  materiality and 
investigate there the material transformation of the paradigm of rule” "^*, they 
announce at one point, following this with the distinctly opaque claim that “The great 
industrial and financial powers ... produce not lonely commodities but also
ibid p. XV
Naomi Klein No Logo (London: Harper Collins 2000) p. 284
George McKay ‘DiY Culture: Notes towards an intio’ in George McKay (ed) pp 26 - 27 
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 2000  
ibid. p. 22
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subjectivities. They produce agentic subjectivities within the biopolitical context”^^ . 
These stylistic infelicities do not, of course, mean that the analysis they offer is 
necessarily incorrect; they merely make it much harder for anyone reading the book 
to grasp what that analysis actually is. Their treatment of International Relations is 
also rather sketchy, repeating the now familiar -  and indeed, in most contemporary 
International Relations theory (as chapters 1-3 showed) long superseded - 
simplifications of realism vs. idealism.
So what is it that Hardt and Negri claim? The chief claim in Empire is that 
globalisation does not undermine sovereignty, for the simple reason that it is the new 
sovereignty. And because ‘sovereignty’ is simply represented as popular power, 
although empire now might be driven by corporate and political elite’s the 
opportunity exists in principle for a reborn radicalism.
They are perceptive when discussing the positive programme of internationalism, 
which they understand as “the will of an active mass subject”, b u t  they claim that 
the world of states that it responded to has been superseded by empire, a new form of 
global rule. They therefore claim that we need to recognise,
the emergence of a new quality of social movements. We ought to be able to 
recognise, in other words, the fundamentally new characteristics these 
struggles all present, despite their radical diversity. First, each struggle, 
though firmly rooted in local conditions, leaps immediately to the global level 
and attacks the imperial constitution in its generality. Second, all the struggles 
destroy the traditional distinction between economic and political struggles. 
The struggles are at once economic, political and cultural -  and hence they are 
biopolitical struggles, struggles over the forms of life. They are constitutive 
struggles, creating new public spaces and new forms of community.
ibid. p. 32 
ibid. p. 49 
ibid. p. 56
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This collects together so many of the themes that I have been arguing against in this 
thesis that it is hard to know where to start. They are claiming that these anti­
corporate attacks are significant because they challenge the logic of neo-liberalism, 
but one hunts in vein anywhere in the (very long) pages of Empire to find anything 
that might resemble an actual program for action and thus we are no further foi*ward 
than with the poststructural agonism criticised in chapter 2. This brings us full circle 
-  we are back to the small competing groups in civil society that Beck and Giddens 
also celebrate.
Conclusion
If both advocates and critics of globalisation can be found wanting in the ways I have 
suggested, what accounts for the success of the ‘globalisation debates’? In this 
section, focusing once more especially on international relations, I suggest a different 
focus through which to understand the changes that are taking place. Globalisation 
fiinctions both as a description of a state of affairs, and an explanation of how they 
have come about. It obviously does touch on some extremely important changes in 
contemporary world politics, but exaggerates many and marginalised others. The 
main focus of inquiry here is why analysts have developed such an exaggerated sense 
of change, what is marginalised and why and what the implication s of this are.
Let us begin with an obvious point. Many developing country governments are 
almost as bad as liberal interventionists say they are. The great hopes of liberation 
movements have been unfulfilled, and brutal, ineffectual governments have taken 
over in many of the West’s former colonies. Furthermore, Western radicals who 
might once have supported the goal of autonomy in such places are now amongst the 
most vociferous, if sometimes regretful, advocates of intervention.^^
Charismatic leaders like Che Guevara once provided role models for earnest Westem 
radicals. Today’s leaders like Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic do their
e.g. Michael Ignatieff Vitual War: Kosovo and Beyond  (London: Chatto and Windus 2000), Mary 
Kaldor New and Old Wars: Organized violence in a g lobal era (Cambridge: Polity 1999; re-published 
with a new afterward, 2001)
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people no favours, and represent a perverse parody of third world freedom. It would 
be stupid to try to defend these leaders, but it would be even worse to endorse 
intervention as an alternative. It is not rhetorical hyperbole to see the interventions of 
Clinton and Blair as having far worse consequences for Iraqis and Serbs than their 
own leaders. As a result nothing stands between third world peoples and the 
pressures of global markets and international politics.
The economic position of the third world has become even worse since 
decolonisation. Although there have been some startling successes in East Asia, 
Africa is perhaps even more marginal to the world economy than it was in 1900. As a 
result, it has lost bargaining power against the West.
The end of the Soviet Union has become a tediously familiar explanation for 
everything in international relations today, and its significance is obviously not to be 
dismissed. However, it is inadequate to simply invoke it, as if statesmen suddenly 
felt a crisis of confidence because they had to re-orient themselves. Rather, we need 
to trace its impact in different areas of interest. The important issue for my purposes 
is not the change in the balance of power from a bi-polar to a unipolar (or multipolar) 
system, as if these ahistorical categories can be evoked to capture all of the 
complexities of post-Cold War system. What interests me is the effect that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union had on radicalism, in both domestic and international 
politics. This can be traced one step further by looking at how this conditioned the 
response of conservative forces once their enemy had been removed, and indeed to 
the effects that this had on politics once the historic dispute between right and left lost 
its f o r c e . T h e  collapse of the Soviet Union has had an immense impact on the 
ability of the third world to pursue its own agenda in international relations. It is not 
simply that they have lost the ability to play one superpower off against another. 
Rather, the Soviet Union stood as an example of the possibility of radical change, 
however degraded Soviet communism was in practice. Now, there is no credible
59 This theme has been treated by, among many others, Anthony Giddens Beyond Left and Right
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model for third world states seeking to chart a course independent of the orthodoxy of 
international institutions.
Finally, in the really extreme cases third world states have collapsed altogether, 
creating a neo-medieval anarchy of groups fighting over the scraps. This remains an 
unusual scenario, and one which International Relations scholars perhaps make too 
much of. However, the fact that this can happen at all in the modem world is an 
indictment of the present global order, and it is easy to see how some people have 
drawn the conclusion that decolonisation was a mistake.
These factors mean that there is a much greater latitude for Westem intervention. But 
more significantly they create the basis for the creation of a new élite of 
collaborationists calling for intervention from within the third world. Africans are 
already adept at presenting their demands in the language of liberal NGOs. A 
powerful coalition is thus established against traditional notions of sovereignty. This 
point can be developed in relation to the discussion of the attack on the World Trade 
Centre, which prompts speculation about where these dynamics are leading.
By declaring a war on terrorism, George Bush has set in place a process that could be 
used to manage international relations in a world where America is at once 
hegemonic and hidebound. Whilst there is more to this new cmsade than cmdely 
trying to re-create the Cold War (a task that everyone now sees as futile), it represents 
the consolidation of certain trends in intemational relations that have been developing 
for some time rather than an entirely new departuie.
The United States has proved to be an uncertain superpower. After the Cold War it 
was without a great enemy, but it soon discovered that it was without close friends as 
well. Japan and the other allies haggled over their Gulf War contributions, Somalis 
whom they had gone to help shot back at them, NGOs that had argued their case for 
intervention pointed the finger back at their sponsor, highlighting its record on racism 
and capital punishment. At home, the public has shown short-term approval for
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dramatic interventions, but this has not translated into longer-term national solidarity 
or identification with political élites. One paradigm has succeeded another -  the End 
of History, the Clash of Civilizations, the New Interventionism -  they have all come 
and gone. Now we face the question of whether the crusade against terrorism will 
have the durability that previous attempts at organising hegemony have lacked.
On the surface, it has everything in its favour. America, the arrogant imperialist, is 
now cast as the victim. States, NGOs, journalists and individuals have united in grief 
for the innocent dead. For some years now, victimhood has provided a moral 
authority that the establishment has lacked. Now this criticism could be directed in 
America’s favour. A public reluctant to support entangling alliances and lengthy 
wars now has a stake in a righteous crusade. The question of whether they back 
overwhelming force or a more subtle approach is moot at this point. States that have 
had their human rights records questioned over their draconian approach to 
subversion see a way to build bridges with America. Europe, brusquely pushed aside 
over the Kyoto Protocol, can draw America back in to the diplomatic process. 
Middle Eastern states that have been trying to make their peace with the West ever 
since the Soviet Union collapsed have quickly seized the opportunity to line up with 
America. And since the enemy is unknown and everybody has gone to great lengths 
to clarify that this is not a war on Islam, fewer groups will be immediately alienated 
than has been the case when America has pointed the finger in the past.
But this will not be an easy process to negotiate. The problems that have been widely 
highlighted are the least important. The problems of identifying the terrorists and 
intervening in difficult terrain are the most immediate, but least pertinent. For 
America to achieve anything from this apparent catastrophe, they need to manage the 
process of fighting terror, which means managing relationships that they have little 
experience of. Different actors will have different stakes in the process, and be 
looking for different outcomes. America has tended to vacillate between 
unilateralism and multilateralism. The scope for unilateralism over the past decade 
has been historically unprecedented; there is simply nobody ready to challenge
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America. However, the nervous superpower has been reluctant to go ahead without 
support, and it camiot sustain the costs of hegemony indefinitely. On the other hand, 
multilateral action, involving both states and NGOs, raises the spectre of conflict in 
cases where the NGOs have different aspirations from their governmental sponsors 
and are unwilling to toe the American line.
For this to succeed, it cannot be brought to a resolution. Even if Osama bin Laden is 
eliminated, America will need to uncover new conspiracies, and persuade its 
newfound friends that they all have an interest in targeting them as well. At this 
point, the process becomes more difficult to manage, as it acquires an independent 
dynamic and the war against terrorism tears itself away fiom the hands of those who 
instigated it. The world’s sympathy is unlikely to be sustained for that long.
Maintaining domestic interest and support could prove an even greater challenge. 
While the war party prepares for action, the popular mood is moving towards a 
therapeutic solution. For every Bruce Willis wannabe, there are many other voices 
calling for us to understand the rage of the oppressed. These responses are sometimes 
misunderstood as the return of the old anti-war movement. But where the anti­
imperialists of yore wanted the oppressed to have their freedom, the dominant 
response now is to call upon America to take up its responsibilities for administering 
the third world. The response is that we must not only feed the hungry, we must 
govern the ill governed, teach the stupid, and counsel the traumatised. No doubt there 
are many in the higher reaches of the American administration who would love to 
harness this idealism, but in the end it makes impossible demands upon them.
The tragedy is that the crisis is generated in America, not Afghanistan. The desperate 
action of the zealots who attacked the World Trade Centre is a measure of the 
weakness of anti-Americanism, not its strength. It does not speak to a popular 
movement, and it does not even hope to mobilise anti-Americanism abroad. It was a 
futile gesture by isolated individuals. Indeed, it could be said that the collapse of any 
competing global visions is at the root of America’s foreign policy dilemmas. It
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lurches from crisis point to crisis point, from one slogan to another, without any of 
the organising principles that were provided by the negative example of third world 
liberationism and global communism. Despite the attempts to talk up the global 
terror waiting to strike at the West, the demons are all at home.
In the meantime, a war on terrorism will bring barbarism to all. In the west, liberties 
will be withdrawn in the interests of a spurious sense of security that will only be 
further weakened by the imposition of official vigilance. Abroad, states that stand up 
to the anti-terrorism measures imposed will find themselves targeted by the full might 
of the westem war machine. And none of it will do anything to prevent random acts 
of terror.
This chapter has tried to avoid the temptation of simply counterposing the claims 
about globalisation to evidence of internationalisation from a longer historical period, 
as some critics have done. Instead, I have tried to explain the appeal of globalisation 
theory. In doing this, I have taken the opportunity to distinguish my position from 
other arguments that superficially seem to be defending the idea of sovereignty.
These theories express a sense of insecurity and powerlessness, which is externalised 
into fears about global crime and terrorism, capital flight, brain drain and 
environmental catastrophe. The absence of competing visions of political community 
since the end of the Cold War has removed the most pressing challenge to the 
exercise of sovereignty. Other threats pale into insignificance.
Before leaving this point, it is worth re-iterating a point from the introduction. The 
perceived decline in the capabilities of particular states, and of states in general, is not 
a direct cause of the changing way in which sovereignty is understood. The 
undermining of the principle of autonomy is far more important. This is why the 
changes discussed in this chapter as so important, although they seem modest by 
comparison with the extravagant claims of certain globalisation theorists
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The globalisation debate is important for the approach to sovereignty taken in this 
thesis because it understates the role of agency in intemational relations. Both the 
power attributed to forces outside conscious control such as flows of finance capital 
and the radical espousal of local forms of resistance serve to undermine the idea that 
states and individuals can act consciously and purposively upon the world. It is that 
aspect of the globalisation debate that this thesis takes issue with.
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Conclusion
This thesis has offered a critical assessment of the treatment of sovereignty in recent 
writing on International Relations. Its claim, simply put, is that for all the problems 
associated with it, the notion of sovereignty still remains the most effective way of 
guaranteeing the rights of people who live within bounded territories, despite recent 
developments and in the teeth of much contemporary intemational theorising. It has 
thus in part been a negative critique of those aspects of the discipline of intemational 
relations over the last few decades that have suggested otherwise. By way of a 
conclusion I want to offer some general reflections on this argument and also 
articulate some possible responses to valions possible lines of criticism. Finally, I 
shall offer some thoughts as to what this argument as a whole means for thinking 
about intemational relations in the contemporary period.
Answering the Critics
The winding down of the Cold War has prompted endless speculation about the 
changing intemational system. Foreign policy makers have based their decisions on 
new assumptions, and many theorists have assumed that we are confronted with quite 
new thieats and opportunities (see chapters 2 and 3). This thesis has treated these 
claims with profound scepticism, suggesting that these theoretical and political 
changes owe more to the fears and uncertainties about the world than to real structural 
changes. Instead of following the fashion for assuming that the state is increasingly 
outmoded, I have claimed that the right of self-determination remains valid. In this 
section it remains for me to anticipate some of the more obvious lines of argument 
against this old-fashioned focus.
Given that I have presented a theory of intemational relations that holds that we must 
respect sovereignty as a privilege right, sceptical readers may reasonably ask what 
can be done when sovereign states behave abominably towards their own people.
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Even if the sceptic accepts the arguments put forward in chapter 7, for example, there 
is still the question of what could be done in a hypothetical case of, say, genocide.
One response is to deny the magnitude of the situation where intervention is 
demanded, and indeed there may be cases where the crisis is exaggerated. 
Nonetheless, the basic question still remains; after all allowances are made sometimes 
there will be genocidal governments. Under such circumstances what should we do? 
the short answer is that there are still a number of possibilities. To begin with. In the 
event of true humanitarian disasters there is a time-honoured self-help mechanism; 
flight. This is certainly not optimal, but it is surely better than any of the alternatives. 
The barrier to this today, however, is often that privileged Westem states are 
determined to deny foreigners -  and especially poor and disadvantaged foreigners -  
the right to entry. There are often quite understandable reasons for this, but even a 
fairly cmde utilitarian calculation would probably suggest that this solution is better 
than intervention, when measured against the vast cost of military operations and 
post-war reconstruction, quite apart from the humanitarian case. Given that this is a 
counterfactual, no conclusive scorecard can be produced, but the cost of the Iraq 
intervention must give pause for thought.
But, taking the counterfactual one stage further, what could be done if a sovereign 
state engaging in genocide, actively prevents its victims leaving? Under such 
extreme conditions I allow that intervention is justified but only if there is a tme 
commitment on the part of the intervening state to a real solution to the issue and only 
if it is a last resort.
Interventionism is of course presented as enlightened and humane, and the other side 
of this is that interventionists are sometimes guilty of denigrating their opponents as 
either naïve or callous. To give one very obvious example, Noam Chomsky is cited 
with almost wearying regularity as the beginning and the end of the interventionist 
case. Nicholas Wheeler argues that Chomsky’s ‘realist’ critique is invalid because he 
ignores the fact that humanitarian ideology constrains subsequent actions, and
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because humanitarianism is in large part a response to popular pressure in the west.* 
It is surprising that Wheeler fails to notice that Chomsky’s critique derives its force 
precisely from the fact that Westem leaders feel pressure to conform to their own 
rhetorical pronouncements. He is exposing their hypocrisy and arguing that their 
actions cannot possibly fulfil their stated aims. Chomsky is a powerful polemicist, 
but he does not claim to be providing a theoretical elaboration of changing norms of 
intervention. It is therefore telling that he provokes so many dismissive references, 
and that they fail to engage with his arguments.
Although interventionists often refer to the suffering of particular victims, the 
inteiwentionist case rarely delves into the specific problems or has to deal with the 
longer term implications for these people. Writers like Martin Shaw offer a rather 
naïve assurance that power has been civilised, and that the radical campaigns of the 
past are no longer relevant to a world where the greatest evils are being perpetuated in 
the third world. There is a sense in which they are unable to relate to the victims that 
they claim to be helping as real people. They are ciphers for the imiversal victim 
rather than people capable of shaping their own societies or acting on their own 
initiatives. This is reflected in the diminished sense of agency in the post-positivist 
theories discussed in chapters 2 and 3, and can be seen in the way that discussions of 
démocratisation circumscribe democracy to limit the ability of people to elect 
nationalist governments.
Sovereignty has been eroded chiefly in the sense that many in the elites of the major 
powers (corporate and intellectual as well as political) have rejected the idea of 
collective autonomy in favour of an elitist model of global management. The ideal of 
political independence has, however, not been lost, and this thesis is a contribution to 
the revival and defence of this principle. The goal of an egalitarian global society can 
only be reached by elevating the ideal of self-determining individuals, not by 
substituting an often abstract concern for individual victims.
* Nicholas J. Wheeler Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2000) p. 288
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One of the more grotesque aspects of the new interventionism is that many of the 
advocates of humanitarian intervention rarely pause to consider the balance sheet of 
interventions in the twentieth century. Sanctions in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian war, 
ongoing interventions in the Balkans have claimed many lives. But none of these 
situations has been ‘resolved’, and the number of lives saved cannot be quantified. 
Doing something certainly provides a sense of moral worth to the interventionists, 
who can identify themselves with a humanitarian project. But it is hard to prove that 
the recipients of this beneficence really benefit, and in many cases intervention is a 
prelude to even more intervention as optimistic assumptions about transition are 
frustrated. In Bosnia and now in Iraq there is no foreseeable end to Westem 
presence.
International Relations
Let me now move to the implications of these arguments for the field of Intemational 
Relations itself, hitemational Relations has been peculiarly obsessed by its status as a 
discipline. Although I believe that this introspection is unhelpful, and that we should 
be concemed with studying the world rather than studying how we can go about 
studying the world, it is necessary to say a few words about the discipline in the 
conclusion to a work such as this. I am not going to propose a new ‘research agenda’. 
Indeed, I identify the proliferation of research agendas as part of the problem. In part, 
this has been the result of the professionalisation (and ghettoisation) of the study of 
international relations, which has caused academics to develop their reputations on 
adherence to a particular research agenda. The pretensions of positivist social science 
to be able to produce definitive answers to social problems has contributed to this, but 
post-positivists have, in their own way, shown strong tribal loyalties to their own 
research agendas.
In the past there were radical thinkers who looked at intemational relations as part of 
a social whole, refusing to elevate the division of the world into sovereign states as an 
etemal human problem (see the discussion of Lenin in chapter 5). The discipline of
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International Relations, on the other hand, took just such a division for granted. As a 
result, radical thinkers tended to be on the outside, as critics of the discipline.
From 1919, when International Relations was institutionalised as an academic 
discipline, radical approaches to world politics were infoiined by a number of factors 
many of which have recently vanished, or been vanquished. First, for good or ill, the 
Soviet Union provided a solid example of an alternative to market society. Even 
those who despised Soviet Communism could draw inspiration from the fact that 
there was a concrete alternative. Second, radicals were informed by a sense of the 
clear injustice of colonialism, an institution whose nature was further clarified by 
anti-colonial movements holding imperialist states to account on their own claims to 
represent civilization, freedom and progress. Finally, although often muted and 
contradictory, there was an internationalist ethos in certain sections of the Western 
left, manifested in the International, and later in third world solidarity campaigns.
The basis of my argument has been that a progressive approach to international 
relations must be based on a predisposition to see other people as essentially Tike us% 
Superficially, this seems to he the case with the critical approaches that I have 
surveyed, but I have shown that their underlying impulse is regulatory. They are 
trying to create a world run by civilised ‘people like them’, where potential conflict is 
regulated through respecting our difference rather than affirming our commonality. 
Furthemiore, I have contrasted my approach to the multiculturalist argument, by 
claiming that in spite of an infinite variety of difference between individual humans, 
there are no essential differences between groups of humans that need to be accorded 
any special kind of recognition.
International Relations is no longer concerned with studying and understanding the 
relations between nations, still less with changing them. It has become a self- 
referential game of competing theories and research agendas with less and less 
connection to the real world of global politics. Phrases like ‘post-positivism’ and 
‘complex multipolarity’ embody a host of assumptions that are understood only by
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players in the game. Arcane language and pointless terminology create an aura of 
mystique around ideas that are very simple. Approaching real issues and using real 
language would he far more helpful.
However, despite the enthusiasm with which International Relations scholars discuss 
their own discipline, it is not the main problem. More important is the turn away 
from the idea of equality towards a more relativistic approach among radical critics. 
Part of this involves a renewed elitism which disdains the masses and despairs of the 
possibility of rational and open democratic deliberation. I have treated this theme 
extensively in this thesis, and so I now turn to the other aspect of this, which is that 
the idea of development has also been rejected in the name of environmentalism and 
cultural diversity.
Development and Freedom
The ideal of social development has been almost entirely rejected today. Ideals like 
democracy and diversity are promoted as important in their own right, but the idea 
that people in the third world should have the opportunity to share our standard of 
living is widely rejected as culturally insensitive. The focus of this thesis has been on 
the need for developing countries to be granted autonomy, but this autonomy will 
mean very little without the development of their societies. We can anticipate that 
this process of development will alleviate many of the tensions that are at the root of 
many of the problems identified by interventionists today.
In part, development has been cynically promoted in the interests of global social 
stability. Rita Abrahamsen is particularly perceptive on this point, “Development is 
always presented as a humanitarian and moral concern, an ethical obligation on 
behalf of the rich to help and care for those less fortunate. But behind this aura of 
humanitarianism lurks a certain fear of poverty and the poor. In the words of
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President Tmman, ‘Their poverty is ... a threat both to them and to more prosperous 
„2areas.
Mark Duffield characterises the process thus, “In redefining underdevelopment as 
dangerous, from its position of dominance liberal discourse has suppressed those 
aspects of Third Worldism and international socialism that argued the existence of 
inequalities within the global system and, importantly, that the way in which wealth is 
created has a direct bearing on the extent and nature of poverty. The new logic of 
exclusion is reflected in the relativisation and internationalisation of the causes of 
conflict and political instability within the South. At the same time, the main burden 
of responsibility for solving the problems has been placed on Southern actors.”^
It is interesting to note the treatment of inequality in discussions of globalisation. A 
recunent theme is that inequality transcends nation states, creating a global 
underclass and a transnational elite."^  The apologetic aspect of this scarcely needs 
spelling out: the problem that is identified is global, and so remedying economic 
inequalities between states cannot be the solution. This theme also comes through in 
the discussion of third world corruption, and fanciful stories of trillions of dollars in 
Swiss bank accounts. Here, third world elites are blamed for the underdevelopment 
of their societies. In developmental discourse the focus has fundamentally shifted 
away from developing entire economies and societies towards a charitable concern 
for the very poorest members of third world societies.^ Alongside support for 
political autonomy, a progressive approach to international relations demands that we 
return to a belief in the universal benefits of economic and social development.
 ^Rita Abrahamsen Disciplining Democracy: Developm ent Discourse and Good Governance in Africa 
(London: Zed 2000) p. 17; italics and ellipsis Abrahamsen’s
 ^Mark Duffield Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging o f  Development and Security 
(London: Zed 2001) p. 28 
Especially in Zygmunt Bauman Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cambridge: Polity 1999) 
 ^This argument is effectively developed in John Pender, ‘From “Structural Adjustment” to 
“Comprehensive Development Framework”: Conditionality Transformed?’ Third World Quarterly 
(22/3 2001 pp 397-411)
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Sovereignty is being attacked for the wrong reasons. The ideal of a global society is 
laudable, but the attack on sovereignty does not propose this. Instead, it is an attack 
on the ability of people to organise themselves collectively. My approach to 
sovereignty begins from the assumption that humans are rational, social creatures 
which want to he able to control their destinies themselves. The critical accounts 
discussed in this thesis do not share this assumption, and are therefore drawn towards 
regulationism. In their world, affairs are conducted by people just like them -  liberal, 
intelligent, enlightened -  while politics is limited to cultural expression and 
occasional expressions of support through elections. This impoverished vision is no 
basis for cosmopolitanism. Those, including myself, who aspire to a global society 
where the particularist demands of nationality are removed need to show the ambition 
and vision necessary to convince people of its possibility, rather than endorsing 
global policing arrangements convenient to the great powers. A focus on liberty and 
development provides a firmer basis for a critical approach to international relations. 
Inasmuch as it is reasonable to follow the fashionable trend of placing ‘developed’ in 
inverted commas in ‘developed’ world, it is because the process of development has 
only just begun.
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